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CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
MATTHEW LIPPMAN* 
Crimes against humanity-inhumane acts or persecutions based 
on racial, religious or political grounds-constituted a revolutionary 
step in the evolution of international jurisprudence. This principle 
established that individuals and groups possess international legal per-
sonality and protection and that those who have drastically denigrated 
human dignity will be considered criminally culpable. The rights of 
individuals were thus determined to transcend culture and country 
borders, and public officials could no longer claim immunity for the 
mistreatment of those within their own or other States. 
Crimes against humanity provides a potentially potent principle 
in combating the current escalation of national conflict and strife. 
Practice, however, often fails to match potential. The turn towards the 
next century provides an opportunity to diagram the drafting, devel-
opment, and the next required step in the evolution of crimes against 
humanity. 1 
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The first section of this article will outline the evolution of crimes 
against humanity, which is rooted in transcendant humanitarian prin-
ciples. The notion that there are transcendant humanitarian principles 
of international law was suggested in the Hague Convention and dis-
cussed in the debate over whether to punish defeated German military 
and political leaders following World War 1. This established the foun-
dation for the United States' proposal that the Nuremberg Charter 
incorporate a prohibition on crimes against humanity. 
The second section notes that a compromise resulted in the Char-
ter provision penalizing certain inhumane acts against civilians as well 
as persecutions based upon sectarian animus undertaken in connec-
tion with an aggressive war. The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, failed 
to fully differentiate crimes against humanity from war crimes. The 
Tribunal viewed crimes against humanity as an extension of the hu-
manitarian law of war rather than as an autonomous source of rights. 
Several American occupation courts departed from this precedent 
and ruled that crimes against humanity encompassed the systematic 
commmission of inhumane acts and acts of sectarian persecution, 
whether committed in periods of war or peace. 
The third section of the paper observes that the third phase in 
the development of crimes against humanity affirms that the interna-
tional interest in punishing crimes against humanity takes precedence 
over considerations of state sovereignty. The debate over the Genocide 
Convention, as well as various authoritative textual interpretations, 
support the view that genocide constitutes a crimes against humanity, 
whether committed in times of peace or war. The early versions of the 
Draft Code on The Peace and Security of Mankind affirmed that other 
crimes against humanity also were not required to be connected to 
crimes against peace. The United Nations subsequently proclaimed 
that the international interest in punishing crimes against humanity 
prohibits the application of domestic statutes of limitations. Interna-
tional documents and domestic courts also noted that the catastrophic 
character of crimes against humanity permits the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction and excludes such offenses from being considered non-ex-
traditable political offenses. 
The fourth section notes that recent domestic court decisions have 
affirmed these general principles. France, however, narrowly construed 
crimes against humanity so as to immunize World War II collaborators 
from prosecution. 
The fifth section surveys the contemporary jurisprudence of crimes 
against humanity. The development of crimes against humanity culmi-
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nated III the 1989 draft of the International Criminal Code which 
conceptualizes crimes against humanity as a mechanism for protecting 
universal human rights rather than as a part of the humanitarian law 
of war. The draft also limits crimes against humanity to large-scale, 
systematic acts. The autonomous status of crimes against humanity was 
confirmed by the fugoslavian war crimes court. 
The conclusion notes that crimes against humanity remain a cus-
tomary rather than a conventional crime. An international code on 
the prohibition of crimes against humanity (code of conflict) provides 
the best safeguard against the dilution of this delict. This would also 
contribute to the clarification of uncertainties and ambiguities in the 
definition and scope of crimes against humanity. 
I. THE MARTENS CLAUSE 
The history of crimes against humanity begins with the Martens 
Clause. Fedor Fedorovitch Martens was a principal expert on interna-
tionallaw and representative to the Hague conferences on the law of 
war. He drafted the so-called Martens Clause which was incorporated 
into the eighth paragraph of the Hague Convention of 1907. The 
Clause states that, in cases not covered by the Convention, the "bellig-
erents remain under the protection of the rule of the principles of the 
laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public 
conscience."2 The latter language clearly connotes that the principles 
of humanity extend the compass of the code of conflict to cover "the 
interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization."3 
The Martens Clause thus recognizes that States possess an obligation 
to adhere to both the spirit and substance of the humanitarian law of 
war. The Clause, however, remained an insignificant insertion into the 
code of conflict until discovered by the diplomats who drafted the 
Nuremberg Charter's prohibition on crimes against humanity.4 
2 Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex of 
Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, Preamble, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539,1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]. 
3Id. 
4 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6( c), 
59 Stat. 1544,82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
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European States had long claimed the prerogative to intervene on 
behalf of national and non-Muslim minorities within the Ottoman 
Empire.5 This claim increasingly came to be justified on the basis of 
the principles of humanity. The Allies issued a joint declaration in May 
of 1915 which warned that in view of the Turkish regime's support for 
'''crimes ... against humanity and civilization [in relation to Armeni-
ans] ... that they will hold personally responsible ... all members of 
the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated 
in such massacres. '''6 
II. WORLD WAR I 
The Paris Peace Conference appointed a fifteen member commis-
sion to inquire into the legal liability of those responsible for World 
War I.7 The commission invoked the concept of crimes against human-
ity, concluding that the German Empire and her Allies were responsi-
ble for "outrages of every description committed on land, at sea, and 
in the air, against the laws and customs of war and . . . the laws of 
humanity."8 The Tribunal later reiterated that" [i] n spite of the explicit 
regulations, of established customs, and of the clear dictates of human-
ity, Germany and her allies have piled outrage upon outrage."9 
The commission appeared to limit "laws of humanity" and "dic-
tates of humanity" to aggravated violations of the laws and customs of 
war which were directed against civilians and prisoners of war. This 
encompassed the intentional commission of the "most cruel practices 
which primitive barbarism, aided by all the resources of modern sci-
ence, could devise for the execution of a system of terrorism carefully 
planned and carried out .... "10 
Id. 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
5 Vahkn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War 
I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE]. INT'L L. 221, 233-40 (1989). 
6Id. at 262. 
7 See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 96 (1920) [hereinafter Commission on Responsibility]. The 
Commission consisted of two representatives from each of the five Allied Powers and one from 
Belgium, Greece and Poland, Rumania and Serbia. Id. at 96-97. 
8Id. at 113. 
9Id. 
10 Id. The Tribunal concluded that the "war was carried on by the Central Empires together 
with ... Turkey and Bulgaria, by barbarious or illegitimate methods in violation of the established 
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The commission recommended the unprecedented extension of 
criminal liablity to heads of State. Immunity for the Kaiser, as well as 
other officials, "would involve laying down the principle that the great-
est outrages against the laws and customs of war and the laws of 
humanity, if approved against him, could in no circumstances be pun-
ished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilized man-
kind. "11 Other German officials also were to be prosecuted before an 
international tribunal. The court was to apply "'the principles of the 
laws of nations as they result from the usages established among civi-
laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity." ld. at 115 (emphasis omitted). 
"Not even prisoners, or wounded, or women, or children have been respected by belligerents 
who deliberately sought to strike terror into every heart for the purpose of repressing all 
resistance." ld. at 113. 
Murders and massacres, tortures, shields formed of living human beings, collective 
penalties, the arrest and execution of hostages, the requisitioning of services for 
military purposes, the arbitrary destruction of public and private property, the 
aerial bombardment of open towns without there being any regular siege, the 
destruction of merchant ships without previous visit and without any precautions 
for the safety of passengers and crew, the massacre of prisoners, attacks on hospital 
ships, the poisoning of springs and of wells, outrages and profanations without 
regard for religion or the honor of individuals, the issue of counterfeit money ... 
the methodical and deliberate destruction of industries with no other object than 
to promote German economic supremacy after the war, constitute the most striking 
list of crimes that has ever been drawn up to the eternal shame of those who 
committed them. 
ld. at 113-14.Professor Egon Schwelb analyzed the allegations of atrocities lodged by the Allied 
Powers against Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria. Most constituted conventional war crimes. 
But, the charges also included crimes committed by Turkish and German authorities against 
Armenians and Greek-speaking citizens of Turkey. The annex to the Commission's report also 
lists the pillage by Austrian troops of Gorizia, which, at the time, was an Austrian town. The claim 
that Austrian and Turkish officials should suffer international liability for acts against their own 
State was unprecedented. See Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 178, 
181 (1946). "[A]lready on 28 May 1915 the Governments of France, Great Britain, and Russia 
made a declaration regarding the massacres of the Armenian population in Turkey, denouncing 
them as 'crimes against humanity and civilization for which all members of the Turkish Govern-
ment will be held responsible together with its agents implicated in the massacres.'" ld. (emphasis 
omitted). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
11 See Commission on Responsibility, supra note 7, at 116. Individuals, regardless of their 
position, ''who have been guilty of offenses against the laws and customs of war or in the laws of 
humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution." ld. at 117. The vindication of the "principles of the 
laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity" would be incomplete if the Kaiser along with 
other officals were not prosecuted and punished. See id. The panel argued for recognition of 
negative criminality-the imposition of liability on individuals who failed to intervene to prevent 
penal delicts. "A word from them [the defendants] would have brought about a different method 
in the action of their subordinates on land, at sea and in the air." ld. The Commission did not 
endorse the superior orders defense, but "lilt will be for the court to decide whether a plea of 
superior orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility." ld. 
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lized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience.'''12 
The American representatives, Robert Lansing and James Brown 
Scott, dissented from the proposal to punish both war crimes and 
violations of the principles of humanity. They contended that the the 
laws and customs of war provide a "standard certain, to be found in 
books of authority and in the practice of nations."13 The laws and 
principles of humanity, in contrast, ''vary with the individual" and 
should be excluded from legal consideration.14 A judicial tribunal ad-
dresses "existing law, leaving to another forum infractions of the moral 
law and actions contrary to the laws and principles of humanity."15 
The Treaty of Versailles, as well as other post-World War I peace 
pacts, adhered to the predictable parameters of the code of conflict. 
The surrendering States recognized the right of the Allied Powers to 
prosecute those accused of acts in violation of the laws and customs 
ofwar.16 
The exception was the Treaty of Se'vres, which obligated Turkey 
to hand over for trial those responsible for massacres. The Allied 
Powers reserved the right to designate a tribunal to try these offend-
ers.17 This provision was directed at those who committed crimes against 
Armenian and Greek citizens of Turkey-acts which would constitute 
crimes against humanity under the Nuremberg Charter of 1945.18 The 
12Id. at 122. Those to be prosecuted before an international, rather than domestic tribunal, 
were individuals committing outrages against civilians and soldiers affiliated with more than a 
single country, those whose orders were executed in more than one country, civilians and military 
authorities who ordered or failed to intervene to prevent criminal acts, and individuals it is 
advisable to prosecute before an international tribunal. Id. at 121-22. 
13Id. at 127, 134 (referring to Memorandum of Reservations Presented l7y the Representatives of 
the United States to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities). 
14 Id.; see also id. at 144. The American representatives also objected to the extension of 
liability to Heads of State. These authorities were politically accountable to the citizens of their 
country-subjecting them to an international tribunal is violative of State sovereignty. Id. at 
135-36. They also questioned the imposition of negative criminality absent knowledge, power 
and authority. See id. at 143. 
15Id. at 144. The laws and principles of humanity "are not certain, varying with time, place, 
and circumstance, and ... to the conscience of the individual judge. There is no fixed and 
universal standard of humanity. The law of humanity, or the principle of humanity, is much like 
equity .... " Id. at 144. See id. at 151 (discussing reservations by the Japanese delegation). 
16 See Treaty of Peace with Germany (Versailles Treaty), June 28, 1919, arts. 228-30, 13 AM. 
]. INT'L L. 151 (Supp. 1919). Article 227 arraigned the German Emperor "for a supreme offence 
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" and is a significant step in the punish-
ment of crimes against peace. See id. at art. 227. For other World War I treaties incorporating the 
same language, see Schwelb, supra note 10, at 182. 
17 See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Sevres), Aug. 10, 
1920, art. 230, 15 AM.]. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921). 
18 See Schwelb, supra note 10, at 182. 
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Treaty was never ratified and was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne. 
The Greek and Turkish governments, under the terms of this agree-
ment, announced an amnesty "for all crimes and offenses."19 In the 
end, an international tribunal was not convened-only a handful of 
German combatants were prosecuted for war crimes before the Leipsic 
Supreme Court.20 Most were acquitted and those who were convicted 
soon gained release from custody. One commentator rationalized that 
"[w]hile ... it shocks our sense of justice that the monstrous war 
crimes of Germany should go unpunished, it is perphaps best, in view 
of the interest of all the world and future generations that this should 
be so rather than that further seeds of hatred between nations should 
be sown. "21 The notion of laws of humanity which transcended the 
parameters of positive international law provided a foundation for the 
Nuremberg Charter's prohibition of crimes against humanity. Both the 
drafting conference and Nuremberg Tribunal struggled with the con-
nection between the waging of a war of aggression, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. 
III. NUREMBERG 
A. The Drafting Of The Nuremberg Charter 
The concept of crimes against humanity reemerged during the 
war crimes debate following World War II. President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, in a March 1944 statement, castigated Adolf Hitler for "com-
mitting . . . crimes against humanity in the name of the German peo-
ple."22 The President condemned the savagery visited upon civilians in 
Europe and denounced the "wholesale systematic murder of the Jews."23 
A drafting conference was convened in London in 1945 to organ-
ize the prosecution of alleged German war criminals. A memorandum 
penned by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and Attorney General Francis Biddle, pro-
posed that liability should be imposed on Nazi officials for acts com-
19 Treaty with Turkey and Other Instruments Signed at Lausanne (Treaty of Lausanne), Ch. 
VIII, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,92-93 (Declaration Of Amnesty) (Supp. 1924). 
20 See generaUy German War Trials 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 674-724 (1922) Uudicial decisions 
involving questions of international law). 
21 George C. Battle, The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of Germans Accused of War 
Crimes, 8 VA. L. REv. 17 (1921). 
22 Statement by the President, Mar. 24, 1944 in Report of Robert H. Jackson United States 
Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials 12, 13 (1945) [hereinafter 
Jackson Report). 
23Id. 
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mitted throughout Hitler's regime, beginning with the Fuhrer's ascen-
dancy to power on January 30, 1933.24 The three conceded that pre-war 
atrocities were: 
neither "war crimes m the technical sense, nor offenses 
against international law; and the extent to which they may 
have been in violation of German law, as changed by the 
Nazis, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared policy of the 
United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be punished; 
and the interests of postwar security and a necessary rehabili-
tation of German peoples, as well as the demands of justice, 
require that this be done. 25 
The eventual American proposal advocated a more conventional 
scheme and concentration on the initiation and waging of a war of 
aggression, with limited attention directed to war crimes.26 The United 
States also envisioned Nuremberg as the foundation for the further 
prosecution of Germans active in organizations declared criminal by 
the Nuremberg Court.27 
Justice Robert H. Jackson refined the American proposal in June 
1945 and catalogued various crimes with which the defendants could 
be charged. He stressed that the termination of World War II and the 
accompanying decision to punish international penal delicts provided 
a singular opportunity to fix the future of international criminallaw.28 
Jackson supported the Secretaries' scheme and advocated an article 
punishing "[t]hose acts which offended the conscience of our people 
[and] were criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized 
countries .... "29 This would center on the Nazi's persecution of civil-
24 Memorandum to President Roosevelt from the Secretaries of State and War and the 
Attorney General, January 22,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 2,4-5 (Document I). 
This [criminal] conduct goes back at least as far as 1933, when Hitler was first 
appointed Chancellor of the Reich. It has been marked by mass murders, impri-
sonments, explusions and deportations of populations; the starvation, torture and 
inhuman treatment of civilians; the wholesale looting of public and private property 
on a scale unparalleled in history; and, after initiation of "total" war, its prosecution 
with utter and ruthless disregard for the laws and customs of war. 
[d. at 4. 
25 [d. at 5-6. 
26 American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers at San Francisco, 
April 30, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at art. 6, 22, 24 (Document IV). 
27 American Memorandum Presented at San Francisco, April 30, 1945, in Jackson Report, 
supra note 22, at 28,29-30 (Document V). 
28 Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, June 6, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 
22, at 42, 52. 
29 [d. at 42, 48. 
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ians-the confiscation of property, murder, torture and persecution on 
political, racial, and religious grounds. These practices, according to 
Jackson, were contrary to the sovereign prerogative of the Reich and 
were preparatory to international aggression: "Our people felt that 
these were the deepest offenses against that International Law de-
scribed in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 as including the 'laws 
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience."'3o 
Jackson proposed to supplement the punishment of those who 
contravened the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare 
with a separate provision prohibiting "[a]trocities and offenses, includ-
ing atrocities and persecutions on racial or religious grounds, commit-
ted since 1933. This is only to recognize the principles of criminal law 
as they are generally observed in civilized states."31 Jackson explained 
that this was based on the Martens Clause of the Fourth Hague Con-
vention which provided that "inhabitants and belligerents shall remain 
under the protection and rule of 'the principles of the law of nations, 
as they result from the usage established among civilized peoples from 
the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience."'32 Liability 
was imposed on those who incited, ordered, procured, or counselled 
the commission of such atrocities and offenses.33 
Id. 
30Id. at 49. 
Early in the Nazi regime, people of this country came to look upon the Nazi 
Government as not constituting a legitimate state pursuing the legitimate objectives 
of a member of the international community. They came to view the Nazis as a 
band of brigands, set on subverting within Germany every vestige of a rule of law 
which would entitle an aggregation of people to be looked upon collectively as a 
member of the family of nations. Our people were outraged by the oppressions, 
the cruelest forms of torture, the large scale murder, and the wholesale confiscation 
of property which initiated the Nazi regime within Germany. They witnessed per-
secution of the greatest enormity on religious, political and racial grounds, the 
breakdown of trade unions, and the liquidation of all religious and moral influences 
31 Id. at 50. Jackson noted that the principles of criminal law generally observed in civilized 
States had been assimilated into International Law at least since 1907. Id. 
32Id. at 51. 
[T]he feeling of outrage grew in this country, and it became more and more felt 
that these were crimes committed against us and against the whole society of 
civilized nations by a band of brigands who had seized the instrumentality of a state. 
I believe that those instincts of our people were right and that they should guide 
us as the fundamental tests of criminality. We propose to punish acts which have 
been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and have been so written in every 
civilized code. 
Id. at 50. 
33Id. at 51. 
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The American proposal of June 14, 1945 provided, inter alia, for 
the punishment of atrocities and offenses against persons or property 
constituting violations of international law, including the laws, rules, 
and customs of land and naval warfare.34 A separate provision prohib-
ited "atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on 
racial or religious grounds, committed since 1 January 1933 in viola-
tion of any applicable provision of the domestic law of the country in 
which committed. "35 This, in part, was intended to condemn the per-
secution of Jews, minorities and political dissidents within Germany. 
Jurisdiction was extended to acts committed subsequent to Hitler's 
ascent to power, some six years prior to the initiation of World War II. 
Jurisdiction was also limited to acts which were violative of the domestic 
law of the country in which they were committed. The latter avoided 
the complications involved in claiming international cognizance over 
acts prior to the initiation of armed aggression, but placed most of the 
Nazi's racial repression within the Reich outside of the Tribunal's 
procedural parameters.36 
A second American draft limited this provision to atrocities, per-
secutions, and deportations undertaken on political, racial, or religious 
grounds, in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise to dominate 
other nations. The scope of this provision was restricted by the require-
ment that these acts were preparatory to, or part of, Germany's war of 
aggression. The draft also specified that such acts were punishable 
"whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. "37 
A Soviet proposal expressly condemned atrocities and violence "in 
regard to civilian populations" and specifically listed as intolerable 
"deportations of civilians to slave labour, murder and ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war, destruction of towns and villages, plunder and other 
violations of the laws and customs ofwar."38 The Soviet provision omitted 
34 Revision of American Draft Proposed Agreement, June 14, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra 
note 22, at 55,57 (Document IX). 
35Id. at 12(b). 
36Id. The Tribunal "shall be bound by this declaration of the parties to this Agreement that 
the following acts are criminal." Id. art. 12. International law under the American proposal "shall 
be taken to include treaties between nations and the principles of the laws of nations as they 
result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the 
dictates of public conscience." Id. 
37 Revised Draft of Agreement and Memorandum Submitted by American Delegation, June 
30, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 119, 121 (Document XVIII). 
38 Draft Showing Soviet and American Proposals in Parallel Columns, in Jackson Report, 
supra note 22, at 165, 169 (Document XXIII). 
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reference to racial or religious persecution and was limited to viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war.39 Premising this provision on the 
laws and customs of war seemingly deprived the Tribunal of jurisdic-
tion over events prior to the Nazi's 1939 invasion of Poland.40 
A sub-committee incorporated both the American and Russian 
proposals into the draft protocol. The Soviet provision was accepted 
without modification. Bracketed language in the American version 
indicated that the sub-committee was unable to agree whether to re-
quire that atrocities and persecutions motivated by political, racial or 
religious animus, undertaken in pursuance of a common plan or 
enterprise to dominate other nations, be punishable. The sub-commit-
tee also did not know whether or not these acts were in violation of 
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.4l A British draft 
also adhered to the American version.42 
The French retreated from the requirement that atrocities and 
persecutions against civilian populations were required to be motivated 
by a political, racial or religious animus. The draft also omitted refer-
ence to deportations and other specified acts. A separate provision, 
consistent with the Russian version, sanctioned the waging of war 
"contrary to the laws and customs of internationallaw."43 The French 
also specified that the Tribunal was charged with punishing acts which 
39 [d. 
40 See also Redraft of Definition of "Crimes." Submitted by Soviet Delegation, July 23, 1945, 
in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 327 (Document XLIII). 
41 Draft of Agreement and Charter, Reported by Drafting Subcommittee, July 11, 1945, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 195, 197 (Document XXV). 
The following acts shall be considered criminal violations of International Law 
and shall come within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: 
(a) Violations of the laws. rules or customs of war. Such violations shall include 
murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war; atrocities against and violence towards 
civil populations; the deportation of such populations for the purpose of slave 
labour; the wanton destruction of towns and villages; and plunder; as well as other 
violations of the laws, rules and the customs of war. 
(e) Atrocities and persecutions and deportations on political, racial or religious 
grounds [in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise referred to in sub-para-
graph (d) hereof, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated]. 
Id. 6(a)(e), at 197. 
42 Draft Agreement and Charter, Proposed by British Delegation, July 11,1945, in Jackson 
Report, supra note 22, at 202, 205 (Document XXVI). See also Redraft of Charter, Submitted by 
British Delegation, July 23,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 348,352 (Document XLV). 
43 See Draft Article on Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by French Delegation,July 19, 1945, 
in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 293 (Document XXXV). Article 6(ii) punishes "the policy 
of atrocities and persecutions against civilian populations." Id. at art. 6(ii). 
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were violative of "international law, the laws of humanity and the 
dictates of the public conscience."44 A second British draft confined 
the Tribunal's jurisdiction to "[s]ystematic atrocities against or system-
atic terrorism or ill-treatment or murder of civilians."45 This explicitly 
limited the Tribunal's jurisdiction to barbaric conduct which was part 
of a sustained government policy. 
The debate revolved around several considerations. First, there 
was a question of including a separate provision directed at crimes 
against civilians or encompassing these delicts under the canopy of a 
prohibition on crimes against the humanitarian law of war. Second, 
drafters debated whether to incorporate a motive requirement and 
whether to enumerate specific acts which were illustrative of the type 
of delicts to be punished. The latter might have been interpreted to 
qualifY or limit the acts encompassed within parameters of crimes 
against humanity. A third consideration was the restriction of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Drafters compared limiting jurisdiction to the 
period subsequent to the launching of Germany's war of aggression or 
to include preparatory or unrelated acts which risked extending the 
Tribunal's jUIisdiction into Germany's domestic shpere. A fourth ques-
tion was whether the Tribunal's jurisdiction should encompass acts 
which were in contravention ofinternationallaw, regardless of whether 
they were violative of domestic law. There also was a question of 
whether international law should be broadly interpreted to include the 
laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience. A final issue 
revolved around whether to limit crimes against humanity to systematic 
atrocities.46 
The proposal eventually drafted was discussed by the drafting con-
ference. The somewhat ambiguous text condemned atrocities against 
the civilian population, including murder and ill-treatment, deporta-
tion to slave labor and other violations of the laws and customs of war. 
The latter clause would limit crimes against humanity to acts commit-
ted during the conduct of warfare.47 The British representative, Sir 
David Maxwell Fyfe, objected to the phrase, '" [a]nd other violations of 
the laws and customs of warfare'" as limiting the scope of the draft.48 
44Id. 
45 Proposed Revision of Definition of "Crimes" (Article 6), Submitted by British Delegation, 
July 20,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 312 (Document XXXIX). 
46 See supra notes 24-45. 
47 Redraft of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by Soviet Delegation,July 23, 1945, in Jackson 
Report, supra note 22, at 327 (Document XLIII). 
48 Minutes of Conference Session of July 23, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 328, 
329 (Document XLIV) [hereinafter Session of July 23,1945]. 
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The phrase was redundant-such acts were already encompassed within 
the provision punishing violations of the laws and customs of war. 49 
Justice Jackson objected to the Soviet's failure to require that 
atrocities against civilians were part of a plan to wage a war of aggres-
sion. Jackson noted that "[i]t has been a general principle of foreign 
policy of our Government from time immemorial that the internal 
affairs of another government are not ordinarily our business .... [It] 
is not our affair any more than it is the affair of some other government 
to interpose itself in our problems."5o Absent "a war connection as a 
basis for reaching them, I would think we have no basis for dealing 
with atrocities. "51 
Jackson explained that the requirement that atrocities, persecu-
tions and deportations were to be based on political, racial or religious 
grounds stemmed from the fact that such acts were connected with the 
Nazi's consolidation of power and the propulsion of Germany into war. 
We think it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring 
retribution to individuals or to states only because the con-
centration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of 
a common plan or enterprise of making an unjust or illegal 
war in which we became involved. We see no other basis on 
which we are justified in reaching the atrocities which were 
committed inside Germany, under German law, or even in 
violation of German law, by authorities of the German state. 
Without substantially this definition, we would not think we 
had any part in the prosecution of those things .... 52 
The Russian representative, Professor A.N. Trainin, disputed the 
limitation of crimes against civilians to acts motivated by a sectarian 
49Id. at 329. The prefatory phrase in the Soviet draft article six, inter alia, punished the 
preparation or conduct of criminal acts. Sir David Maxwell Fyfe argued that the terrorization of 
the GermanJewish population was in preparation for war. See id.JusticeJackson insisted that the 
Allied Powers agree to the definition of the relevant crimes so as to avoid this being litigated 
before the Tribunal. See id. 
50Id. at 331. Justice Jackson argued that there was no need to convene an international 
tribunal to prosecute violations of the laws and cutoms of land warfare. The only rationale for 
an international prosecution was "when we couple these individual acts with the German plan to 
make warfare by that lawless and terroristic method." Id. 
5l Id. ''They [the atrocities] were a part of the preparation for war or for the conduct of the 
war in so far as they occurred inside of Germany and that makes them our concern." Id.Jackson's 
remarks appear to lack coherence. The Soviet draft specifically punished atrocites against the 
civilian population which were contrary to the "laws and customs of war"-suggesting such acts 
must occur during armed conflict. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
52 Session of July 23, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 333. Jackson may have feared 
that a contravention of Germany's domestic jurisdiction would lead to scrutiny of racial segrega-
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animus. He sought to incorporate Justice Jackson's sentiments, noting 
that "[t]here can be no doubt that ... violations of the customs of war, 
whether in regard to prisoners of war or civilians, is in fact an interna-
tional crime. An action becomes an international crime even though 
it may be carried out in accordance with definitions of international 
law if it is done as part of preparation of aggression or domination over 
other nations. "53 Professor Andre Gros of France favored the French 
draft. He argued against enumerating acts constituting crimes against 
civilians, pointing out that "[b]y the fact of saying those acts are 
deemed criminal violations we admit some of them were not, and the 
... construction which I attempted ... was to get the same result ... 
without incurring the risk of any criticism against construction."54 
Professor Gros questioned whether humanitarian concerns only 
achieved an international dimension when connected with a war of 
aggression. He also pointed to the evidentiary burden of establishing 
that the persecution of Jews and others was part of a plan to wage war. 55 
Professor Gros noted that "the American [s] want to win the trial on 
the ground that the Nazi war was illegal, and the French people and 
other people of the occupied countries just want to show that the Nazis 
were bandits."56 Sir David Maxwell Fyfe nevertheless pointed out that 
there was a distinction under international law between a "Nazi chas-
tising a Jew before the war and the systematic persecution of the Jews 
in order to carry out the Nazi plan .... "57 
tion in the United States. He noted that "[wle have some regrettable circumstances at times in 
our own country in which minorities are unfairly treated." Id. Justice Jackson also noted that the 
Nuremberg Charter should not be limited to acts committed by the European Axis Powers. "If it 
is a good rule of law, it should bind us all, and if not, we should not invoke it at this trial. It 
sounds very partial to me, and I think we would get great criticism from it." Id. at 336. The Russian 
representative Generall.T. Nikitchenko, on the other hand, stressed that the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal should be limited to the crimes of Axis Powers-"it is not our task to try to draft a code 
which could be applied at all times and under all circumstances." Minutes of Conference Session 
of July 25,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 376,382 (Document LI). 
53 Session of July 23, 1945, supra note 48, at 333. 
54Id. at 334. Professor Gros also argued that the Tribunal might declare various acts criminal, 
but that this should be declared to be in violation of international law. See id. This, in his opinion, 
was the retroactive creation of law. See id. The document being developed "is a creation by four 
people who are just four individuals-defined by those four people as criminal violations of 
international law." Id. at 334. Those acts have known for years years before and have not been 
declared criminal violations of international law. See id. It is ex post facto legislation. Id. at 335. 
55 Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945, inJackson Report, supra note 22, at 360-61 
(Document XLVII). 
56 Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 376, 
381-82 (Document LI). 
57 Session of July 25,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 361. 
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The Soviet Union offered a compromise proposal which seem-
ingly captured these contending views. The Soviet draft punished war 
crimes and crimes against civilians in separate articles. Atrocities against 
civilians, including murder and ill-treatment of civilians and deporta-
tions to slave labor, were punished. The second clause of this provision 
punished persecutions on racial or religious grounds which where 
inflicted in pursuance of aggression or domination over other nations. 
The Soviets omitted mention of the destruction of towns and villages 
and plunder, presumably fearing that this would implicate the Allied 
Powers.58 Justice Jackson approvingly noted that "I have seen the vil-
lages and towns of Germany. I think that you will have great difficulty 
distinguishing between the military necessity for that kind of destruc-
tion as distinguished from some done by the Germans ... [i) t seems 
to me those subjects invite recriminations that would not be useful in 
the trial."59 The American delegation continued to insist that crimes 
against civilians should also be confined to exterminations or depor-
tations on political, racial or religious grounds-whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Fur-
thermore, such crimes, according to Justice Jackson, should be re-
quired to be undertaken in pursuit of a common plan, enterprise or 
policy to prepare or wage a war of aggression. 60 Justice Jackson, in 
abandoning the initial American position, later proclaimed that the 
"[Russian] provision as to atrocities against civilians is much the same 
as the draft we submitted except that we expressly provided for disre-
gard of domestic law because otherwise there would be difficulty reach-
ing some of the German activities toward their own population. "61 
58 See Redraft of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by Soviet Delegation, July 25, 1945, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 373 (Document XLVIII). See also Redraft of Soviet Definition 
of "Crimes" (Article 6), Submitted by British Delegation, July 23, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra 
note 22, at 359 (Document XLVI). Great Britain again offered a compromise proposal, prohib-
iting atrocities and persecutions and deportations on political, racial or religious grounds with 
bracketed language specifYing that such acts are undertaken in pursuance of a common plan or 
enterprise. See id. A separate article condemned violations of the laws, rules or customs of war 
and enumerated various examples drawn from the Russian draft. See Redraft of Charter, Submit-
ted by British Delegation, July 23, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 348,352 (Document 
XLV). The acts enumerated under the war crimes provision were murder and ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war; atrocities and violence towards civil populations; the deportation of such 
populations for slave labor; the wanton destruction of towns and villages; plunder; and other 
violations of the laws, rules and customs of war. [d. at 351. 
59 Minutes of Conference Session of July 24, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 376, 
380 (Document LI). 
60 Redraft of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 25, 1945, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 374 (Document XLIX). 
61 Minutes of Conference Session of July 25, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 
376,380. 
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A joint British and French draft adopted the essential features of 
the Russian proposal and amalgamated both atrocities against civilians 
and persecution on political, racial or religious grounds into a single 
provision. The draft included, but was "not limited to murder and 
ill-treatment of civilians and deportations of civilians to slave labour."62 
A second clause prohibited "persecution on political, racial or religious 
grounds committed in pursuance of the common plan or conspiracy 
[aimed at domination over other nations]. "63 A separate article pun-
ished violations of the laws, rules and customs of war, including "atroci-
ties against civilian populations of occupied countries and the depor-
tation of such populations to slave labour, wanton destruction of towns 
and villages and plunder. "64 There was no pretension of propounding 
universal principles, since the Anglo-French proposal envisioned the 
charter as a constitutive document which merely defined the jurisdic-
tion of the Allied Tribunal.65 
An additional American draft added that the Tribunal's jurisdic-
tion extended to atrocities and persecutions "committed in any coun-
try, at any time, in pursuance of the common plan or conspiracy [to 
dominate other nations]."66 This was intended to clarify that "we are 
reaching persecution ... of Jews and others in Germany as well as 
outside of it, and before as well as after commencement of war."67 
Justice Jackson also noted that "[d]estruction, as well as plunder, should 
be specified or we fail to reach such conduct as opening dykes to flood 
lands with salt water .... "68 But, he stressed that the enumeration of 
some acts should not be interpreted to preclude prosecution for oth-
ers.69 The Anglo-French draft stated that the offenses enumerated 
"shall be deemed to be crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. "70 The American draft was even more restrictive, providing 
that the Tribunal "shall have power and jurisdiction to hear, try and 
62 Revised Definition of "Crimes," Prepared by British Delegation and Accepted by French 
Delegation,July 28,1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 390(Document LII). 
63Id. 
64Id. at art. 6(a). 
65Id. at art. 6. 
66 Revised Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 3D, 1945, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 393 (Document LlV). 
67Notes on Proposed Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 31, 
1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 394(Document LV). 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70 See Revised Definition of "Crimes," Prepared by British Delegation and Accepted by French 
Delegation, July 28, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra text accompanying note 22. 
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determine charges of crimes against only those who acted in aid of the 
European Axis Powers. "71 
The American draft submitted on July 31, 1945 denominated 
delicts directed at civilians as "Crimes Against Humanity. "72 This paral-
leled the provision which was subsequently incorporated into the Nurem-
berg Charter: 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the 
war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.73 
The Tribunal accepted the Russian text, which replaced the semi-
colon between the words "war" and "or" with a comma. This replace-
ment clarified the Tribunal's jurisdiction, focusing the Nuremberg 
trials on the initiation and waging of aggressive war rather than the 
violation of human rights. 74 
The drafting conference thus adopted a separate article directed 
at crimes against civilians. This provision extended and supplemented 
the prohibition on war crimes. Inhumane acts as well as political, racial 
71 See Revised Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 30, 1945, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 393. Justice Jackson noted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
was limited to the trial of individuals affiliated with the European Axis Powers. See id. Justice 
Jackson observed, however, that these same acts would be crimes if committed by United States 
officials. See Notes on Proposed Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 
31, 1945, in Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 394, (Document LV). 
72 Revision of Definition of "Crimes," Submitted by American Delegation, July 31, 1946, in 
Jackson Report, supra note 22, at 395 (Document LVI). 
n Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(c). The other core crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal were: 
CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplish-
ment of any of the foregoing .... 
Id. at art. 6(a). 
WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor 
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder 
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, 
or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
Id. at art. 6(b). 
74 See supra text accompanying note 26. 
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or religious persecution, were subject to prosecution so long as con-
nected to a crime against peace or a war crime. It was uncertain 
whether the enumeration of grave and serious offenses was intended 
to limit the character of punishable crimes. This did not appear to be 
an exhaustive list. Justice Jackson, for instance, stressed the need to 
punish destruction and plunder of property-neither of which were 
specifically prohibited. There was no geographic limitation on the acts 
encompassed within this article, indicating that the Tribunal's author-
ity extended to acts against "any civilian populations," including those 
within the territorial boundaries of the Reich.75 The language that a 
crime against humanity was punishable regardless of the law of the 
country where the act was committed was intended to assert the pri-
macy of international legal standards. But, the relevant sources of 
international law were not enumerated.76 
There clearly is a significant overlap between the types of acts 
envisioned as constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Murder is enumerated as both a war crime and a crime against human-
ity. The war crime of extermination is also included under crimes 
againt humanity, suggesting that drafters intended to punish the large-
scale loss of civilian life. The crimes against humanity of enslavement 
and deportation appear analogous to the war crime of deportation and 
slave labor; and inhumane acts appears similar to the war crime of 
ill-treatmen t. 77 
The conceptualization of crimes against humanity was a major 
step towards the primacy of international law. Civilians were no longer 
captive to domestic doctrine. However, the application of international 
law was limited to acts which were connected to the planning, prepa-
ration, initiation, or waging of an aggressive war. The drafters thus 
defaulted on the opportunity to provide protection for human rights 
in times of peace as well as war.78 
75 See supra text accompanying note 73. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See supra text accompanying notes 22-74. An early reference to the "elementary dictates 
of humanity" was contained in a 1937 treaty protecting merchant ships against submarine attacks 
during the Spanish civil war. See Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, L.N.T.S. 4184. The peace 
treaty with Italy was unique in requiring the Italians to surrender those accused of war crimes 
and crimes against peace or humanity. See Italian Peace Treaty, Feb. 10, 1947, reprinted in IV Major 
Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967 art. 45 (l)(a), at 2421 (1967). 
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B. The Nuremberg Indictment 
Twenty-two high-ranking Nazi officials were variously convicted of 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity at Nurem-
berg. Count One charged the defendants with a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit a crime against peace. The indictment alleged 
that the defendants carried out this common plan or conspiracy in a 
"ruthless" fashion in "complete disregard and violation of the laws of 
humanity."79 These "methods and crimes" constituted ''violations of 
international conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general prin-
ciples of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized 
nations and were involved in and part of a systematic course of con-
duct."8o The content of these crimes against humanity was detailed in 
Count Four, which incorporated by reference the war crimes set forth 
in Count Three.81 Count Four charged that the defendants committed 
crimes against humanity during the period preceding May 8, 1945, in 
Germany, and in all those countries and territories occupied by the 
German armed forces since September 1, 1939, including Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the High Seas.82 
Two crimes against humanity were enumerated which were not 
incorporated into the war crimes count. German civilians believed to 
oppose the Nazi Government were imprisoned without trial, murdered 
and tortured.83 The Nazi regime also singled out various groups for 
political, racial and religious persecution. This persecution constituted 
"deliberate and systematic genocide, the extermination of racial and 
national groups, against the civilian populations of certain occupied 
territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people 
and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and 
Gypsies and others. "84 For instance, the Nazi regime orchestrated vio-
79 United States v. Hermann Goering et. aL (indictment), reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27, 41 (1948) [hereinafter 
Nuremberg Judgment]. 
80Id. at 65 (Count Four). 
81 Id.; see also 42-52 (Count Three). Acts listed under war crimes include: murder and 
ill-treatment of civilian populations; deportation for slave labor; murder and ill-treatment of 
prisoners of war and other members of the armed forces; killing of hostages; plunder of public 
and private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages not justified on the basis of 
military necessity; conscription of civilian labor; forcing civilians in occupied territories to swear 
allegiance to a hostile power; and Germanization of occupied territories. See id. 
82Id. at 65. 
83Id. at 66-67. 
84 NurembergJudgement, supra note 79, at 43-44 (Count Two). 
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lent anti:Jewish demonstrations throughout Germany in November 
1938. Jewish property was confiscated and destroyed and 30,000 Jews 
were arrested and sent to concentration camps. The acts against civil-
ians in the occupied territories were war crimes as well as crimes 
against humanity. German troops fleeing Russia, "exterminated Jews 
rather than allow[ing] them to be liberated .... [C]oncentration camps 
and ghettos were set up in which Jews were incarcerated and tortured, 
starved, subjected to merciless atrocities, and finally exterminated. "85 
This "systematic course of conduct" against suspect individuals 
and groups86 contravened international conventions, and internal pe-
nal laws. This conduct also violated the general principles of criminal 
law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations and violated 
the Nuremberg Charter.87 
C. The Nuremberg judgment 
The Nuremberg Tribunal confronted the challenges of clarifying 
the requisite connection between crimes against humanity and a war 
of aggression and of differentiating between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Nuremberg Tribunal noted that the Charter was 
the expression of sovereign legislative power by the countries to which 
Germany had unconditionally surrendered. The exercise of this pre-
rogative had been endorsed by the civilized members of the commu-
nityof nations. The Court emphasized that the legal principles applied 
by the tribunal were not an arbitrary exercise of power, but an "expres-
sion of international law existing at the time of [the Court's] creation; 
and to that extent is itself a contribution to internationallaw."88 Even 
a retroactive application of the law, however, would not prohibit these 
prosecutions: "the maxim nullum criminen sin lege is not a limitation of 
sovereignty, but it is in general a principle ofjustice."89 
The fact that crimes against humanity had not been previously 
codified was not controlling. International law is not limited to con-
ventions. It also is revealed in the customs and practices of States which 
"gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general prin-
ciples of justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. "90 
85Id. at 67 (Count Four). 
86Id. at 65. 
87Id. 
88 NurembergJudg;ment, supra note 79, at 411, 46l. 
89Id. at 462. 
90 Id. at 464. 
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These precepts are to be interpreted in a dynamic fashion: "The law 
is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a chang-
ing world. "91 The Court ruled that in ternationallaw imposes culpability 
upon individuals as well as States. Limiting liability to States lends 
license to individuals to transgress the contours of the international 
code of war. This responsibility attaches regardless of individuals' pres-
tige, rank or official status. 
[T] he very essence of the Charter is that individuals have 
international duties which transcend the national obligations 
of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates 
the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pur-
suance of the authority of the state, if the state in authorizing 
action moves outside its competence under internationallaw.92 
Those who transgress the boundaries of the law of war may not 
rely on the superior orders defense. Such a command may be recog-
nized in mitigation of punishment, but the test "is not the existence of 
the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible."93 
Count One charged conspiracies to commit a war of aggression 
as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Tribunal ruled 
that a conspiracy charge was not negated by the existence of a dicta-
torship-Hitler "had to have the co-operation of statesmen, military 
leaders, diplomats and businessmen. When they, with knowledge of his 
aims, gave him their co~operation, they made themselves parties to the 
plan he had initiated .... That they were assigned to their tasks by a 
dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. "94 The 
Tribunal, however, ruled that the text of the Charter only prohibited 
a conspiracy to prepare, initiate, and wage an aggressive war and 
dismissed the other conspiracy charges.95 
The Tribunal next turned its attention to the substantive charges 
and observed that war crimes were committed on a "vast scale never 
91Id. 
92 NurembergJudgment, supra note 81, at 466. 
93Id. 
94 !d. at 468-69. 
95Id. at 469. This conclusion is not fully supported by the text of the Charter. See id. The 
Tribunal arguably desired to focus on the aggressive war charge. See id. This was intellectually 
persuasive since the Court concluded that aggressive war "is the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the 
whole." Id. at 427. The conspiracy component of Article 6 read as follows: "Leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any 
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before seen in the history of war . . . and were attended by every 
conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror. "96 These were not 
capricious; rather, they were the consequence of "cold and criminal 
calculation. "97 This pernicious pattern was the predictable product of 
the Nazi philosophy of "total war" which denied restraints on warfare.98 
The Tribunal suggested that German war crimes against civilians also 
constituted crimes against humanity. These acts "not only [were] in 
defiance of well-established rules of international law, but [were] in 
complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity."99 
The Tribunal then shifted its attention to crimes against humanity. 
A vast number of Jews and political opponents were murdered in 
Germany prior to the war while others were systematically interned and 
persecuted under cruel conditions. In order to constitute a crime 
against humanity such acts "must have been in execution of, or in 
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."lOo 
The Court concluded that as "revolting and horrible as many of these 
persons in execution of such plan." Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6. The Tribunal 
rather ambiguously stated that the "words do not add a new and separate crime to those already 
listed. The words are designed to establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common 
plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges ... that the defendants conspired to 
commit War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity .... " NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 
469 (discussing the contours of the law of conspiracy). 
96Id. at 469. 
97 Id. at 470. 
98Id. at 469. 
99Id. at 470. 
Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance 
of the well-established rules of international law, but in complete disregard of the 
elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian populations in the occupied territories 
suffered the same fate. Whole populations were deported to Germany for the 
purposes of slave labor upon defense works, armament production and similar tasks 
connected with the war effort. Hostages were taken in very large numbers from the 
civilian populations in all the occupied countries and were shot as suited the 
German purposes. Public and private property was systematically plundered and 
pillaged in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense of the rest of 
Europe. Cities and towns and villages were wantonly destroyed without military 
justification or necessity. 
Id. The Tribunal was "bound by the Charter, in the definition ... of War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity." Id. at 497. But, the former already were prohibited under the Hague Con-
vention of 1907 which civilized nations had come to regard by 1939 as declaratory of the laws 
and customs of war. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 46, 50, 56. The claim that the 
humanitarian law of war was inapplicable due to the Reich's subjugation and incorporation of 
the occupied territories was ruled inapplicable so long as the German presence was being 
militarily contested. See NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 497. "As to war crimes committed 
in Bohemia and Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories were never added to the 
Reich, but a mere protectorate was established over them." Id. at 497-98. 
100 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at 498. 
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crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done 
in execution of, or in connection with, any such crime. "101 The Tribu-
nal, therefore, refrained from a "general declaration" that acts prior to 
1939 were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the Char-
ter.102 However, following the invasion of Poland, 
war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also 
crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts 
charged in the Indictment and committed after the begin-
ning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all 
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggres-
sive war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.103 
The Tribunal thus ruled that a crime against humanity was only 
cognizable when undertaken in connection with a crime against peace 
or a war crime. The Court refused to rule that international law 
controls the conduct of countries in periods of peace as well as war. 
The Tribunal, however, interpreted the "execution ... or ... connec-
tion" standard broadly in relation to the persecution of Jews , determin-
ing that the seizure of Jewish assets within Germany was intended to 
finance the war effort. 104 The Nazi regime's eradication of German 
Jews, according to the Court, were also part of the German plan to 
create a culturally and politically pure Greater Germany. 105 
Nonetheless, the differentiation between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity remained imprecise. Most of the crimes against hu-
manity catalogued in the judgment-the murder and mistreatment of 
civilians, the pillage of public and private property, slave labor and 
persecution of Jews in the occupied territories-also constituted war 
crimes. 106 
D. Crimes Against Humanity: Streicher and von Schirach 
Julius Streicher and Baldur von Schirach were the only defendants 
indicted for crimes against humanity who were not also indicted for 
war crimes.107 Streicher was acquitted of waging a war of aggression 




104Hague Convention, supra note 2, at 492. 
IOSId. at 492-93. 
106Id. at 471-96. 
107 See id. at 547, 563. 
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Number One" based on the writings which he published in Der Sturmer, 
an anti-Semitic weekly whose circulation reached over half a million in 
1935. Streicher was an ardent advocate of the boycott of Jewish busi-
nesses and the racially exclusionary Nuremberg Decrees. The Tribunal 
also determined that he was "responsible" for the demolition on Au-
gust 10, 1938 of the synagogue in Nuremberg and publicly supported 
the Jewish pogroms of November 1938.108 
Streicher began to call for the annihilation of the Jewish race as 
early as 1938. The fervor of his call increased as German troops crossed 
into adjoining countries. A May 1939 article proclaimed that "[t]he 
Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be exterminated root and 
branch."109 Streicher continued to advocate the annihilation of Jews 
while fully aware that they were being slaughtered in the occupied 
territories. 110 
The tribunal did not determine the scope of Streicher's liability. 
The Tribunal merely ruled that, "Streicher's incitement to murder and 
extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed 
under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on 
political and racial grounds in connection with War Crimes . . . and 
constitutes a Crime against Humanity. "111 
The issue of intent was central to incitement to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity-an offense which was not specifically set 
forth in the Nuremberg Charter. Hans Frizsche held various propa-
ganda positions, eventually rising in 1942 to Head of the Radio Division 
in the Propaganda Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Political Or-
ganization of the Greater Reich. He was acquitted based on the finding 
that his anti-Semitic speeches were not "intended to incite the German 
people to commit atrocities on conquered peoples ... [h]is aim was 
rather to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the Ger-
man war effort. "112 
Von Schirach served as Gauleiter of Vienna as well as Reich Gov-
ernor for Vienna and Reich Defense Commissioner for the Gauleiter 
of Vienna, providing him with plenary power over the Austrian capi-
108 Hague Convention. supra note 2, at 547,563. 
Hl9 Id. at 548. 
l1°Id. at 548-49. 
111 Hague Convention. supra note 2, at 549. 
112Id. at 584-85. The Tribunal ruled that Fritzsche was not aware that the war of information 
was false. See id. It also noted that there was no evidence that he was aware of the extermination 
of Jews in the East. See id. The Court also observed that "[hlis position and official duties were 
not sufficiently important ... to infer that he took part in originating or formulating propaganda 
campaigns." Id. at 584. 
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tal. 1l3 He defended his deportation of sixty thousand Vienese Jews as 
"contributing to European culture. "114 Von Schirach regularly received 
reports of events in the East and was well-aware that these Jews faced 
"special action. "115 He was convicted of crimes against humanity: "while 
he did not originate the policy of deporting Jews ... [h] e knew that 
the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the 
ghettos of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were 
in his office. "116 The Streicher and von Schirach judgments indicate 
that the Tribunal relied on crimes against humanity to extend its 
jurisdiction over acts prior to Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939. The 
only limitation was that such delicts were required to have been un-
dertaken in connection with a war of aggression. Acts initiated against 
civilians during armed conflict or in the occupied territories were 
considered crimes against humanity as well as war crimes. The latter 
affirmed the special status accorded to these protected persons and 
highlighted that such atrocities were not an accepted aspect of armed 
conflict. Although the International Military Tribunal did not distin-
guish between war crimes and crimes against humanity in convicting 
the other defendants, the judgments provide some sense of the scope 
of crimes against humanity.ll7 
E. Crimes Against Humanity: Other Defendants 
Several defendants were convicted of atrocities against civilians in 
the occupied territories. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was appointed head of 
113 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at 563. The Tribunal characterized Hitler's "invasion of 
Austria" as a "premeditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against 
other countries." [d. at 433. This was a "common plan of aggression" rather than a war of 
aggression. [d. It nevertheless constituted a '''crime within the jurisdiction of Tribunal' as that 
term is used in Article 6(c) of the Charter." [d. at 565. Murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhumane acts and persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
in association with the occupation thus constituted crimes against humanity. [d. 
114 Hague Convention, supra note 2, at 565. 
115 [d. 
116 [d. at 565-66. Von Schirach, while Gauleiter of Vienna, continued to function as Reich-
sleiter for Youth Education (Hitler Jugend) and was informed of the organization's participation 
in the deportation of Soviet young people and the Soviet's apprenticeship in German industry 
and auxiliary units of the German armed forces. See id. Von Schirach urged the bombing of an 
English town in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich in 1942. See id. Both of the latter 
arguably constituted war crimes. [d. at 566. 
117See supra text accompanying notes 107-16. Several defendants were only indicted and 
convicted of war crimes. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 79, at 557, 562-63. Various 
organizations which engaged in crimes under the Charter were declared criminal. See id. A 
defendant's voluntary, knowing membership in a criminal organization or a conscript's involve-
ment in criminal conduct resulted in the imposition of criminal liability. See id. at 500; see also 
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 9, 10. 
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the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) in 1943. He was convicted of 
ordering the murder, ill-treatment and torture of civilians.lls Others 
were sentenced for ordering summary punishment. General Field Mar-
shal Wilhelm Keitel served as Chief of Staff of the High Command of 
the Armed Forces. He was convicted of ordering the execution of 
50-100 Communists for each German killed, and noted that human 
life was worth little in the East. He authorized the use of firing squads 
to punish the relatives of suspected saboteurs in Norway. Keitel also 
signed the infamous "Nacht und Nebef' decree that provided for the 
secret deportation, detention and summary sentencing of those ac-
cused of resisting Germany occupation in the occupied territories. He 
also ordered French, Dutch and Belgian citizens to work on the Atlan-
tic Wall. llg 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart served as Reich Commissioner of the Ger-
man-occupied Netherlands from 1940-1945. He was "ruthless in apply-
ing terrorism to suppress all opposition ... a program which he de-
scribed as 'annihilating' his opponents ... [H]e was involved in the 
shooting of hostages for offenses against the occupation authorities 
and sending to concentration camps all suspected opponents ... in-
cluding priests and educators. "120 
Wilhelm Frick served as Reich Minister of the Interior until Au-
gust 1943 when he was appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia and 
Moravia. He was aware that euthanasia was being practiced during the 
war against the aged, mentally challenged, sick and socially undesir-
able, yet, "he did nothing to stop them." A report of the Czechoslovak 
War Commission estimated that 275,000 mentally deficient and aged 
... for whose welfare he was responsible, fell victim to it."121 
Hermann Goring was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Pleni-
potentiary for the Four Year plan and a close confidant of the Fuhrer. 
He significantly contributed to the process of singling-out Jews for 
persecution. He imposed a billion dollar fine on the Jewish Community 
following the Crystal Week riots. Goring also signed decrees extending 
anti-semitic legislation to the newly occupied territories and, in July 
1941, ordered a "'complete solution of the Jewish question in the 
German sphere of influence in Europe."'122 
118 NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 537. 
119 ld. at 535-36. 
120 ld. at 575. Dutch police were forced to participate through threat of reprisal against their 
families. See id. 
121 ld. at 546-47. 
122 ld. at 527. 
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Frick, while Reich Minister of the Interior, drafted, signed and 
administered various decrees excluding Jews from the social and eco-
nomic sectors of German society. He also signed a final decree in 1943 
which granted plenary power over the Jews to the Gestapo, paving the 
path for their annihilation. During Frick's tenure as Reich Protector 
of Bohemia and Moravia, thousands of Jews were transferred to Ausch-
witz where they were killed.123 Defendant Seyss-Inquart, while Reich 
Commissioner of the Netherlands, signed a series of decrees economi-
cally enervating Jews. He followed this with decrees dictating registra-
tion, ghettoization, affixation of the Star of David, and finally the 
deportation of roughly ninety percent of Holland's 140,000 person 
Jewish community to community.124 
Defendant Fritz Saukel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for 
the Utilization of Labor in 1942. He was charged with securing workers 
to staff the Reich's industries. Saukel conceded that only 200,000 of 
the five million foreign workers deported to the Reich departed vol-
untarily. He was aware that "ruthless methods [were] being taken to 
obtain laborers and vigorously supported them on the ground[s] that 
they were necessary to fill the quotas. "125 
Those defendants responsible for economic discrimination against 
Jews, as well as the pillage and plunder of the occupied territories, were 
also convicted of crimes against humanity. In August 1942, Goring 
ordered the occupation chiefs to exploit the newly-acquired territories 
and admonished that '" [i] t makes no difference to me ... if you say 
that your people will starve. "'126 
Defendant Seyss-Inquart denounced the legal limitations on pil-
lage and plunder as "obsolete. "127 He issued regulations authorizing 
the "widespread pillage of public and private property" in the Nether-
lands.128 Hans Frank was Governor General of the occupied Polish 
territory. The Tribunal noted that the: 
123 Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 79, at 545-46. Joachim von Ribbentrop served as Reich 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Id. He also ordered diplomatic representatives to expedite the 
deportation of Jews to the East. Id. He participated in a conference in which the Hungarians 
were informed that the Jews either must be exterminated or deported to concentration camps. 
Id. at 532. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was appointed head of RSHA with authority over the security 
police and service. Id. He signed a series of decrees deporting Jews to concentration camps and 
headed an organization responsible for the death of six million Jews. Id. at 538. 
124Id. at 576. 
125 NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 567. 
126Id. at 552. Goring imposed a billion dollar fine on German Jews following the Crystal 
Week riots. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
127 NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 567. 
128Id. 
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[E]conomic demands made on the Government General were 
far in excess of the needs of the army of occupation and were 
out of all proportion to the resources of the country. The 
food raised in Poland was shipped to Germany on such a wide 
scale that the rations of the population of the occupied ter-
ritories were reduced to the starvation level, and epidemics 
were widespread.129 
Walter Funk, while serving as President ofthe Reichsbank in 1942, 
entered into an agreement to receive currency, gold and jewels from 
the Security Police and instructed his subordinates to disregard doubts 
and questions. The Reichsbank retained gold and notes in reserve and 
sent the valuables to Berlin municipal pawn shops. The Tribunal con-
cluded that "he either knew what was being received or was deliberately 
closing his eyes to what was being done. "130 
Defendant Alfred Rosenberg was Reich Minister for the Occupied 
Territories. He was convicted of conducting the systematic plunder of 
both private and public property throughout German-occupied Europe. 
He organized and directed "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" which plundered 
museums and libraries, confiscated art treasures and pillaged private 
homes. "Aktion-M" was instituted in December 1941. Over 69,000 Jew-
ish homes in the Western Europe were plundered, 38,000 in Paris 
alone. Roughly 27,000 railroad cars were required to transport these 
goods to Germany. In addition, approximately 22,000 art objects had 
been seized by the Einsatzstab as of July 14, 1944.131 
The Tribunal required both knowledge of and active involvement 
in crimes against humanity. The Tribunal failed to find "that the 
evidence sufficiently connects [Rudolf] Hess" to crimes against human-
ity and war crimes.132 Absent more compelling evidence, the Tribunal 
was unable to sustain a guilty verdict. This finding appeared to have 
been based on the fact that although Hess possessed knowledge of 
crimes committed against Jews in Eastern Europe, but neither partici-
pated nor ordered such delicts. His role in other atrocities was ad-
judged de minimis. 133 On the other hand, Hans Frank, Governor Gen-
129Id. at 542. Goring participated in planning the spoliation of Russian agriculture and 
industry and diverted food to Germany. Id. at 526. 
130 Id. at 551. 
131 NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 540. 
132Id. at 529. Hess was Minister without Portfolio and was Hitler's closest confidant. He 
inexplicably fled to England in 1941. See id. 
133Id. 
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eral of Poland, was determined to have been a "willing and knowing 
participant in the use of terrorism ... in ... economic exploitation 
... which led to the death by starvation of a large number ... in the 
deportation ... as slave laborers of over a million ... and in ... the 
murder of at least 3 million Jews. "134 
The Nuremberg Court also imposed vicarious liability on defen-
dants with power and authority to intervene to prevent illicit activity. 
Constantin Freiherr von Neurath was appointed Reich Protector of 
Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939. He contended that the anti-se-
mitic and repressive policies put into place were conceived and carried 
out by the Reich security apparatus. The Tribunal, however, convicted 
von Neurath, ruling that "he served as the chief German official in the 
Protectorate ... knowing that war crimes and crimes against humanity 
were being committed under his authority."135 
Von Neurath was succeeded in 1943 by Frick who "knew full well 
what the Nazi policies of occupation were in Europe, particularly with 
respect to Jews ... and by accepting the office of Reich Protector ... 
assumed responsibility .... "136 Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary General 
for the Utilization of Labor, claimed that he was not responsible for 
the abuses associated with the detention and transportation of workers 
to Germany. The Tribunal, however, noted that "Sauckel had over-all 
responsibility for the slave labor program .... He was aware of the 
ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers and vigorously sup-
ported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas. "137 
An official's protest and prevention of some atrocities, and lack of 
involvement in others, does not absolve him of complicity in the com-
mission of criminal conduct. Defendant Seyss-Inquart, while Reich 
Commissioner for the Netherlands: 
[I] n certain cases ... opposed ... extreme measures ... as 
when he was largely successful in preventing the Army from 
carrying out a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher 
SS and Police Leaders to reduce the number of hostages to 
be shot. But ... Seyss-Inquart was a knowing and voluntary 
participant in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity .... 138 
134Id. at 544. 
135Id. at 582. 
136 Nurembergjudgement, supra note 79, at 546. 
137Id. at 541,567 (discussing defendant Alfred Rosenberg). 
138Id. at 576. 
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Defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner served as Head of the Reich Secu-
rity Service and claimed that the: 
[C]riminal program had been started before his assumption 
of office; that he seldom knew what was going on; and that 
when he was informed he did what he could to stop them .... 
But he exercised control over the activities of the RSHA, was 
aware of the crimes it was committing, and was an active 
participant in many of them.139 
Mitigating circumstances were recognized in sentencing defen-
dants. The Tribunal noted that Walther Funk, Minister of Economics 
and President of the Reichsbank, ''was never a dominant figure in the 
various programs in which he participated. This is a mitigating fact of 
which the Tribunal takes notice."I40 Rudolf Hess was Reich Minister for 
Armaments and War Production and a member of the Central Plan-
ning Board for the Four Year Plan. He was central in the slave labor 
program. The Tribunal emphasized that Rudolf Hess had established 
industries in the occupied territories in order to avoid deporting work-
ers to Germany. In addition, "[h]e carried out his opposition to Hitler's 
scorched earth program in some of the Western countries and in 
Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk. "141 
The Tribunal also recognized that Von Neurath intervened to gain the 
release of detained Czechs. He was reprimanded by Hitler, but persist-
ed in cautioning restraint. Von Neurath went on leave in September 
1941, refused to resume his duties and his resignation was formally 
accepted in August 1943.142 
On the other hand, the Tribunal noted in the case of Hermann 
Goring that "[t] here is nothing to be said in mitigation ... Goring was 
often ... the moving force ... [h] e was the leading war aggressor ... 
director of the slave labor program and the creator of the oppressive 
program against the Jews and other races, at home and abroad."143 
Superior orders were not recognized in mitigation for those instances 
in which a defendant voluntarily and willingly engaged in grossly crimi-
nal conduct.144 Wilhelm Keitel was Chief of the High Command of the 
139Id. at 538. 
140Id. at 552. 
141Id. at 579. 
142 NurembergJudgment, supra note 79, at 582. Hess and Funk were sentenced to life impris-
onment; von Neurath to fifteen years imprisonment. See id. at 588-89. 
143 [d. at 527. 
144 Id. at 533. 'There is abundant evidence ... that Ribbentrop was in complete sympathy 
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Armed Forces. The Tribunal ruled that superior orders could neither 
be recognized in defense or in mitigation in the case of "crimes so 
shocking and extensive ... committed consciously, ruthlessly, and with-
out military excuse or justification. "145 
F. The Nuremberg judgement And Crimes Against Humanity: Summary 
In sum, the Nuremberg Tribunal failed to provide a principled 
distinction between war crimes and crimes against humanity. Crimes 
against humanity were limited to inhumane acts against civilians un-
dertaken in execution of, or in connection with, a crime against peace 
or war crime. These atrocities, of course, also constituted war crimes 
when carried out in contested or occupied territory. Repressive acts 
within Germany which were considered to be connected with a crime 
against peace also were within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 146 
Murder, mass extermination, deportation and enslavement of ci-
vilians were enumerated as crimes against humanity under the terms 
of the Nuremberg Charter. The phrase "other inhumane acts" was 
interpreted to encompass economic discrimination against Jews as well 
as the confiscation of Jewish property and the pillage and plunder of 
property in the occupied territories. 147 The Tribunal made no distinc-
tion between personal, commercial and state-owned property.148 
Crimes against humanity thus were viewed as extending the scope 
of the humanitarian law of war rather than as an autonomous source 
of rights which accrued to individuals in periods of peace as well in 
war. The impact of the Tribunal's interpretation of crimes against 
humanity would ultimately prove to be limited by the Nuremberg 
Charter's exclusive concern with the European Axis Powers. 149 The 
Tokyo Trial-the other major war post-World War II war crimes trial-
added little to the jurisprudence on crimes against humanity. 
with all the main tenets of the National Socialist creed, and that his collaboration with Hitler and 
with other defendants ... was whole-hearted. It was because Hitler's policy and plans coincided 
with his own ideas that Ribbentrop served him so willingly to the end." Id. at 533. 
145 NurembergJudgement, supra note 79, at 536. Alfred JodI was Chief of the Operations Staff 
of the High Command. Id. The Tribunal noted that the superior orders defense was prohibited 
by Article Eight of the Nuremberg Charter. See id. In addition, superior orders were not recog-
nized in mitigation: "There is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes ... has never 
been required of any soldier and he cannot ... shield himself behind a mythical requirement of 
soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes." Id. at 571. 
146 See supra text accompanying notes 88-145. 
147Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6(c). 
148 See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 52-56. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 10-145. 
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G. Tokyo Trilrunal 
The Tokyo Charter was the foundation document which defined 
the jurisdiction and powers of the International Military Tribunal in 
Tokyo.150 The Charter was an executive decree of General Douglas 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers inJapan, who 
only cursorily consulted the other Allied Powers in developing the 
document. 151 
The Tokyo Tribunal was charged with the 'Just and prompt trial 
and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East. "152 The 
Tokyo Charter's definition of crimes against humanity differed from 
that at Nuremberg in omitting the requirement that such acts were 
"committed against any civilian population. "153 
The Tokyo Tribunal focused almost exclusively on crimes against 
peace, striking all but one war crimes count on the grounds of lack of 
jurisdiction, redundancy and vagueness. There was no explicit charge 
of crimes against humanity. The remaining war crimes count charged 
various defendants with "recklessly disregarding their legal duty to take 
adequate steps to rescue the observance and prevent breaches of 
the laws and customs of war."154 The evidentiary presentation under 
this count went towards war crimes against civilians. Although the 
charge was not explicit, it presumbably also constituted crimes against 
humanity.155 
Koki Hirota intermittently served as Japanese Foreign Minister 
between 1936-38. Hirota was convicted of failing to take steps to insure 
the observance and to prevent breaches of the laws and customs of 
150 Charter Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far East, Apr. 26, 1946 reprinted 
in RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 185 (1971) [hereinafter 
TOKYO CHARTER]. 
151 The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, reprinted in II THE LAw OF WAR A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
1029,1031 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter TOKYO JUDGMENT]. 
152Tokyo Charter, supra note 150, at art. 1. 
153 See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 4, at art. 6( c). Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, so-called 
conventional war crimes were not enumerated: 
(b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely violationns of the laws or customs of war; 
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts committed before or during the war, or perse-
cutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
Tokyo Charter, supra note 150, at art. 6(b)(c). 
J54Tokyo Judgment, supra note 151, at 1033. 
155Id. 
1997) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 203 
war. He received reports of atrocities in Nanking between December 
1937 and February 1938, and accepted assurances from the War Min-
istry that the atrocities would be curbed. Reports of such acts never-
theless continued for at least another month. The Tribunal concluded 
that Hirota was "derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet 
that immediate action be taken ... [h]e was content to rely on assur-
ances which he knew were not being implemented while hundreds of 
murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were being commit-
ted daily. His inaction amounted to criminal negligence. "156 
Several other defendants with knowledge and authority also were 
held liable for a breach of their duty to intervene to halt war crimes.157 
General Iwane Matsui was Commander-in-Chief of the Central China 
Area Army which occupied Nanking. Under General Matsui's direc-
tion, there: 
[f]ollowed a long succession of most horrible atrocities com-
mitted by the Japanese Army upon the helpless citizens. Whole-
sale massacres, individual murders, rape, looting and arson 
were committed by Japanese soldiers .... In ... six or seven 
weeks thousands of women were raped, upwards of 100,000 
people were killed and untold property was stolen and 
burned.15s 
The Tribunal held that Matsui was cognizant of these atrocities and 
was criminally culpable in failing to fulfill his duty to control his 
troops and to protect the citizens of Nanking. 159 
The Tokyo Tribunal, in contrast to Nuremberg, did not define or 
discuss crimes against humanity. The decision did affirm that civilian 
and military officials with power and authority were liable for a failure 
to intervene to halt war crimes and crimes against humanity. The duty 
was triggered in the case of serious and widespread official delicts of 
which a decision-maker was aware or should have been aware. 160 
156Id. at 1134. The duty of army commanders and relevant governmental officials is "to take 
such steps and issue such orders as will prevent ... the commission of war crimes and satisty 
himself that such orders are being carried out." Id. at 1151-162. 
157Id. at 1146. Kenryo Sato was Chief of the Military Mfairs Bureau. See id. He was responsible 
for responding to protests, but lacked authority to initiate preventive action. See id. at 1147. 
158 Tokyo Judgement, supra note 151, at 1142. 
159Id. In the absence of direct knoweldge, "[t)hat crimes are notorious, numerous and 
widespread as to time and place are matters to be considered in imputing knowledge." Id. at 1039. 
160 See id. 
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The impact of the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments was limited 
by the fact that only the vanquished were subject to prosecution. These 
trials nevertheless ushered in a paradigm shift. Severe violations of the 
laws and customs of war were now the concern of the civilized world 
community as well as the victim State. This was clearly conveyed in the 
concept of crimes against humanity which symbolized the common 
interest of all people in protecting civilians from the scourge of war. 
Some, such as Justice R.B. Paul, remained skeptical. Paul queried, in 
his dissent at Tokyo, whether the prosecutions were "essentially politi-
cal though cloaked by a juridical appearance. "161 
The innovation introduced by the concept of crimes against hu-
manity cannot be under-estimated. British Chief Prosecutor at Nurem-
berg, Sir Hartley Shawcross, in his closing speech, observed that inher-
ent in the notion of crimes against humanity was the notion that there 
is a limit to the power of the State and that the individual, who is the 
ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind 
when the State infringes upon his rights in a manner which outrages 
the conscience of mankind.162 
The fact is that the right of humanitarian intervention by war 
is not a novelty in International Law-can intervention by 
judicial process then be illegal? . . . The Charter . . . gives 
warning for the future, to dictators and tyrants masquerading 
as a State that if, in order to strengthen or further their crimes 
against the community of nations they debase the sanctity of 
man in their own courntries, they act at their peril, for they 
affront the International Law of mankind.163 
American tribunals convened under Control Council Law No. 10 
in occupied Germany and were divided in their interpretation of crimes 
against humanity. Most courts adhered to the Nuremberg precedent, 
but two influential decisions determined that crimes against humanity 
were not required to be connected to the waging of a war of aggression. 
These judgments also clarified that crimes against humanity required 
the systematic commission of severe State-sponsored delicts. 
161 Tokyo Judgment, supra note 153, at 1159, 1182 (dissenting judgment of justice R.B. Pal). 
162XIX Trial of German Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 
472 (1947). 
163 Id. 
1997] CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 205 
H. Control Council Law Law No. 10: The Flick Case 
Following the war, the Allied Powers agreed to prosecute alleged 
German war criminals found within their zones of occupation. Control 
Council Law No. 10 defined crimes against humanity as "[a] trocities 
and offenses which included, but were not limited to, the various 
enumerated offenses. "164 In addition to murder, extermination, en-
slavement and deportation, the enumerated "inhumane acts" were 
expanded to include imprisonment, torture and rape. 165 A third modi-
fication was omitting the requirement that crimes against humanity 
must be undertaken in connection with any crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal. 166 An American court considered the scope of 
crimes against humanity in the Flick case. Count three charged Frie-
drich Flick, along with two other executives in the Flick firm, Otto 
Steinbrinck and Konrad Kaletsch, with crimes against humanity. The 
three allegedly exerted economic and political pressure on the Jewish 
owners of certain German industries which were subsequently acquired 
by the Flick firm. These events occurred prior to the Nazi invasion of 
Poland. 167 
The Flick Tribunal noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal had de-
clined to assume jurisdiction over crimes against humanity occurring 
prior to September 1, 1939. The court rejected the argument that its 
jurisdiction was broadened by the omission of the requirement that a 
crime against humanity should be in execution of, or in connection 
with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal from Control 
Council Law No. 10. The judges ruled that the Court had been estab-
lished to prosecute major Nazi war criminals and that nothing in 
164Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 art. 6(c), XVIII, XIX 
(1952). 
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or relig-
ious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where 
perpetrated. 
Id. at art. 6(c). 
165Id. 
166Id. 
167 United States v. Friedrich Flick, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1187, 1212 (1942) 
[hereinafter Flick judgment]. 
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the record indicated that crimes committed "before and wholly un-
connnected with the war" should have been punished.168 
The Tribunal next addressed the issues of whether property of-
fenses were encompassed within crimes against humanity? The taking 
of property by a sovereign without just compensation is prohibited 
under the law of many states, but is usually not considered a crime. A 
sale through pressure or duress may be challenged in equity, but the 
use of coercion, even when motivated by race or religion, does not 
constitute a crime against humanity. The court observed a distinction 
between industrial property and the dwellings, household furnishings, 
and food supplies of a persecuted people. The court explained, "in 
this case . . . we are . . . concerned with industrial property, a large 
portion of which (ore and coal mines) constitutes natural resources in 
which the state has a peculiar interest. "169 
The Tribunal noted that the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg had cited the involvement of various defendants in anti-
semitic economic discrimination. However, it does not appear that 
"[The] IMT considered, much less decided, that a person becomes 
guilty of a crime against humanity merely by exerting anti-Semitic 
pressure to procure by purchase or through state expropriation indus-
trial property owned by Jews. "170 
168Id. at 1213. Control Council Law No. 10 was expressly made subject in the Preamble to 
the requirements of the Nuremberg Charter. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 164. 
169Id. at 1214. 
To try war crimes is a task so large ... that there is neither necessity nor excuse 
for expecting this Tribunal to try persons for offenses wholly unconnected with the 
war .... [N] 0 one else has been prosecuted to date in any of these courts including 
IMT for crimes committed before and wholly unconnected with the war. We can 
see no purpose nor mandate in the chartering legislation of this Tribunal requiring 
it to take jurisdiction of such cases. 
Id. at 1213. Defendants were convicted for the confiscation of personal property. See United States. 
v. Oswald Pohl, reprinted in V TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 958, 978 (1950) [hereinafter WVHA Judg-
ment]. 
170 FlickJudgment, supra note 167, at 1215. The Tribunal noted that economic discrimination 
against Jews had been cited in the cases of Funk and Seyss-Inquart. See id. The Leadership Corps 
was declared a criminal organization based upon various acts, including economic discrimination 
against Jews. See id. The Court observed that crimes against humanity is an awkward and ambigu-
ous concept which through self-interested interpretation may be used to justifY intervention into 
the affairs a third-party State. See id. Despite the elastic nature of this concept, earlier discussions 
all concur that crimes against humanity are directed against physical threats and injuries and do 
not encompass property offenses. See id. The latter, of course, may be incidental to the persecu-
tion of peoples. See id. 
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Control Council Law No. 10 punished "atrocities and offenses," 
including "murder, extermination" and other crimes against the per-
son. l7l Property is not mentioned. The doctrine ejusdem generis, accord-
ing to the Tribunal, dictates that the scope of "other persecutions" 
include "only such as affect the life and liberty of the oppressed 
peoples. Compulsory taking of industrial property, however reprehen-
sible, is not in that category. "172 Thus, "[ w] hether we hold that we have 
no jurisdiction or whether we assume jurisdiction and hold that no 
crime against humanity has been proved, the result ... is the same .... 
[T] he evidence ... relates to subject matter not within [our] jursdic-
tion."173 
I. Control Council Law No. 10: The Medical Case 
The Medical Judgment was the second decision issued by an Ameri-
can war crimes court under Control Council Law No. 10. The defen-
dants were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
counts were identical other than that war crimes were alleged to have 
been directed against "civilians and members of the armed forces then 
at war with the German Reich ... in the exercise of belligerent con-
trol."174 The same acts in Count Four were alleged to have been di-
rected against "German civilians and nationals of other countries."175 
These charges were based on involuntary experiments involving simu-
lated high-altitudes, freezing water, mustard and poison gas survivabil-
ity, the effect of spotted fever, poison and incendiary devices, bone, 
muscle and nerve regeneration, and the potability of sea water. 176 The 
protocols allegedly resulted in brutalities, tortures, disabling injury, 
and death. 177 In addition, they contravened international conventions, 
the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law, 
171Id. at 1215. (discussing Control Council Law No. 10, at art. 6(c). Article 6(b)), which 
punishes war crimes, specifically lists "offenses against persons or property." See Control Council 
Law No.10, supra note 164, art. 6(b). 
172 Flick Judgment, supra note 167, at 1215. 
173Id. at 1216. 
174 United States v. Karl Brandt, reprinted in II TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERN-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 171, 174 (1950) [hereinafter 
MedicaIJudgment]. Counts two and three alleged in substance that between September 1939 and 
April 1945 that the defendants were involved in medical experiments without the subjects' 
consent. See id. These resulted in '''murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, and other 
inhuman acts.'" Id. at 175. 
175Id. 
176Id. at 175-78. 
177 Id. at 183. 
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Control Council Law No. 10 as well as "usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of 
public conscience."178 
The Tribunal concluded that "[j]udged by any standard" the re-
cord revealed the commission of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity during World War 11.179 These were "not the isolated and casual 
acts of individual doctors and scientists ... but were the product of 
coordinated policy-making and planning at high governmental, mili-
tary and Nazi Party levels, conducted as an integral part of the total 
war effort. "180 
Karl Brandt was Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health 
Services with plenary power over health affairs. He was convicted of 
involvement in various experiments and also was determined to have 
organized and administered the euthanasia program, involving the 
gassing of so-called incurables. This was subsequently extended to Jews 
and concentration camp inmates who were considered unfit for work. 
Brandt alleged that he was involved in the euthanasia of incurables, 
but then turned his attention to other affairs and was uninvolved in 
the extermination of Jews and other concentration camp inmates. The 
Tribunal ruled that he had breached his duty to supervise the pro-
gram: "A discharge of that duty would have ... revealed ... that ... 
its [euthanasia] purposes were prostituted by men for whom Brandt 
was responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals were 
exterminated . . . . "181 
Brandt argued that euthanasia was justified to alleviate the pain 
and expense of the incurably ill. The Tribunal did not address the 
prerogtive of a State to subject its citizens to euthanasia. But, "[a] ssum-
ing that it may do so, the Family of Nations is not obligated to give 
recognition to such legislation when it manifestly gives legality to plain 
murder and torture of defenseless and powerless human beings of 
1781d. 
1791d. at 181. 
180 Medical Judgement, supra note 174, at 181. Coincidental with the initiation of World War 
II, "criminal medical experiments on non-German nationals, both prisoners of war and civilians, 
including Jews and 'asocial' persons, were carried out on a large scale in Germany and the 
occupied countries." ld. These acts were "ordered, sanctioned, permitted, or approved by persons 
in positions of authority who under all principles of law were under the duty to know about these 
things and to take steps to terminate or prevent them." ld. 
1811d. at 197. The evidence, in any event, is "conclusive that almost at the outset of the 
program, non-German nationals were selected for euthanasia and exterminated." ld. 
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other nations."182 The Court concluded that "[t]o the extent that these 
criminal acts did not constitute war crimes they constituted crimes 
against humanity. "183 
Karl Gebhardt was a consulting surgeon in the Waffen Schutzstaf-
fel (commonly known as the SS) and chief clinical officer of the Reich 
Physician SS and Police. He participated in sulfanilamide protocols 
upon non-consenting human subjects, during which several died. Vari-
ous female subjects also were subjected to bone, muscle and nerve 
regeneration and bone transplantation experiments. Gebhardt, as chief 
clinical officer, also approved sea-water and sterilization protocols. 184 
He contended that in the interest of advancing medical knowledge, a 
State may subject prisoners condemned to death to painful experimen-
tal protocols. The Tribunal concluded that: 
[w] hatever may be the right of a state with reference to its 
own citizens, it is certain that such legislation may not be 
extended so as to permit the practice upon nationals of other 
countries who, held in the most abject servitude, are sub-
jected to experiments without their consent and under the 
most brutal and senseless conditions.185 
Gebhardt was convicted of aiding, abetting and taking a consent-
ing part in medical experiments upon non-German nationals without 
their consent. This resulted in maiming and other inhuman treatment: 
"To the extent that these experiments did not constitute war crimes, 
they constituted crimes against humanity. "186 
The Medical Tribunal ruled that crimes against humanity are not 
ameliorated by a good motive. Defendant Wolfram Sievers was Reich 
Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe Society which was devoted to 
racial research. Sievers obtained funds, materials, equipment and con-
centration camp inmates for experimental research. He claimed that 
he served as business manager in order to monitor Himmler's activities 
and to obtain information of utility to the resistance. The Tribunal 
182Id. at 198. The evidence indicates that Brandt's dereliction of duty contributed to the 
extermination of non-German nationals. See id. 
183 Medical Judgement, supra note 174, at 198. 
184Id. at 224-26. 
185Id. at 227. The law of war, under some circumstances, permits the execution of spies and 
illegal combatants. See id. The law of war, however, "does not under any circumstances counte-
nance the infliction of death or other punishment by maiming or torture." Id. at 224. 
186Id. at 227. 
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ruled that "murders were committed with cooperation of the Ah-
nenerbe upon countless thousands of wretched concentration camp 
inmates who had not the slightest means of resistance .... It certainly 
is not the law that a resistance worker can commit no crime, and least 
of all, against the very people he is supposed to be protecting. "187 
The Medical Judgment thus held that State-sponsored euthanasia 
and involuntary medical experiments against non-German nationals 
during wartime constituted crimes against humanity. VVhatever the 
legality of euthansia or involuntary medical experimentation against a 
State's own citizens, such practices are contrary to international law 
when directed against non-nationals. The Tribunal made no attempt 
to connect the abuse of German nationals with crimes against peace 
and was content to limit its judgment to non-nationals. There also was 
no effort to distinctly differentiate crimes against humanity from war 
crimes-the only demonstrable distinction was that the latter was in-
tended to safeguard civilians. 188 
J. Control Council Law No. 10: The Justice Case 
The Justice case clarified and extended the concept of crimes 
against humanity. The defendants were leading legal officials, judges 
and lawyers in the Third Reich. They were charged with participation 
in a "government-organized system of cruelty and injustice, in violation 
of the laws of war and of humanity, and perpetrated in the name of 
law by the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and through the instru-
mentality of the courts. "189 The accomplishment of aggressive war, the 
elimination of political opposition and the extermination of European 
187 Medical judgment, supra note 174, at 263,292-94 (discussing Adolf Pokorny). On the 
other hand, defendant Kurt Blome, who was Plenipotentiary for Cancer Research, was acquitted 
based on the defense that he advocated criminal conduct which resulted in less harm than that 
which would have resulted from the plan contemplated by his superiors. See id. Blome persuaded 
Heinrich Himmler to intern rather than exterminate tubercular Poles. See id. There was no 
evidence that any Poles were deprived of their life or property. See id. The Tribunal determined 
that a moral or humanitarian appeal would have had a minimal impact upon Himmler or Hitler. 
See id. at 231-34. "[Ilt cannot be held that the latter was not well-worded when considered as an 
attempt to put an end to the plan originally adopted, and to bring the substitution of another 
plan not so drastic. Whatever may have been its purpose, the record shows that ... the letter did 
in fact divert Himmler from his original program and that as a result ... the extermination plan 
was abandoned." Id. at 234. 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 174-87. 
189 United States. v. josef Altstoetter, reprinted in III TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 954, 985 (1951) 
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Jewry required the Nazis "to harness the Ministry of Justice and the 
entire court system for the enforcement of the penal laws in accord-
ance with National Socialist ideology."19o 
The Tribunal noted that the prohibition on crimes against hu-
manity are "not surplusage," but are intended to supplement the pre-
ceding sections on war crimes by including acts absent from the pre-
ceding definitions.l9l War Crimes encompass atrocities committed against 
civilians in, or from, occupied territories, whereas crimes against hu-
manity prohibit atrocities "against any civilian population. "192 The crimes 
against humanity provision also prohibits persecutions on racial, relig-
ious, or political grounds, regardless of whether such acts are sanc-
tioned under domestic law. This language clearly indicates that "acts 
by Germans against German nationals may constitute crimes against 
humanity within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to punish. "193 
The Tribunal noted that the prosecution of persons charged with 
crimes against humanity is limited "both by definition and illustration, 
as appears from C.C. Law 10."194 Control Council Law No. 10 employs 
the words "against any civilian population" rather than "against any 
civilian individual. "195 This precludes the isolated crime-the provision 
is "directed against offenses and inhumane acts and persecutions on 
[hereinafter Justice Judgment]. The Tribunal asserted that its jurisdiction was based on the Reich's 
unconditional surrender and the resulting Allied occupation of Germany. See id. at 960. The 
perameters of the Court's power was defined by Control Council Law No. 10 which was a joint 
legislative act by the occupying powers. Id. at 965. The Court also contended that Control Council 
Law No. 10 was an expression of existing international law. See id. at 966. 
]90Id. at 999. 
]9] Id. at 972. The judgment suggested that not all of the acts enumerated as crimes against 
humanity were violative of preexisting international law. See id. The punishment of these acts 
rested upon the exercise of the Allied Powers' condominum jurisdiction over Germany. 
All of the war crimes and many, if not all, of the crimes against humanity ... were 
... violative of preexisting principles of international law .... C.C. Law 10 may be 
deemed to be a codifiction rather than original substantive legislation. Insofar as 
C.C. Law 10 may be thought to go beyond established principles of international 
law, its authority, of course, rests upon the exercise of the "sovereign legislative 
ower" of the countries to which which the German Reich unconditionally surren-
dered. 
Id. at 966. 
]92JusticeJudgment, supra note 189, at 972. 
]93Id. at 973. The Allied Tribunals were authorized to act as a German court and to adjudicate 
crimes committed by "persons of German citizenship or nationality against other persons of 
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political, racial, or religious grounds systematically organized and con-
ducted by or with the approval of government."I96 
The Tribunal, in the justice case, stressed that the evidence indi-
cates that the defendants' inhumane acts were committed in execution 
of, and in connection with aggressive war, and therefore satisfied the 
requirements of crimes against humanity established in the Nurem-
berg Charter. The Tribunal stressed, however, that there was no re-
quirement that this connection be established. Control Council Law 
No. 10 "differs materially from the Charter" and "defines crimes against 
humanity as inhumane acts, etc., committed, 'in execution of, or in 
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal,' 
whereas in C.c. 10 the words last quoted are deliberately omitted from 
the definition. "197 
The Tribunal rejected the contention that this was retroactive 
punishment. The defendants' acts constituting war crimes or crimes 
against humanity were in direct violation of German criminal law. The 
prohibition of ex post facto punishment, "as a rule of justice and fair 
play, should be no defense if the act ... in violation of C.C. Law 10 
was also known . . . to be a punishable crime under . . . domestic 
law."198 
The justice Tribunal thus affirmed that crimes against humanity 
were limited to the systematic commission of severe, State-sponsored 
delicts. The Court extended crimes against humanity to encompass 
crimes committed by Germans against German nationals prior to, and 
independent of, the initiation of aggressive war. The Tribunal noted 
196Id. "It is not the isolated crime by a private German individual which is condemned, nor 
is it the isolated crime perpetrated by the German Reich through its officers against a private 
individual." Id. 
We hold that crimes against humanity as defined in e.e. Law 10 must be strictly 
construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity or persecution whether committed 
by private individuals or by governmental authority. As we construe it, that section 
provides for punishment of crimes committed against German nationals only where 
there is proof of conscious participation in systematic government organized or 
aproved procedures amounting to atoricities and offenses of the kind specified in 
the act and committed against populations or amounting to persecutions on politi-
cal, racial, or religious grounds. 
Id. at 982. 
197Id. at 974. 
198 See Control Council Law No.lO, supra note 164, at 977. The Tribunal argued that many 
of the laws of the Weimar era which protect human rights were never repealed. See id. The 
defendants conduct thus was in violation of domestic law. See id. International law, according to 
the judgment, "requires proof before conviction that the accused knew or should have known 
that in matters of international concern he was guilty of participation in a nationally organized 
system of injustice and persecution shocking to the moral sense of mankind, and that he knew 
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that violations of the laws and customs of war will no longer be the 
only offenses recognized by common international law. 199 
The Tribunal commented that this interpretation reflected a shrink-
ing of the scope of States' domestic jurisdiction which was immune 
from international regulation. 20o 
The Court noted that Nuremberg was the culmination of a grow-
ing international concern with the welfare of the individual. There was 
a realization that the abuse of individuals may attain international 
significance due to a direct and adverse impact upon the rights and 
interests of other States.201 It would not be inaccurate to declare that: 
[T]yrannical conduct, or massacres, or religious persecutions 
are wholly unrelated to the foreign relations of the territorial 
sovereign .... [T] he society of nations ... may not unreason-
ably maintain that a state yielding to such excesses renders 
itself unfit to perform its international obligations, especially 
... as they pertain to the protection of foreign life and prop-
erty within its domain.202 
The Tribunal bolstered this contention by pointing to the fact that 
as far back as 1827, in an effort to safeguard the interests of humanity, 
American and European States had both intervened, and threatened 
to intervene in other States.203 Control Council Law No. 10, according 
to the Court, thus was "limited ... to the type of criminal activity which 
or should have known that he would be subject to punishment if caught." Id. at 977-78. The 
defendants possessed the requisite intent and cannot complain that the subsequent codification 
of such a crime constitutes retroactive punishment-the Allied Powers repeatedly warned of their 
intent to punish the perpetrators of the acts sanctioned in Control Council Law No. 10. See id. 
Control Council Law No 10 also does not recognize a superior orders defense-individuals are 
subject to punishment regardless of whether their acts were consistent with the domestic law of 
their country. See id. at 983. Governmental participation is a material element of a crime against 
humanity. See id. Such involvement, thus, may not be asserted as a defense. See id. at 984. 
Id. 
The very essence of the prosecution case is that the laws, the Hitlerian decrees and 
the Draconic, corrupt, and perverted Nazi judicial system themselves constituted 
the substance of war crimes and crimes against humanity and that participation in 
the enactment and enforcement of them amounts to complicity in crime. 
199Id. at 979. Control Council Law No. 10 "is not limited to the punishment of persons guilty 
of violating the laws and customs of war in the narrow sense; furthermore, it can no longer be 
said that violations of the laws and customs of war are the only offenses recognized by common 
international law." Id. 
200Id. 
201 See Control Council Law No.10, supra note 164, at 980. 
202Id. 
203Id. at 981-82. 
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prior to 1939 was and still is a matter of international concern." Such 
atrocities "were acts of such scope and malevolence ... [that] they so 
clearly imperiled the peace of the world that they must be deemed to 
have become violations of international law. "204 Regardless of whether 
the concept of crimes against humanity is the "product of statute or of 
common international law, or as we believe, of both, we find no injus-
tice to persons tried for such crimes. They are chargeable with knowl-
edge that such acts were wrong and were punishable when committed."205 
The Justice Tribunal convicted Oswald Rothaug, director of the 
district court in Nuremberg, of crimes committed within Germany 
against German nationals. In one instance in 1942, Rothaug sentenced 
a sixty-eight year-old Jew to death for racial pollution. The evidence 
indicated that the defendant greeted a young family friend with a kiss 
and permitted her to momentarily sit on his lap.206 The Justice Tribunal 
concluded that Rothaug: 
[i) n spite of the legal sophistries which he employed, was 
merely an instrument in the program of the leaders of the 
Nazi State of persecution and extermination .... His acts 
were ... terrible in that those who might have hoped for a 
last refuge in the institutions of justice found these institu-
tions turned against them and a part of the program of terror 
and oppression.207 
The Court ruled that crimes against humanity may not be justified 
by an alleged effort to prevent more atrocious acts. 
Franz Schlegel berger served as Secretary of State in the Reich 
Ministry of Justice. He was instrumental in creating a criminal justice 
and judicial system which was calibrated to the Nazi legal cosmology. 
This centralized system subsequently was extended to the occupied 
territories. Schlegelberger also assisted in arranging the so-called "Night 
and Fog" procedure, which involved the secret detention and depor-
tation of suspected political dissidents in the occupied territories. 208 
204Id. at 982. The Tribunal noted that Hitler based his intervention into Czechoslovakia on 
the grounds of that country's purported persecution of racial Germans which he alleged was 
violative of international law. See id. The Court cited the crime of genocide as the exemplar of 
crimes against humanity. See id. at 983. 
205Id. 
206Id. at 1151-54. 
207Id. at 1155-56. Rothaug thus was involved in a national program of racial persecution and 
"participated in the crime of genocide." Id. at 1156. 
208Id. at 1081-85. 
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The Tribunal noted that Schlegelberger's weakening of the rule 
of law had set the stage for the triumph of terror. This introduced an 
"element of evil to the State which is not found in ... atrocities which 
do not sully judicial robes. "209 
The Tribunal also commented on the meaning of "political per-
secution" within the definition of crimes against humanity in Control 
Council Law No. 10.210 Defendant Rudolf Oeschey served on the Spe-
cial Court at Nuremberg. He sentenced Count Montgelas to death for 
privately insulting Hitler and approving of the assassination attempt 
on Hitler's life. The Count was placed in solitary confinement, denied 
counsel and secretly indicted, prosecuted and executed within a two 
day period.211 
The Tribunal ruled that prosecutions for remarks hostile to the 
Nazi regime do not constitute a violation of Control Council Law No. 
10. The tribunal did note however: 
the circumstances under which the defendant was brought to 
trial and the manner in which he was tried convince us that 
Monteglas was not convicted for undermining the already 
collapsed defensive strength of the defeated nation, but on 
the contrary, that the law was deliberately invoked ... as a 
last vengeful act of political persecution. If the provisions of 
e.e. Law 10 do not cover this case, we do not know what kind 
of political persecution it would cover.212 
The prohibition on political and racial persecution thus pertains to 
the motive and factual basis for the prosecution. The Tribunal 
depended heavily upon circumstantial evidence to establish a politi-
cal motive in the Montgelas case.213 
209 Id. at 1086. Hitler presented Schlegelberger with 100,000 Reichmarks as a gift upon 
Schlegelberger's retirement. See id. The Tribunal recognized that Schlegelberger was not an 
ardent Nazi. See id. Nevertheless, "he sold [his] intellect and ... scholarship to Hitler for a mess 
of political pottage and for the vain hope of personal security." Id. at 1087. 
210 See Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 164, at 1164. 
211 Id. at 1163-65. 
212Id. at 1164. The Tribunal ruled that laws against habitual criminals, looters, hoarders or 
those guilty of undermining the defense strength of the nation were a valid exercise of State 
power. But, "these laws were in many instances applied in an arbitrary and brutal manner 
shocking to the conscience of mankind and punishable here." Id. at 1165. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 211-12. 
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K. Control Council Law No. 10: The Einstazgruppen Case 
Crimes against humanity also were discussed in the Einsatzgruppen 
case, which involved the prosecution of the commanders of the killing 
squads which shadowed the German troops advancing into Poland and 
Russia. These units liquidated two million Jews, Gypsies, the mentally 
and physically challenged, communists, and political dissidents.214 
The Einsatzgruppen Court saw the codification of crimes against 
humanity as the culmination of a trend towards the international 
protection of the integrity and rights of individuals. The desire to 
punish these acts previously "existed only in the hearts of mankind" 
and "has now been written into the books of men as the law of human-
ity. "215 The Court grounded crimes against humanity within the princi-
ples of justice common to all civilized States. "[M] urder becomes no 
less murder because directed against a whole race instead of a single 
person. "216 
Absent a legal mechanism to bring the perpetrators of atrocity to 
justice, only the ineffective and impractical mechanisms of diplomatic 
protest and armed intervention previously were available. 217 As a result 
of the Nuremberg Charter, however, the "inalienable and fundamental 
rights of common man need not lack for a court ... [h]umanity can 
assert itself by law. It has taken on the role of authority. "218 
214 United States v. Otto Ohlendorf, reprinted in IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10411,412,415-16 (1950) 
[hereinafter Einsatzgrupen Judgment]. 
215Id. at 497. The Tribunal noted that it derived its existence from Control Council Law No. 
20, but that its subject matter jurisdiction resulted from international law "valid long prior to 
World War II." Id. at 454. The defendants were charged with murder which certainly did not 
involve retrospective punishment. See id. at 459. International law may be derived from written 
enactments-codes, treaties and conventions. See id. But, it also may develop through custom and 
usage and through the application of the common law. See id. at 458. The Court stressed that 
although crimes againt humanity were adjudicated at Nuremberg as an international offense for 
the "first time" that "this does not ... mean that a new offense has been added to the list [of] 
transgressions of man." Id. at 499. 
216Id. at 497. "A Fuehrer Order, announcing the death of classifications of human beings 
can have no more weight in the scales of international justice than the order of a highwayman 
or pirate." Id. 
217Id. at 497-98. 
218 Einsatzgrupen Judgment, supra note 214, at 498. The Tribunal was reluctant to concede 
that crimes against humanity were a novel offense. 
Although the Nuernberg trials represent the first time that international tribunals 
have adjudicated crimes against humanity as an international offense, this does not 
... mean that a new offense has been added to the list of transgressions of man. 
Nuernberg has only demonstrated how humanity can be defended in court, and it 
1997] CRIMES AGAINST HUMANJTY 217 
Crimes against humanity under Control Council Law No. 10 are 
not restricted to times of war, but protection to humanity at all times.219 
The Tribunal thus possesses wide jurisdiction to try crimes against 
humanity, regardless of the nationality of the victim.220 None of the 
indictment's charged defendants with crimes against any specified 
country, but against humanity as a whole. 221 Humanity was the sover-
eignty which had been offended and the Tribunal was convoked to 
determine why. 222 
The Tribunal noted that those indicted for crimes against human-
ity were being prosecuted before an American Tribunal. However, the 
defendants were not solely accountable to the Allied Powers. They also 
were responsible to "humanity itself, humanity which has no political 
boundaries and no geographical limitations."223 The prohibition on the 
killing of non-combatants had been incorporated into international 
treaties on the humanitarian law of war for some time. The prosecution 
of such acts as crimes against humanity, as well as war crimes under 
Control Council Law No. 10, was intended to vindicate the interests of 
people as well as victim States.224 
The prosecution of crimes against humanity filled a vacuum in law 
enforcement. International jurisdiction provided protection when the 
domestic criminal system failed to respond. The Tribunal noted that 
crimes against humanity only fall within international jurisdiction when 
the state involved, because of indifference, impotency or complicity, 
has not taken measures to prevent the crimes and punish the crimi-
nals.225 The Einsatzgruppen Tribunal thus viewed crimes against human-
is inconceivable that with this precedent extant, the law of humanity should ever 
lack for a tribunal. 
Jd. at 499. 
219 Jd. at 497. 'These acts have unfortunatley been occurring since the world began, but not 
until now were they listed as international offenses." Jd. 
220 Jd. at 499. The killing squads victims in the Soviet Union included German nationals. 
See id. 
221 EinsatzgrupenJudgment, supra note 214, at 499. 
222 Jd. at 497. "This is not a new concept in the realm of morals, but it is an innovation in 
the empire of the law." Jd. 
22~ Jd. at 498. "Humanity is man itself. Humanity is the race which will go on in spite of all 
the fuehrers and dictators .... " Jd. at 498. 
224 See generally Einsatzgrupen Judgment, supra note 214, at 459. 
225 Jd. at 498. 
Where law exists a court will rise. Thus, the court of humanity ... will never 
adjourn .... It would be an admission of incapacity ... that mankind ... should 
be unable to maintain a tribunal holding inviolable the law of humanity, and, by 
doing so, preserve the human race itself. 
Id. at 499. 
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ity as an embodiment and fulfillment of a universal sentiment for 
justice. This was the ultimate vindication of the rule of law. 226 
The defendants attempted to claim that their civilian victims sup-
ported Bolshevism and therefore posed a threat to Germany. In con-
trast, the Tribunal ruled that "the genocide program was in no way 
connected with the protection of the Vaterland ... the argument that 
the Jews ... constituted an aggressive menace to Germany ... which 
called for their liquidation in self-defense, is untenable as being op-
posed to all facts, all logic and all law. "227 
The defendants claimed that they sacrified their victims in order 
to save their own lives. The Tribunal noted that the defendants were 
not required to place themselves in peril by protesting or resisting 
these killings. It determined, however, that there was no indication that 
the defendants had been compelled or coerced-they approved of the 
order to kill. Any expression of doubt or disability would have led to 
their being released from their lethal responsibilities. 228 Neither could 
a defendant claim in justification that protest was futile since others 
would have carried out the Nazi's policies. Individuals are responsible 
only for their own conduct, and cannot accurately calibrate the impact 
of their acts on others. In fact, protest may have emoldened others 
to act.229 
The indictments in the other American prosecutions were limited 
to acts committed during armed conflict and the judges did not ad-
dress the scope of crimes against humanity.230 Defendants, for the most 
part, were convicted of both crimes against humanity and war crimes 
based upon the same underlying facts. 231 The Tribunal in the RuSHA 
case did note that the acts charged as: 
226Id. at 462-63. 
227Id. at 469-70. The Tribunal distinguished between the incidental killing of civilians during 
an air attack and the killing squad's mass and indiscriminate killing of Jews. See id. at 467. 
228 Einsatzgrupen Judgment, supra note 214, at 480-81. Some defendants contended that 
resistance was futile. See id. But, "[n]o one can shrug off so appalling a moral responsibility with 
the statement that there was no point in trying." Id. at 482. A soldier could not be accused of 
cowardice who sought to avoid involvement in assassination of civilians. See id. at 485. 
229 Id. at 485. 
230 See United States v. Alfried Krupp, reprinted in IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 1327, 1374 (1950). "All 
of the acts relied upon as constituting crimes against humanity occurred during and in connec-
tion with the war." Id. Defendants were held liable under Control Council Law No. 10 for taking 
a consenting part in crimes against humanity. See id. Liability was imposed on defendants who 
were "part of an organization actively engaged in crimes again sty humanity, [who were] aware of 
those crimes and who yet voluntarily remained a part of that organization lending [their] own 
professional efforts to the continuance and furtherance of those crimes .... " Id. 
231 See WVHAJudgment, supra note 169, at 962. 
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[c]rimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law 
No. 10 ... are violative of international conventions, and 
particularly ... the Hague Regulations (1907), and are viola-
tive of the general principles of criminal law as derived from 
the criminal laws of all civilized nations and of the internal 
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were com-
mitted.232 
219 
This suggested that the RuSHA recognized that crimes against 
humanity could be punished in times of peace as well as war. 
L. Control Council Law No. 10 And Crimes Against 
Humanity: Summary 
The American courts convened under Control Council Law No. 
10 agreed that their power and authority was a product of the Allied 
Powers' co-dominion jurisdiction over Germany. The judges acknow-
ledged that they were constrained by the statutory architecture of the 
article defining the scope of crimes against humanity. Some courts, 
however, noted that crimes against humanity were also rooted in cus-
tomary international law. 233 
The Flick Tribunal was alone in interpreting the crimes against 
humanity provision of Control Council Law No. 10 in accordance with 
the narrow Nuremberg precedent.234 The justice and Einsatzgruppen 
Tribunals noted that the text did not dictate that crimes against hu-
manity were to be undertaken in connection with a war of aggression 
or war crime. This meant that courts were free to take cognizance of 
the treatment accorded to German nationals prior to the initiation of 
the Reich's wars of aggression without linking such acts to the initiation 
of aggressive war.235 Crimes against humanity thus were envisioned as 
extending the scope of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.236 The panels con-
curred that crimes against humanity were limited to severe and system-
atic State violations of international law. 237 Mass atrocities and extermi-
nations were prohibited under the law of all civilized legal systems and 
232 United States v. Ulrich Greifelt, reprinted in V TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 88, 153 (1950) [here· 
inafter RuSHA Judgment]. 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 194-96. 
234 See supra text accompanying notes 170-71. 
23;; See supra text accompanying notes 168, 191-93. The Medical Judgment avoided addressing 
this issue-limiting itself to the treatment of non-German nationals. See generally Medical Judg-
ment, supra note 174. 
236 See supra text accompanying note 191. 
237 See supra text accompanying note 199. 
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had been continuously condemned, posing no issue of retroactive 
punishment.238 
A significant number of judges thus extended crimes against hu-
manity into areas traditionally viewed as within States' domestic juris-
diction. This reflected a realization that catastrophic criminal conduct 
threatened global peace and stability and that, as a result, the safe-
guarding of individuals had evolved into a matter of international 
concern. A regime which engaged in such conduct also was an unfit 
and unworthy member of the community of nations. The international 
punishment of these penal offenses was intended to provide effective 
prosecution in those instances in which domestic institutions were 
stymied by the self-interest of the States.239 
The Control Council No. 10 judgments severed the connection 
between armed conflict and crimes against humanity. The Eighth 
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, in July 1947, extended 
the concept of crimes against humanity to encompass the protection 
of the fundamental human rights of individuals based upon their 
national, political, racial, or religious groupS.240 
The e~tension of international jurisdiction into areas formerly 
considered to be within States' domestic jurisdiction, of course, was not 
universally endorsed.241 Crimes against humanity, however, were estab-
lished as a core concept in international jurisprudence and were ref-
erenced and incorporated into various domestic military codes. The 
Belgium Decree of December 13, 1944 established a commission to 
investigate violations of international law and the laws of customs of 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 215-18. 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 201-05, 225. 
240 Sydney L. Goldenberg, Crimes Against Humanity-1945-1970 10 v.w.o. L. REv. 1, 12 
(l971) (quoting the Eigth Conference for the V nification of Penal Law, July, 1947). 
Id. 
Whoever, abusing the sovereign power of the State, of which he is the soldier, agent 
or protege, deprives without right, by reason of their nationality, their race, their 
religion or their opinion, an individual, or group of individuals or a collectivity, of 
one of the elementary rights attaching to the human being, that is to say: 
-right to life 
-right to corporeal integrity and health 
-right to individual liberty 
-right to found a family 
-'droit de cite' 
-right to free work, sufficeintly remunerated to secure the subsistence of the 
individual and of his family 
-right to improve oneself, to learn, to profess a religion or a philosophical opinion, 
commits a crime against humanity. 
241 See supra text accompanying note 168. 
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war. The Preamble recalled that "numerous violations of the rules of 
International Law and of the obligations of humanity have been com-
mitted by the invaders."242 Similarly, the Luxemburg Grand Ducal De-
cree of July 3, 1945, which established a National Office for the Inves-
tigation of War Crimes, referred in its Preamble "to the numerous 
violations of international law and of the obligations of humanity which 
have been committed by the invader .... "243 The Austrian Constitutional 
Law of July 26, 1945 provided for the punishment of those contraven-
ing the accepted rules of international law, the laws of war, as well as 
"'the natural principles of humanity. "'244 The Danish Act for the prose-
cution of war crimes of July 13, 1946 incorporated the text of the 
Nuremberg Charter.245 The United Nations War Crimes Commission 
also affirmed that crimes against humanity were not required to be 
connected with the waging of a war of aggression. 
M. United Nations War Crimes Commission 
The Allied Powers charged the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission with responsibility for investigating and compiling evidence of 
war crimes. The Commission also issued legal opinions relating to war 
crimes and the penal liability of purported perpetrators.246 The United 
States representatives to the Legal Committee drew attention to the 
atrocities which were committed against German Jews and Catholics as 
well other offenses perpetrated on religious or racial grounds. The 
representatives proposed that the Commission should consider "crimes 
committed against stateless persons or against any persons because 
of their race or relgion as 'crimes against humanity."'247 The repre-
sentatives explained that these acts threatened the foundation of civi-
lization, regardless of time, geography or contravention of the laws and 
customs of war. 248 
The Czechoslovakian representative stressed that such criminal 
conduct could no longer be regarded as within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the Axis Powers. The admonitions issued by Allied leaders 
242 Schwelb, supra note 10, at 223. 
243Id. 
244 Id. The law later refers to "the natural principles of humanity." Id. 
245Id. at 224. 
246 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMMISSION 120,169 (1948) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES COMMISSION]. 
247Id. at 175. 
248Id. The Belgian representative to the Committee on Facts and Evidence had made a 
similar, but unsuccessful proposal in April 1944. See id. at 173. 
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during World War II were a recognition that such acts were a matter 
of international concern which had been instrumental in precipitating 
armed conflict.249 The Legal Committee urged the War Crimes Com-
mission to transcend the strict standard for war crimes and to expand 
its jurisdiction to crimes against humanity. Such crimes, in accordance 
with the spirit of the Nuremberg Charter, en om passed "crimes com-
mitted against any person without regard to nationality, stateless per-
sons included, because of race, nationality, religious or political belief, 
irrespective of where they have been committed. "250 The War Crimes 
Commission, following an extended debate, somewhat ambiguously 
determined in 1945 that "crimes against humanity ... were war crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission. "251 
The Committee on Facts and Evidence implemented this proposal 
and implicated a commander of an Austrian unit for crimes against 
humanity committed prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Two ad-
ditional charges against Czechoslovakians and ten allegations against 
Italians and Yugoslavs resulted in findings of crimes against human-
ity.252 A report by the Legal Committee, adopted by the War Crimes 
Commission in 1947, limited crimes against humanity to acts which by 
their "number, magnitude and savagery ... contributed to a systematic 
pattern of abuse. "253 Such systematic offenses were required to have 
been carried out pursuant to an official governmental policy. 254 
In the next phase in the development of crimes against humanity, 
the United Nations affirmed that crimes against humanity were not 
required to be connected to an aggressive war and could be committed 
in periods of peace. The United Nations also proclaimed that domestic 
statutes of limitations were inapplicable to crimes against humanity. 
These developments reflected that the international interest in pun-
249Id. at 175. 
250 Id. at 176. Delicts which transcended war crimes were described as a "violation of the 
criminal laws of the countries invaded or otherwise affected, or of the laws and customs of war, 
of the general principles of criminal law as recognised by civilised nations, or of the laws of 
humanity and dictates of the public conscience as provided in the Hague Preamble." Id. 
251 WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 246, at 177. 
252Id. at 177-78. 
253Id. at 179. 
254Id. The report detailed that there were two types of crimes against humanity-the "murder 
type" and the "persecution type." Id. at 178. These delicts were designed to protect civilians and 
may be committed prior to, or during, the war. See id. The nationality of the victim and whether 
the act was contrary to domestic law was irrelevant See id. The perpetrators, as well as those who 
planned and ordered crimes against humanity, all were criminally liable. See id. at 178-79. 
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ishing war crimes was considered to take precedence over municipal 
law and politics. 
III. PosT-NuREMBERG U.N. DEVELOPMENTS 
A. The Genocide Convention 
Polish scholar and attorney Raphael Lemkin is credited with coin-
ing the neologism "genocide"255 to denote the destruction of a nation 
or ethnic group. Lemkin explained that genocide is derived "from the 
ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus 
corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homo-
cide, infanticide, etc. "256 He noted that the extreme form of this crime 
entails the extermination of an entire group. However, the more typi-
cal pattern involves a systematic assault on a group's economic, politi-
cal, religious and social life. Those who are victimized are singled out 
for persecution based upon their group membership rather than their 
individual characteristics.257 
The leading post-war European precedents concerning genocide 
are a triad of prosecutions before the Supreme National Tribunal of 
Poland. These cases resulted in the conviction and execution of three 
mcyor Nazi officials, but contributed little to clarifying the definition 
or scope of the crime of genocide. Amon Leopold Goeth served as 
commandant of the forced labor camp at Plaszow (Cracow) between 
February 11, 1943 and September 13, 1944. He ordered or indirectly 
caused the deaths of roughly 8,000 inmates. He also liquidated the 
Cracow and Tarnow Jewish ghettos as well as the forced labor camp at 
Szebnie and appropriated currency and valuable metals.258 In convict-
ing Goeth, the Tribunal noted that "[t]he wholesale extermination of 
Jews and ... of Poles had all the characteristics of genocide in the 
biological meaning of this term and embraced, in addition, the de-
255 See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AxIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE LAws OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS 
OF GoVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 79 (1944). 
256Id. 
257Id. Lemkin described two phases of genocide: the destruction of the customary culture 
of the victims; and its replacement by that of the oppressor. Id. He proposed two new international 
crimes: barbarity, oppressive and destructive actions directed against members of a national, 
religious or racial group; and vandalism, the malicious destruction of works and art and culture 
thought to represent the artistic destruction of an oppressed group. Id. at 91. 
258Trial of Haupsturmfuhrer Amon Leopold Goeth, 7 I.L.R. 1 (1948)(discussing the Su-
preme National Tribunal Policy of 1946). 
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struction of the cultural life of these nations."259 Rudolf Franz Ferdi-
nand Hoess was commandant of Auschwitz from May 1,1940 until the 
end of October 1943 and served as commander of the security police 
garrison at Auschwitz between June and August 1944. The Tribunal 
paid particular attention to the medical experiments engineered by 
Hoess which were designed to "lower or destroy the reproductive 
power of the Jews, Poles, Czechs and other non-German nations which 
were considered by the Nazis as standing in the way of the fulfillment 
of German plans of world domination. . . . [T] hey were preparatory 
to the carrying out of the crime of genocide."260 
Artur Greiser was Deputy Gauleiter of the Nazi Party for the 
Danzig District and President of the Senate of occupied Danzig. Greiser's 
involvement in the deportation and extermination of Jews and Poles 
and in the Germanization of Polish children was characterized as 
"physical and spiritual genocide. "261 He was convicted of having or-
dered, approved and facilitated "the general totalitarian genocidal 
attack on the rights of the small and medium nations to exist, and to 
have an identity and culture of their own."262 
The United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. Article One states 
that "[t]he Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international 
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish."263 Article Four 
provides that individuals commmitting genocide "shall be punished 
259Id. at 9. 
The criminal activities of the accused Amon Goeth in the Cracow district were 
but a fragment of a wide action which aimed at the extermination of the Jewish 
population in Europe .... [T]he ... freedom of the Jews was ... restricted; they 
were ... deprived of personal freedom and confined in ... ghettoes. From there 
they were ... transferred to concentration camps and eventually murdered in a 
wholesale manner by shooting and in gas-chambers. Large numbers ... perished 
in each stage ... through inhuman treatment and torture or were individually 
murdered by German and Ukrainian henchmen. 
Id. at 2. 
260 Trial of Obersturmbannfuhrer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 7 I.L.R. 11, 25 (1948)( dis-
cussing the Supreme National Tribunal Policy of 1947) (Notes On The Case). 
261 Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, XlII I.L.R. 70, 114 (1949) (discussing the Supreme 
National Tribunal). 
262Id. 
263Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of The Crime Of Genocide, Jan 12, 
1951, art. I, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
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whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or 
private individuals. "264 
The phrase "in time of war and in time of peace" in Article One 
was inserted by the Ad Hoc Committee in order to clarify that, unlike 
the Nuremberg Charter, the Genocide Convention is not limited to 
acts committed during armed conflict.265 This was supported in the 
Sixth Committee,266 but some argued for a broader phrase which would 
clearly encompass situations of civil unrest or armed occupation.267 
Extensive debate took place over the description of genocide as a 
crime against international law in Article One. The preamble to the 
Secretariat's draft refers to genocide as a "crime against the Law of 
Nations."268 Article One of the Ad Hoc Committee's version charac-
terizes genocide as a "crime under internationallaw."269 A number of 
delegates urged that genocide should be referred to as a "crime against 
humanity" in order to identify the Convention with the proceedings at 
Nuremberg.27o Mr. Ordonneau of France, during the Committee de-
bates, argued that the "foundation-stone of the structure which was to 
defend the world from crimes committed against humanity had been 
laid at Nuremburg .... The Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, which 
now had to lay the second stone ... should base its work ... within 
the general framework of crimes against humanity."271 He later pro-
264 Id. at art. IV. The interpretation of the Genocide Convetion is based on three documents: 
Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, Commentary, U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/447 
(1947) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Comment]; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide 
to the Economic and Social Council on the Meetings of the Committee Held at Lake Success, New York, 
from April 5 to May 10,1948, 7U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No.6), U.N. Doc. E/794 (1948) [hereinafter 
Ad Hoc Committee Report]; Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, 
Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/760 (1948) [hereinafter Sixth 
Committee Report]. See Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee, U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. 
on Genocide, 6th Sess, 1st-28th mtgs., U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/SR.1-E/ AC.25/SR.28 (1948); Proceed-
ings of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm. 3d Sess., 63d-135th Mtgs. (1948). 
265 U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc. Comm. on Genocide, 6th Sess., 21st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/ AC.25/SR.21 (1948) (Referring to statements of Mr. Rudzinski). Mr. Rudzinski objected that 
mention of war implied that armed conflict was inevitable and suggested that the Genocide 
Convention should be made applicable at all times. Id. 
266U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 68th mtg. at 53 (1948). 
267Id. at 52 (Mr. Tarazi, Syria). 
268Secretary-General's Comment, supra note 264, at 5 (referring to the Preamble). 
269 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 264, art. 1, at 4. 
270 U.N. ESCOR Ad Hoc Comm. on Genocide, 6th Sess., 20th mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. 
E/ AC/25/SR.20 (1948) (referring to statements by Mr. Morozov of the former U.S.S.R.). See also 
id. at 7 (referring to Mr. Ordonneau Fr. and genocide defined as a crime against humanity). 
271 Id. 7th mtg., at 7-8 (referring to U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/SR.7). 
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claimed that "in his Government's opinion, genocide was the most 
characteristic of crimes against humanity. "272 Despite general recogni-
tion that genocide was a crime againt humanity, a French proposal to 
define genocide as a crime against humanity was rejected.273 Mr. Rudz-
inski of Poland argued that although genocide was a crime against 
humanity, the inclusion of such a characterization would breach the 
parameters placed on the Committee by the United Nations General 
Assembly.274 Mr. Maktos of the United States, at the close of the Com-
mittee's consideration of the Convention, noted that the instrument 
"for the first time in history, would outlaw the most heinous crime 
against humanity-the crime of genocide .... "275 
During the Sixth Committee debates, Mr. Chaumont of France 
again unsuccessfully argued that genocide should be referred to as a 
crime against humanity rather than as a crime under international law. 
This characterization would provide continuity with the prosecutions 
of Nazi officials following World War II and indicate the determination 
of the world community to enforce the norm against genocide.276 Mr. 
Morozov of the Soviet Union recognized that genocide was an "atro-
cious crime against humanity, "277 but noted that this characterization 
would require the Committee to consider the relationship between 
genocide and other crimes against humanity.278 Mr. Maktos of the 
United States warned that reference to genocide as a crime against 
humanity would create needless confusion. This concept was identified 
with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg whose jurisdic-
tion was limited to offenses committed during armed conflict.279 
Despite the text of the treaty, genocide has been explicitly and 
widely recognized as a crime against humanity. The Special Rapporteur 
on Genocide, in his 1978 report, argued that genocide, whether com-
mitted in time of peace or war, should be considered an aggravated 
crime against humanity.280 He noted that genocide is distinguished 
from other crimes against humanity, such as mass murder or racial or 
272Id. 27th mtg., at 11 (referring to U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/SR.27). 
273Id. 
274Id., 20th mtg., at 7 (referring to U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/SR.20). 
275Id. 24th mtg., at 16 (referring to U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/SR.24). 
276 See Sixth Committee Report, supra note 264, at 38 (Mr. Chaumont, France). 
277Id. at 39. 
278Id. 74th mtg., at 104. 
279Id. 67th mtg., at 43. 
280 Nicodeme Ruhashyankiko, Special Rapporteur, Study of the Question of the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 31st Sess, 107, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 
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religious persecution, by the fact that it requires a specific intent to 
exterminate a group. The Special Rapporteur concluded that: 
[g] enocide ... is by its nature simply a crime against human-
ity, and indeed an aggravated crime against humanity. Ac-
cordingly, it would seem more correct from the standpoint 
both of logic and of method to regard genocide as simply an 
aggravated case of crimes against humanity. The aggravation 
lies simply in the additional intent which is characteristic of 
genocide.281 
Genocide committed against civilians in connection with an armed 
conflict, consistent with the Nuremberg Charter, clearly constitutes a 
crime against humanity and also may constitute a war crime. 282 The 
Secretary-General, in the commentary to the Secretariat's draft Geno-
cide Convention, notes that war may be accompanied by the crime of 
(1978) (quoting STEFAN GLASER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PENAL CONVENTIONNEL 109 (1970» 
[hereinafter Study of Prevention and Punishment of Genocide]. The Special Rapporteur noted 
"it was clearly not permissible to qualifY genocide as a crime against humanity when committed 
in connexion with a war, while refusing to do so when its commission was not connected with a 
war." Id. at 107. 
Id. 
281 Id. Glaser notes the difference between crimes against humanity and genocide: 
[It] is not so much objective as subjective, in that it relates to the motives of the 
perpetrator. The same act-for example, murder-may be, or rather may be de-
scribed as, either a crime against humanity or an act of genocide, depending on 
the motives of the person committing it; if his aim is to eliminate the victim because 
of the latter's race, religion or political beliefs, with no other intent, his act consti-
tutes a crime against humanity, whereas if committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, it will be qualified as 
genocide. 
The United Nations Secretariat, in a note submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide 
in 1948, observes that the General Assembly, in adopting the Genocide Convention, "[w]ithout 
going into the general question of crimes against humanity ... wished to give special treatment 
to the crime of genocide because of the particular gravity of the crime, which aims at the 
systematic extermination of human groups." Relations Between the Convention on Genocide on the 
One Hand and the Formulation of the Numberg Principles and the Preparation of a Draft Code of 
Offences Against Peace and Security on the Other, U.N. Secretariat, at 1, 6, U.N. Doc. E/ AC.25/3 
(1948) [hereinafter Relations Between the Convention on Genocide]. 
Id. 
282/d. at 5. 
[G]enocide is mass murder. It constitutes an act of extermination. It is therefore 
covered by ... Article 6, paragraph (c) of the Charter of the international military 
Tribunal. If the crime of genocide is understood in the widest sense to include the 
destruction by brutal means of the specific characteristics of a human group, it is 
still covered by the terms of Article 6, paragraph (c) of the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal which is concerned with "persecutions on political or racial 
or religious grounds. 
228 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:171 
genocide. This occurs "when one of the belligerents aims at extermi-
nating the population of enemy territory and systematically destroys 
what are not genuine military objectives. Examples of this . . . [in-
clude] the massacre of the populations of occupied territory and their 
gradual extermination. "283 
Genocide thus is recongized as a crime against humanity which 
may occur during a time of peace as well as war. The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in Quinn v. Robinson, observed that" [c] rimes against 
humanity, such as genocide, violate international law and constitute an 
'abuse of sovereignty' because ... they are carried out by or with the 
toleration of authorities of a state. "284 The Court noted that crimes 
against humanity may also, but do not necessarily, constitute war crimes.285 
B. Draft Code on the Peace and Security of Mankind 
The United Nations General Assembly, in 1946, affirmed the "prin-
ciples of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."286 The General Assembly, 
on November 21, 1947, then voted "to entrust the formulation of the 
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal to the International 
Law Commission. "287 
Principle VI(c) adopted by the International Law Commission 
reiterated the Nuremberg provision on crimes against humanity. 288 The 
International Law Commission noted that there were two categories of 
crimes against humanity: inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population and persecution on political, racial or religious grounds. 
These acts constituted international crimes when undertaken in con-
nection with either a war crime or a crime against peace. The Com-
mission repeated the finding of the Nuremberg Tribunal that it had 
283 Secretary-General's Comment, supra note 264, at 23. 
284 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,799-800 (9th Cir. 1986). 
285 ld. at 800. 
286U.N. G.A. Res. 95(1). 
287 U.N. G.A. Res. 177 (II). 
2s8U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) Principle 6(c) at 11,14 U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950). 
C. Crimes against humanity: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done 
against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution 
of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime. 
ld. at 14. 
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not been satisfactorily proven that the repression of Jews and the Nazi's 
political opponents in Germany prior to the war had been undertaken 
in execution of, or in connection with, a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. 289 The Commission omitted the phrase "before or 
during the war" contained in Article 6( c) of the Charter of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal. The Commission stressed in its commentary that "such 
crimes may take place also before a war in connexion with crimes 
against peace. "290 The Commission also explained that the language 
specifYing that a crime against humanity may be committed against 
"any" civilian population meant "that these acts may be crimes against 
humanity even if they are committed by the perpetrator against his 
own population."29] 
The report of the Sixth Committee endorsed the efforts of the 
International Law Commission. Some delegates opposed retaining the 
restriction that crimes against humanity only could be committed in 
connection with crimes against peace and war crimes. They asserted 
that this limitation pertained to the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and did not consitute a limitation on crimes against human-
ity. Crimes against humanity were distinguished by the fact that they 
were committed, sponsored or tolerated by governments; and there-
fore, could only be adequately prosecuted and punished at the inter-
national level. Genocide was an example of a crime against humanity 
which may be committed during periods of international peace. Other 
delegations insisted that the scope of crimes against humanity were 
limited by the Nuremberg Charter. They regretted, however, that the 
Commission did not specifY in the text that crimes against humanity, 
if linked to a crime against peace, could be committed both before 
and during armed conflict.292 The General Assembly, in Resolution 
488(v) invited governments to comment on the formulation of the 
Nuremberg Principles.293 
Resolution 177(II) of November 21, 1947 also instructed the In-




292Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N.GAOR, 5th Sess., at Annexes 5, 9-10, U.N. Doc 
A/1639 (1950), reprinted in [1951] II YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 43, 55-56 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/44 
(1951) (comments by delegations to the 6th Committee). 
293 G.A. Res. 488 (V) U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The International Law Commission was 
instructed to take account of these observations in formulating the draft code of offenses against 
the peace and security of mankind. Id. 
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against the peace and security of mankind, indicating clearly the place 
to be accorded to the [Nuremberg] principles ... "294 The Commission 
refused to be restrained by the Nuremberg principles, declaring that 
if "one or more of the Nuremberg principles ... should not be incor-
porated in the draft code, or, at least, not without some modifications, 
the Commission should not hesitate to act accordingly."295 
The crime of genocide and crimes against humanity initially were 
both encompassed as separate provisions within the same article. The 
definition of crimes against humanity shadowed the Nuremberg Char-
ter. Mr. Spiropoulos noted that this broadly-based provision was unsat-
isfactory. The two offenses differed: genocide is not required to be 
undertaken during wartime, for, definitionally, it can occur during 
times of both war and peace; and genocide is aimed against groups 
whereas crimes against humanity are not necessarily directed at distinct 
collectivities. He noted that while genocide must be included within 
the draft code, the inclusion of crimes against humanity created con-
cern. Mr. Spiropoulos concluded that "[p]erhaps it would be prefer-
able to incorporate ... only the crime of genocide, since governments 
might be very reluctant to accept the inclusion ... of the crime against 
humanity as defined by the Nuremberg Charter."296 The draft also 
punished conspiracy to commit crimes within the code, despite the 
recognition that the International Military Tribunal had interpreted 
the Nuremberg Charter to preclude punishment of such an inchoate 
crime.297 The General Assembly instructed the International Law Com-
mission to consider governmental comments.298 
The International Law Commission reconsidered the Rapporteur's 
Draft and State Comments and reformulated the definition of crimes 
against humanity. Such offenses, in part, were defined as: 
[i] nhuman acts committed by the authorities of a State or by 
private individuals against any civilian population, such as 
mass murder, or extermination or enslavement, or deporta-
tion, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, 
when such acts are committed in execution of or in conn ex-
ion with the offences defined [planning, preparation and 
294U.N. GA 177(1l), supra note 287. 
295 Report by J. Spiropoulos, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25, reprinted in 1950(II) 
VB. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 260 (1957). 
296Id. at 263. 
297Id. at 267. 
298 G.A. Res. 488 (V), supra note 293. 
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waging of aggressive war, State terrorism, forceful annexation, 
war crimes] .299 
231 
Genocide is included in a separate article. 30o Crimes against human-
ity are required to be connected with various offenses, but the range 
of such acts is extended to state terrorism and the forceful annexa-
tion of territory. The reformulation also extends liability to private 
individuals, uses the term "mass murder," and clarifies that the 
enumerated offenses are only illustrative.30l 
This draft was again modified to prohibit persecution on "politi-
cal, racial, religious or cultural grounds, when ... committed in exe-
cution of or in connexion with other offences defined in this article. "302 
The Commission observed that acts committed on cultural grounds 
are no less harmful than those motivated by other forms of animus.303 
The next draft added that "[i]nhuman acts" also could be com-
mitted on "social" grounds and that in order to be held liable, private 
individuals must act "at the instigation or with the toleration" of state 
authorities.304 There was no requirement that these acts must be con-
nected with another crime under the code.305 The International Law 
Commission noted that this provision was broadened "so as to make 
the punishment of the acts enumerated ... independent of whether 
or not they are committed in connexion with other offences defined 
in the draft code."306 In addition, "in order not to characterize any 
inhuman act ... by a private individual ... an international crime, it 
was ... necessary to provide that such an act constitutes an interna-
tional crime only if committed by the private individual at the instiga-
tion or with the toleration of the authorities of a State. "307 The decision 
299 Second Report by Mr. J. Spiropoulos, Draft Code Of Offences Against The Peace And 
Security Of Mankind, art. 1(9) U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/44 (1951) reprinted in [1951] II Y.B. INT'L L. 
COMM'N, 43, 57, 59, U.N. Doc. 1858 (1951). 
300Id. art 1(8), at 59. 
301 See supra text accompanying note 301. 
302 Draft Code Of Offences Against The Peace And Security Of Mankind, 6 I.L.R. Comm'n 
2(10), at 10, 13 U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951). 
303Id. 
304 Draft Code Of Offences Against The Peace And Security Of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., 
Supp. No.9, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/12693 (1954). "Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation or persecution, committed against any civilian population on social, 
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals 
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities." Id. 
305Id. 
306Id. (referring to commentary). 
307Id. 
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to delete the requirement that acts must be committed in connection 
with another offense was adopted by a single vote. Some expressed 
satisfaction that acts comprising crimes against humanity were not 
required to be undertaken in connection with other offenses defined 
in the Code. Others objected that this would extend international 
jurisdiction into the domestic affairs of states.30B 
The Sixth Committee believed that it was premature to consider 
the draft code until the question of aggression had been considered.3og 
The General Assembly, in Resolution 898 of December 14, 1954, post-
poned consideration of the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind until the definition of aggression had been 
resolved.310 
Crimes against humanity thus were severed from the Nuremberg 
principles. The Nuremberg Charter was seen as a set of principles 
which defined the legal jurisdiction of the International Military Tri-
bunal. The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind was considered a more expansive document which memori-
alized those offenses which posed a threat to the security and stability 
of the international community. There was general agreement that a 
crime against humanity entails an offically-sponsored, systematic and 
substantial atrocity committed against a civilian population during war 
or peace. There is no geographic requirement and the victims may be 
domestic or foreign nationals. The crimes became of international 
concern because the offenses affect large numbers of people and/or 
are reletively severe.311 
C. Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes 
Against Humanity 
The United Nations, in 1967, decided to give priority to the 
completion of a convention on the punishment of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.312 One year later, the General Assembly adopted 
the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Article One provides that: 
308 Summary Record of the Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/2807 (1954), reprinted in [1954] I.V.B. 
INT'L L. COMM'N 129, 132-33 (267th mtg.). 
309 Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess, Annexes 1,8, U.N. Doc. A/2807 
(1954). 
31OG.A. Res. 897(IX), U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). See also G.A. Res. 1186 (XII), U.N. Doc. 
A/3805 (1957). 
3\1 See supra notes 288-308 and accompanying text. 
3l2G.A. Res. 2338 (XXII), Supp. No. 16 at 281, U.N. Doc. A/6989, A/L.543 (1967). 
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[i]rrespective of the date of their commission ... [n]o statu-
tory limitation shall apply to war crimes ... [and] [c]rimes 
against humanity whether committed in time of war or in 
time of peace ... as defined in the Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal ... [and to] eviction by armed attack 
or occupation and inhuman acts resulting from the policy of 
apartheid, and the crime of genocide ... even if such acts do 
not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the country 
in which they were committed.313 
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The main consideration of the Convention occurred in the Third 
Committee. The discussion centered on Article One. Mr. Gyarmati of 
Hungary explained that this agreement was urgently required to pre-
vent states, such as Germany, from applying statutory limitations to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. These limitations threatened to 
prevent the prosecution of Nazi war criminals as well as those who may 
commit these offenses in the future. 314 Mr. Paolini of France stated that 
the purpose was "to proclaim for the first time in an international 
instrument, that certain crimes were so serious that the international 
community could not allow them to be overlooked, and that their 
perpetrators would be duly punished. "315 
Greece proposed to limit crimes against humanity as well as geno-
cide to the definition contained in the Nuremberg Charter. Artother 
Greek amendment proposed to exclude domestic offenses from cover-
age under the Convention which had already been committed and 
whose prosecution was prohibited under existing statutes of limita-
tions.316 A Chilean draft also omitted apartheid and incorporated a 
phrase stating that the fact that an act constituting a crime against 
humanity was legal under domestic law did not insulate the act from 
313 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391 (XXXIII), U.N. GAOR 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. 
Doc. A/7342 (1968) [hereinafter Convention on Statutory Limitations]. 
If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this 
Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private indi-
viduals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly incite others 
to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, 
irrespective of the degree of completion, and to representatives of the State author-
ity who tolerate their commission. 
Id. For a legislative history, see Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/6813 (1967). 
314U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 23d. Sess., 1563rd plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1563 
(1970) (Mr. Gyarmati). 
315 U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 23d Sess., 1565th mtg. at 2 (1970). 
31fiU.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1563th mtg. at 3, (1968) (Mr. Stathatos). 
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liability.317 The British objected to the phrase "inhuman acts resulting 
from the policy of apartheid. "318 England proposed to reformulate 
Article One to provide that "[t]he present Convention shall apply to 
war crimes of a grave nature and to crimes against humanity as defined 
in international law. "319 
Mr. Paolini advocated the enumeration of an exhaustive list of 
offenses in order to avoid confounding those who may be called upon 
to interpret the treaty in the future. He objected to the inclusion of 
"eviction by armed attack or occupation" as well as the limitation of 
offenses to those committed "by or with the consent of the authorities 
of a State. "320 M. Cao-Pinna of Italy believed that thorough study was 
required prior to constructing a definition of crimes against humanity. 
A legal document which was to be incorporated into domestic legal sys-
tems "could not be approached primarily from a humanitarian stand-
point."321 Mrs. Picker of the United States argued that the task of 
formulating a definition was best performed by eminent jurists-the 
Third Committee should limit itself to the application of a prohibition 
on a statute of limitations on crimes against humanity.322 Mr. Amlie of 
Norway argued that the extension of the statute of limitations violated 
the principle of non-retroactivity. This could be cured by limiting the 
convention to grave offenses. Most importantly, the extension of the 
instrument to "new types of crimes against humanity ... would weaken 
the force of the instrument."323 Mrs. De Bromley, the Honduran dele-
gate, opined that "no crime was exempt from statutory limitation and 
... no law had retroactive effect except in criminal matters when it 
introduced a change in favour of the accused[;] ... an effort should 
be made ... to condemn not the criminals but war itself. "324 
Mr. Gyarmati of Hungary acknowledged the concern with retroac-
tivity, "but believed that it was incumbent upon the countries con-
cerned to take certain steps in view of the exceptional and particularly 
heinous nature of the crimes under consideration .... "325 Mr. Ekondy-
mU.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1563rd mtg. at 3 (1970) (Mr. Artaza). 
3l8U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1564th mtg. at 1 (1968) (Lady Gaitskell). 
319Id. 
320 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1565th mtg. at I, 2 (1968) (Mr. Paolini). He noted the 
complication by introducing the phrase "eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman 
acts resulting from the policy of apartheid . ... " Id. 
321Id. at 4. 
322U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1565th mtg. at 2 (1970). 
323 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 23d Sess. 1565th mtg. at 3 (1970). Norway proposed to omit the 
application of Article 1 to offenses "irrespective of the date of their commission." Id. 
324U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1568th mtg. at 3 (1968). 
325 See id. at 4. 
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Akala of the Congo noted that it was "regrettable that some delegations 
were basing their position on purely legal grounds without taking 
sociological considerations into account. "326 Mr. Nasinovsky of the Un-
ion of Soviet Socialist Republics argued that international law prohib-
ited the imposition of statutory limits on war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The proposed document was aimed at those countries which 
were contravening international law by recognizing such constraints.327 
Others challenged the legalistic desire to limit crimes against 
humanity to those offenses contained in the Nuremberg Charter while 
ignoring serious contemporary crimes such as apartheid.328 Mrs. War-
zazi of Morocco pointed out that colonialism and apartheid were 
long-standing in transgressions. The law "was not immutable ... and 
international law was subject to evolution. Allegations that certain 
principles contradicted ... legal logic were ... unfounded, and their 
sole purpose was to mask a lack of reforming zeal. "329 
Mr. Kachurenko of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic argued 
that the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity was essential if the guilty were to be punished. 
The deletion of apartheid and genocide would permit these crimes 
to be "committed with absolute impunity. "330 Mrs. Conde of Guinea 
"could not understand how delegations which condemned . . . the 
nazis ... could at the same time defend the neo-nazi regime in South 
Africa, and ... appealed to the conscience of those who ... suffered 
oppression ... for the retention of ... Article 1 [sic]."331 Mrs. Ould 
Daddah of Mauritania pointed out that apartheid was "a cancer ravag-
ing the African continent, an outrage ... a threat to peace, and 
an indisputable crime against humanity."332 Mr. Kiti of Kenya argued 
that the existing international definition of crimes against humanity 
reflected the past experience of developed countries. Apartheid "was 
one of the gravest crimes against humanity ... and it would render 
the draft convention meaningless if the words 'including inhumane acts 
resulting from the policy of apartheid were omitted. "'333 Mr. Waldron-
Ramsey of Tanzania noted that the prosecution of Nazi war criminals 
326U.N. GAOR, 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1571st mtg. at 4 (1968). 
327 See id. at 5. The Secretary-General concluded that international law did not recognize a 
limitation since no such constraint was contained in any international instrument. See id. at 4 
(Mr. Stavropoulos, Legal Counsel). 
32SU.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 23d Sess., 1565th mtg. at 3 (1970) (Mr. Mnan, Iraq). 
329 See id. 
330 See id. 
331 See id. at 4. 
332 See id. 
333 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1566th mtg. at 1 (1970). 
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currently concerned the countries of Europe more than those in Mrica 
and Asia, and that the Convention should address the present problem 
of apartheid in Mrica as well as the past events in Europe.334 
Mr. Paolini of France, following the adoption of Article One,335 
proclaimed that the orginal purpose of the Convention was "the draft-
ing of a legal instrument [, and this] had been confused with moral 
and condemnation of a despicable practice . . . [T] he remainder of 
the document was no longer of ... interest to his delegation .... "336 
He opined that the text "created new and dangerously vague offences, 
termed 'crimes against humanity,' and confused the drafting of a legal 
instrument which would have serious consequences in the penal field 
with the enunciation of a political doctrine. "337 Others reiterated that 
the Convention contravened the principle of non-retroactivity.338 Mr. 
Kiti of Kenya argued that the abrogation of this principle could only 
be justified in the case of serious offenses.339 
The General Assembly, in 1973, formalized the status of apartheid 
as a crime against humanity in the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Article One 
declared that apartheid is a "crime against humanity. "340 Acts of apart-
heid are proclaimed as "crimes violating the principles of international 
law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations ... constituting a serious threat to international peace 
and security. "341 
Only Mr. Wiggins of the United States objected to apartheid's 
classification as a crime against humanity. Mr. Wiggins explained that 
334U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1568th mtg. at 2 (1968). 
335 See id. at 5-6. 
336 U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1569th mtg. at 2 (1968). Mr. Stathatos of Greece raised 
the question whether the statute of limitations would be extended under domestic law on offenses 
in those instances in which the statute of limitations had expired. See id. at 2. 
mU.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1573th mtg. at 3 (1968). Mr. Saint-Remy of Belgium 
noted that his delgation could not accept the inclusion within crimes against humanity of 
"essentially political acts which were not regarded as offences by Belgian legislation." U.N. GAOR, 
3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1573th mtg. at 3 (1968). 
338U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d mtg., 1573d mtg. at 4-5 (1968) (Mr. Cuesta, Ecuador; Mrs. 
De Catarossi, Uruguay; Mr. Siri, El Salvador). Various Islamic delegations relied on the language 
condemning apartheid to attack Israel. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d mtg., 1573 mtg. at 3 
(1968) (Mr. Babaa Libya; Mr. El-Fattal, Syria). 
339U.N. GAOR 3d Comm. 23d Sess, 1573d mtg. at 5 (1968). 
340 International Convention On The Suppresson And Punishment Of The Crime Of Apart-
heid, GA Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 30 at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974) 
[hereinafter Apartheid Convention]. 
341Id. 
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"[sJuch crimes were so grave that, at the current stage, their legal 
definition must be very strictly construed."342 Mr. Kabinga of Zambia 
observed that it was necessary to make "international law more pro-
gressive, and found it regrettable that it was not possible to relate legal 
norms to justice .... [TJ here was a marked parallel between nazism 
and apartheid, and it was surprising to find one Power affirming that, 
legally, apartheid was not a crime against humanity. He did not believe 
that legality could be divorced from reality. "343 Miss Cao Pinna of Italy 
observed that the Convention's characterizaton of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity and as a serious threat to internatonal peace and 
security had unnecessarily broadened the "limited meaning of the 
term 'crime against humanity."'344 The Special Rapporteur on Geno-
cide, in 1978, noted that aspects of apartheid constituted genocide, 
lending support to the characterization of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity.345 
In sum, the General Assembly's decision to prohibit statutory 
limits on the prosecution of crimes against humanity clearly indicated 
that crimes against humanity are of multinational concern. A State's 
exercise of jurisdiction over such offenses is constrained by considera-
tions of international law. Thus, "[iJn view of the importance of the 
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations ergo omnes. "346 
The Apartheid Convention also extended the Nuremberg concept 
of crimes against humanity and affirmed that such acts could occur in 
time of peace as well as war. This expansion of crimes against humanity 
reflected the political interest and power of developing countries. 
Nonetheless, the expansion indicates the international community's 
determination to insure that the concept of crimes against humanity 
retains contemporary relevance.347 
The international interest in punishing crimes against humanity 
also was recognized by the application of universal jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity. This extension of jurisdiction was based on 
the belief that the prosecution and punishment of such severe delicts 
342U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2007th mtg. at 160 (1970). 
343U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2007 mtg., at 161 (1973). 
344U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2008th mtg., at 167 (1973). 
345 See Study of Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, supra note 286, at 107-10. 
346 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C]. 4, 32 (Feb. 5) 
(discussing the Genocide Convention). 
347 See supra notes 340-45. 
238 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:171 
should not depend upon the domestic politics and principle of a single 
nation-state. 
IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
A. Post-World War II War Crimes Trials And Universal Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal was based 
on the Nuremberg Charter. The Nuremberg Tribunal ruled that the 
Charter was an exercise of sovereign legislative power by the Allied 
Powers to whom the Reich had unconditionally surrendered. The right 
of the Allies to legislate for occupied Germany had been recognized 
by the civilized world. As a result, the Charter was not an exercise of 
arbitrary power-it was an expression of existing internationallaw.348 
The Tribunal noted in confusing and controversial dicta that in 
creating the Nuremberg Tribunal that the Signatory Powers "have 
done together what anyone of them might have done singly; for it is 
not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special 
courts to administer law. "349 The Secretary-General observed that this 
statement suggested that the Tribunal was recognizing universal juris-
diction over the Nuremberg crimes, and stated "[i]t is possible and ... 
probable that the Court considered the crimes under the Charter to 
be, as international crimes, subject to the jurisdiction of every State. "350 
The American tribunals which presided over prosecutions under 
Control Council Law No. 10 based their jurisdiction on the right of 
the "occupying powers ... to set up special courts to try those charged 
with the commission of war crimes as they are defined by international 
law."351 The Tribunal in The Hostage Case adopted a slightly more 
expansive view and opined that there is concurrent jurisdiction during 
and subsequent to the termination of conflict in both the country 
where a serious war crime was committed and in the belligerent coun-
try which has custody over the accused. The rationale offered was that 
"war is usually followed by political repercussions and upheavals which 
348 Nurembergjudgment. supra note 79. at 46l. 
349Id. 
350 SECRETARy-GENERAL, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NURt:MBERG TRIBUNAL HIS-
TORY AND ANALYSIS 80 (1949)[hereinafter The Charter and judgmentl. 
351 United States v. Wilhelm List, reprinted in XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 1230, 1242 (1950) 
[hereinafter Hostage judgmentl. 
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at times place persons in power who are not, for one reason or another, 
inclined to punish the offenders. "352 The Einsatzgruppen panel also 
invoked the Allied Powers' condominium control over Germany. 353 The 
Tribunal, in dicta, hinted at a universal basis for the trial: "They [the 
defendants] are being tried because they are accused of having of-
fended against society itself, and society, as represented by interna-
tional law, has summoned them for explanation .... It is the essence 
of criminal justice that the offended community inquires into the 
offense involved. "354 
Several national war crimes tribunals, in part, explicitly invoked 
universal jurisdiction. A British military court based its prosecution of 
the German executives, who supplied the Zyklon Gas used in the death 
camps, on the universal prerogative to prosecute pirates and war crimi-
nals. The Court lacked either a territorial or national basis for jurisdic-
tion-the panel noted that the victims at Auschwitz and Birkenau were 
German deportees, Jews and Gypsies from Belgium, Holland, France, 
Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland.355 Another British military tribunal 
relied on universal jurisdiction, along with the nationality principle 
and prerogative of an occupying power, to prosecute Dutch police 
responsible for the arbitrary execution of British prisoners of war and 
Dutch civilians.356 
An American war crimes tribunal prosecuted and convicted Ger-
man diplomatic officials stationed in China who continued to assist the 
Japanese following the German surrender. The tribunal ruled that the 
"laws and usages of war are of universal application and do not depend 
for their existence upon national laws and frontiers."357 Another United 
States military tribunal invoked the universal principle to convict the 
staff members of a small sanatorium in Hadamar, Germany who de lib-
352Id. at 1241-42. 
353 Einsatzgrupen judgment. supra note 214, at 454. 
354Id. at 462. The justice judgment, supra note 184 (distinguishing between the universal 
nature of the law and customs of war and the enforcement mechanisms which are constrained 
by the practicalities of national sovereignty). The Tribunal noted that this distinction between 
substance and procedure explains the failure to prosecute Allied violations of the humanitarian 
law of war. Id. at 370-71. 
355 The Zyklon B Case (Trial Of Bruno Tesch And Two Others), (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, 
1st-8th March, 1946) 1 1.L.R. 93, 96, 103 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Brit. Milit. Ct., Ham-
burg, 1946). 
356The Almelo Trial, I 1.L.R. 35, 42 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, Brit. Milit. Ct., Alemlo, 
Holland, 1947). 
357 Trial Of Lothar Eisentrager And Others, XIV 1.L.R. 8, 15 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, U.S. 
Milit. Ct., Shansai, China 1947). 
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erately killed over four hundred Polish and Soviet nationals by injec-
tions of poisonous drugs.358 
These were isolated judgments which failed to fully discuss or 
develop the scope of universal jurisdiction. The Israeli Supreme Court 
more fully elaborated upon the universal basis of jurisdiction in the 
Eichmann judgment. 
B. The Trial Of Adolf Eichmann 
Adolf Eichmann was charged and convicted before an Israeli 
district court in 1961 with crimes against the Jewish people, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and membership in a criminal organiza-
tion during the period of the Nazi regime. Eichmann served as Head 
of Jewish Mfairs in the Office for Reich Security and was central in 
the persecution, deportation and extermination of Jews, Gypsies and 
Slavs.359 The Israeli Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment of the 
district court, concluded that "it has been proved with unchallengeable 
certainty that he [Eichmann] took his place not only among those who 
were active in, but also those who activated the implementation of the 
'Final Solution,' the total extermination of the Jews of Europe. The 
appellant was no petty killer in this undertaking, but took a leading 
part and had a central and decisive role. "360 Eichmann "acted inde-
pendently and ... exceeded the duties imposed on him through the 
... channels of the official chain of command. "361 
He was charged under the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punish-
ment) Law which incorporated the crimes against humanity provision 
of the Nuremberg Charter as well as a section sanctioning genocide, 
entitled Crimes Against the Jewish People. Crimes against the Jewish 
People which "constitutes the crime of 'genocide,' is nothing but the 
gravest type of 'crime against humanity' ... all that has been said in 
the Nuremberg principles about 'crimes against humanity' applies a 
fortiori to 'crime against the Jewish people. "'362 
358 The Hadamar Trial (Trial Of Alfons Klein And Six Others) I I.L.R. 46, 53 (U.S. Milit. Ct., 
Wiesbaden, Germany 1945). 
359 Attorney-General Of The Government Of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 102-03, 
273-76 (Israel, District Court of Jerusalem 1961) [hereinafter District CourtJudgmentl. See also 
Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962) 
(Israel) [herinafter Supreme Court Judgmentl. 
360 Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 359, at 340. 
361Id. at 313. 
362 District Court Judgment, supra note 359, at 41. For the provisions of the Nazis and Nazi 
Collaborators, see id. at 20, 30-31. 
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Eichmann's criminal activity was concentrated on the period sub-
sequent to the invasion of Austria. The Supreme Court observed that 
it was not necessary to determine whether its jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity extended to acts prior to the German invasion of 
Austria. The Court noted that, in distinction to war crimes, crimes 
against humanity were limited to delicts against civilians. This was of 
little relevance in Eichmann's case-the crimes against the Jewish 
people and crimes against humanity with which he was charged were 
all directed against the civilian population of the occupied territories 
and also constituted war crimes.363 
The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that these Nuremberg delicts 
had ripened into customary crimes under international law at the time 
of the Nazi barbarities.364 The International Military Tribunal's juris-
diction over acts by the Reich against German citizens did not consti-
tute a retroactive application of the law or an excessive interference 
with the domestic jurisdiction of Germany. Instead, this development 
was anticipated in the Martens Clause of the Hague Convention of 
1907. Extending this clause to citizens as well as aliens could hardly be 
characterized as unanticipated and unfair-mass murder is a well-es-
tablished crime under both domestic and international law.365 The 
criminal nature of such acts was affirmed in the Nuremberg judgment 
and in United Nations resolutions. The impact of such barbarities also 
rises to the level of multinational concern since "such acts can under-
mine the foundations of the international community as a whole and 
impair its very stability. "366 The Israeli legislation of 1950 was not a 
363 Supreme Court judgment, supra note 359, at 288-89. The Supreme Court thus noted that 
the central charges were closely connected and could be conveniently categorized and discussed 
under the category of crimes against humanity. ld. at 289. The District Court ruled that the 
Nuremberg Charter did not "limit the substantive nature of a 'crime against humanity' under 
international law, but has only limited the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal to try crimes 
of this kind which are bound up with 'war crimes' or 'crimes against peace.'" District Court 
judgment, supra note 359, at 49. The definition of crimes against humanity in the Israeli law did 
not require a connection between crimes against humanity and other Nuremberg offenses. ld. 
at 30-31. 
364 See District Court judgment, supra note 359, at 294-95. International crimes include the 
following features: they damage vital international interests; impair the foundations and security 
of the international community; and violate the universal moral values and humanitarian princi-
ples that are implicit in the criminal law codes of civilized States. ld. 291-92. 
3651d. at 295. 
366 ld. at 296. The Court cited the humanitarian concern of the international community in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. ld. 
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retroactive enactment, but was "one by which the Knesset gave effect 
to [existing] international law and its objectives."367 
The Supreme Court argued that the international condemnation 
and calamitious character and consequences of crimes against human-
ity justifies the exercise of universal jurisdiction. This principle, which 
historically was limited to piracy, vests every State with the sovereign 
authority to prosecute the perpetrators of such atrocities, regardless of 
the place or persons involved in the offense.368 The State, in such 
instances, acts as the "organ and agent of the international community 
and metes out punishment to the offender for his breach of the 
prohibition imposed by the law of nations. "369 
Israel was not required to extradite Eichmann to Germany-the 
central situs of his criminal activity-prior to asserting jurisdiction. 
Germany expressed no interest in prosecution. Unfortunately extradi-
tion was based on procedural convenience because in this instance, 
the bulk of the documents and witnesses were in IsraeP70 Other coun-
tries with subject-matter jurisdiction also failed to express an interest 
in prosecution. Further, the "crimes in question and their effects have 
extended to numerous countries [and this] drains the territorial prin-
ciple of all content ... and justifies Israel in assuming criminal juris-
diction ... [f]or Israel to decide to which particular country the 
appellant should be extradited would have meant a completely arbi-
trary choice."371 
367 District Court judgment, supra note 3S9, at 297. Crimes against humanity "must be seen 
... as acts that have always been forbidden by customary international law-acts which are of a 
'universal' criminal character and entail individual criminal responsibility." Id. 
368 [d. at 299. 
369 [d. at 300. 
370 [d. at 302-03. 
371 District Court judgment, supra note 3S9, at 303. 
Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international char-
acter, but their harmful and murderous effects were so embracing and widespread 
as to shake the international community to its very foundations. The State of Israel 
therefore was entitled, pursuant to the principle ofuniversaljursidiction and in the 
capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for its enforcement, to try 
the appellant. That being the case, no importance attaches to the fact that the State 
of Israel did not exist when the offences were committed .... 
Id. at 304. 
The District Court supported the view that genocide was an international crime carrying 
universal jurisdiction by pointing to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. 
See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, 19S1 I.C]. IS, 23 quoted in District Court 
judgment, supra note 3S9, at 33-34 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
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Other domestic courts affirmed the assertion of universal jurisdic-
tion over crimes against humanity. The Special Criminal Court of Am-
sterdam affirmed Dutch jurisdiction over three former Nazi officials 
who had been involved in the mistreatment and death of deported 
Dutch laborers. The Court noted that those charged with crimes against 
humanity may be prosecuted by any State with custody over the ac-
cused. This rule: 
[h]as the same universality as that ... which treats pirates as 
enemies of mankind. American tribunals ... have ... [been] 
guided by the same principle .... [T] he system ... of abduct-
ing large groups of the population ... for slave labour ... 
and ... subjecting them ... to an inhumane regime, is a 
crime which is ... of concern to the whole of mankind.372 
The Special Court of Cassation, in affirming this judgment, also 
adopted an expansive view. The Court of Cassation noted that war 
crime prosecutions generally were guided by territorial jurisdiction. 
Such prosecutions, however, also may proceed on the basis of the 
nationality of the victim or the protection of national interests.373 
The United States District Court in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky ob-
served that "[t]he principle that the perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction found 
acceptance in the aftermath of World War II. "374 The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in affirming the ruling in Demjanjuk, noted that the 
wartime allies created the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg and courts within the various occupation zones. It was "generally 
agreed that the establishment of these tribunals and their proceedings 
were based on universal jurisdiction. "375 Under this jurisdictional prem-
ise, "neither the nationality of the accused or the victim(s), nor the 
location of the crime is significant. The underlying assumption is that 
the crimes are offenses against the law of nations or against humanity 
and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations. "376 
372 In re Rohrig, Brunner and Heinze, 17 I.L.R. 393, 395 (l956) (Holland, Special Crim. Ct., 
Amsterdam, 1949). 
373 See id. at 397 (Holland, Special Ct. of Cassation, May 15, 1950). 
374 Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 544, 556 (D.C. Ohio 1985), aJJ'd, 776 F.2d 571 (6th 
Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). 
375 776 F.2d at 582. 
376Id. at 583. 
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Article VI of the Genocide Convention seemingly recognizes the 
territorial principle of jurisdiction.377 Professor Kenneth C. Randall 
explains that "the requirement that the parties must prosecute geno-
cide only under the territoriality principle does not mean that they 
have deprived themselves of the customary right to exercise universal 
jursidiction over the same acts. Nothing suggests that the parties in-
tended such a deprivation of their customary rights. "378 
Subsequent instruments provide for modified versions of universal 
jurisdiction. Article V of the Apartheid Convention provides that per-
sons charged with such acts "may be tried by a competent tribunal of 
any State Party to the Convention which may acquire jurisdiction with 
respect to those State Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdic-
tion. "379 Article VII of the Convention Against Torture states that each 
State Party shall prosecute offenders who are not extradited to States 
with territorial, national and passive personality jurisdiction.38o Similar 
provisions are included in the diplomatic,381 hostage382 and hijacking 
conventions.383 States that are party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
are under an "obligation to search for persons alleged to have com-
mitted ... grave breaches" or: 
[h] and such persons over for trial to another High 
Contracting Party .... [G]rave breaches ... shall be those 
involving ... willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health and extensive 
377 Genocide Convention, supra note 371, at art. VI. "Persons charged with genocide ... shall 
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or 
by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those contracting 
parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." Id. 
378Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785, 
836 (1988). 
379 Apartheid Convention, supra note 340, at art. v. 
380 Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel Inhumane Or Degrading Treatment Or 
Punishment, 1984 YB.U.N. 813, U.N. Doc. A 1391708. 
381 Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. 
No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), 28 U.S.T. 1975. 
382 International Convention Against The Taking Of Hostages,June 4,1983, art. 8, G.A. Res. 
34/146 (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/786 (1979). 
383 Convention For The Suppression Of Unlawful Seizure Of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, 
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1971); Convention For The Suppression Of 
Unlawful Acts Against The Safety Of Civilian Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art.7, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. 
7570 (1970). 
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destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.384 
Randall concludes that the virtually unanimous adoption of these 
conventions by international organizations represents: 
[t]he legitimization of any state's right to prosecute those who 
commit the proscribed offenses. . . . must as every state for 
hundreds of years has had the right to ... punish piratical 
acts ... every state today may have an implied right ... to 
define and punish hijacking, hostage taking, crimes against 
internationally protected persons, apartheid, and torture. 385 
C. Regina v~ Finta 
In Regina v. Finta, the Canadian High Court of Justice upheld the 
extension of federal jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.386 The Canadian statute asserts jurisdiction over individuals 
seized within Canada who have committed an act or omission outside 
the country which constitutes a war crime or a crime against humanity. 
The statute specifies that such acts shall be deemed to have been 
committed within Canada.387 
This was intended to permit Canada to prosecute those responsi-
ble for extraterritorial offenses.388 Under the statute, a crime against 
humanity under the statute must be directed against a civilian popula-
tion or identifiable group. Such offenses, unlike ordinary crimes, are 
of "direct concern to the international community and may be prose-
384 Convention For The Amelioration Of The Condition Of Wounded And Sick In Armed 
Forces In The Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50-51, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
(1949); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces At Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 50-51, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 
3363,75 U.N.T.S. 85 (1949); Convention Relative To The Treatment Of Prisoners Of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 129-130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1949); Convention 
Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In Time Of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146-47, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1949). 
385 See Randall, supra note 378, at 826-27. Two questions arise: 1) Is universal jurisdiction 
based on the conventions or the custom and usage of States? 2) Is the authority to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over such offenses only binding on Signatory Parties? See generally id. at 
823-28. 
386 Regina v. Finta, 1 R.C.S. 701 (1994). 
387 [d. at 740. Defendant Irma Finta was a captain in the Hungarian Gendarmerie which was 
under the command of the German Security Service. See id. He was charged with involvement in 
the ghettoization and deportation of Jews to death camps as well as with the confiscation of their 
property. See id. at 724-26. 
388 [d. at 741, 743, 747. 
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cuted wherever the alleged offender may be found. "389 The govern-
ment where the delict occurs also may be reluctant to prosecute of-
fenders and may have been the catalyst for the crime. International 
law permits other States to assume jurisdiction in order to compensate 
for this constraint.390 
The High Court noted that murder is abhorrent. However, the 
interests of comity and respect for the sovereignty of other States 
ordinarily militates against extraterritorial jurisdiction. This limitation 
also reflects the efficiency and efficacy of prosecuting offenders in the 
territory in which the crime occurred.391 The international community, 
in the case of crimes against humanity, "does not object to our exer-
cising jurisdiction ... it actively encourages the prosecution of those 
whose criminal conduct also constitutes war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. "392 
The High Court ruled that the trial judge had erroneously in-
structed the jury that the mental element of a crime against humanity 
required an awareness of each and every element of the offense. The 
prosecution, under this ruling, was required to demonstrate that a 
defendant possessed knowledge that their act constituted a crime against 
humanity-an inhumane act directed against a civilian population or 
identifiable group in connection with an aggressive war or war crime.393 
The majority rejected this as "far too high a standard," ruling that the 
prosecution only was required to establish the traditional elements of 
individual liability. 394 The factual predicates for a crime against human-
ity, pertained to the justification for international jurisdiction and did 
not constitue a mental element of the offense.395 An accused, for 
instance, was not required to possess knowledge that his or her act was 
inhumane. It was sufficient that the defendant intentionally and vol-
3891d. at 752. 
"[Clrime against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against 
any civilian population or any identifiable group of persons, whether or not it 
constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its 
commission, and that, at that time time and in that place, constitutes a contraven-
tion of customary international law or conventional international law or is criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
Canadian Criminal Code s. 7(3.76),quoted in Regina v. Finta, 1 R.C.S. at 812. 
390ld. at 752. 
3911d. at 770. 
3921d. at 772. 
393 Regina v. Finta, I.R.C.S. at 754-55. 
3941d. at 756. 
3951d. 
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untarily committed the act: "If an accused knowingly confines elderly 
people in close quarters within boxcars with little provision for a long 
train ride, then the fact that the accused subjectively did not consider 
this inhumane should be irrelevant."396 
The prosecution is only required to demonstrate that the defen-
dant satisfies the normal intent or recklessness requirement in relation 
to the charged act or omission. There is no requirement that a defen-
dant comprehend the requirements of international law. 
Piracy or slavery would be contrary to international law as 
long as the accused had preyed on ships or traded in slaves, 
regardless of whether the pirates or slavedealers were aware 
of how their conduct was classified under international law. 
In the international realm as much as the domestic, blame-
worthiness in criminal law does not consist of knowingly snub-
bing the law, but rather in deliberately engaging in certain 
types of conduct that international law prohibits.397 
The High Court also determined that the criminalization of crimes 
against humanity did not constitute retroactive punishment. The stat-
ute required that at the time that a defendant committed the criminal 
act, with which he or she was charged, that it constituted a crime 
against humanity according to customary or conventional interna-
tional law or the general principles of law recognized by the commu-
nity of nations.398 The Court observed that the acts constituting crimes 
against humanity were prohibited by virtually all civilized countries 
prior to 1945.399 
396Id. at 758. 
397Id. at 763. 
[I]n almost all if not every case, I think that our domestic definition of the 
underlying offence will capture the requisite mens rea for the . . . crime against 
humanity .... Thus, the accused need not have known that his act, if it constitutes 
manslaughter or forcible confinement, amounted to an 'inhumane act' either in 
the legal or moral sense. One who intentionally or knowingly commits manslaugh-
ter or kidnapping would have demonstrated the mental culpability required for an 
inhumane act. Id. at 765. 
A defendant is authorized to invoke any defense, excuse or justification available under the 
laws of Canada or international law. See id. But, the fact that an individual acted in conformity 
with domestic law is not recognized as a defense. See id. The latter prevents a regime from passing 
a statute which insulates individuals from criminal culpability. See id. at 776-77, 781. Superior 
orders provides a defense "unless the act is so outrageous as to be manifestly unlawful. See id. 
Further ... an accused will not be convicted of any act committed pursuant to an order wherein 
he or she ·had no moral choice but to obey." Id. at 778. 
398Id. at 782. 
399Id. at 783-84. The Court recognized that there was no comprehensive codification of 
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Accordingly, the Canadian High Court in Finta ruled that Canada 
was authorized under international law to exercise extraterritorial ju-
risdiction over crimes against humanity. The Court clarified the intent 
requirement and affirmed that crimes against humanity had consti-
tuted criminal conduct prior to 1945.400 
The High Court of Australia upheld the extension of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity commit-
ted during World War II in Plyukhovic.401 The panel based their opin-
ions upon parliament's plenary power over external affairs, while only 
three opinions addressed international law concerns. Justice Dean 
noted that there was no need to address whether genocide or crimes 
againt humanity constituted offences under customary international 
law: "the wrongful nature of the conduct would . . . have been . . . 
evident ... [this] simply could not, in any civilized community, have 
been described as innocent or blameless conduct merely because of 
the absence of proscription by law."402Justice Toohey added that there 
was general consensus that war crimes and crimes against humanity 
were subject to universal jurisdiction. This reflected the delicts' hei-
nous moral and physical magnitude.403 He observed that there was a 
consciousness prior to 1939 that acts which offended fundamental 
human rights constituted crimes against humanity. The character and 
scope of this category of crime, however, had remained unclear until 
their codification following World War 11.404 
Justice Toohey noted that the Control Council Law No. 10 trials 
were based on the Allied Powers' assumption of sovereign jurisdiction 
over Germany. In contrast, the Nuremberg Tribunal was exercising 
international jurisdiction. Thus, the latter was a better reflection of the 
international consensus as to the character of crimes against humanity 
at the time of the initiation of World War II. The Nuremberg standard 
indicated that crimes against humanity did not emerge as an inde-
pendent offense prior to 1945. As a result, Justice Toohey approved 
the extension of Australia's extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes 
international law. See id. But, the common law methodology had equipped the Court to examine 
disparate sources in determining legal principles. See id. at 785. 
400 See supra notes 386-99 and accompanying text. 
401 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth of Australia, 91 I.L.R. 3 (1993) (Australia, High Court, 
1991). Polyukhovich was alleged to have committed war crimes while serving in a German unit 
in the Ukraine. Id. at 7. 
402 [d. at 65, 105. 
403 [d. at Ill, 121. 
404 [d. at 131. 
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against civilians "only if it was proved that the conduct was itself a war 
crime or was done in execution of or in connection with a war crime."405 
The international interest in punishing crimes against humanity 
also resulted in the recognition that such delicts did not constitute 
non-extraditable political offenses. 
V. EXTRADITION 
The Declaration on German Atrocities issued by the Allied Powers 
on October 30, 1943, proclaimed that accused German war criminals 
''will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds 
were done in order that they may be judged and punished. . . . [M] ajor 
criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization 
... will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the 
Allies. "406 Various countries adjudged these individuals to be political 
offenders and refused extradition.407 
Professor Garcia-Mora, writing in 1964, challenged the view that 
these were political offenders. He argued that the suffering caused by 
such acts was disproportionate to any political aspiration and were 
violative of the humanitarian basis ofinternationallaw. He also pointed 
out that such atrocities resembled common crimes in that they typically 
were motivated by animis rather than altruism. A reasonable person 
inevitably must be aware of the criminal character of such conduct.408 
Garcia-Mora concluded "barbarity and atrocity which ... accompany 
the commission of crimes against humanity weigh so heavily upon the 
common crime element that any political motivation completely dis-
appears ... [thus] the surrender of the offender is the only rational 
course of action."409 
The United Nations, in Resolution 3(1) in 1946, recommended 
that Member States and neutral nations adopt all necessary measures 
405 Id. Justice Brennan, in dissent, disputed the status of genocide and crimes against human-
ity as international crimes at the time of World War II. See id. He argued that genocide was not 
established as a delict until 1948 and that the status of crimes against humanity was uncertain. 
See id. The Australian statute consequently constituted a retroactive application of the law. See id. 
at 21, 6l. 
406Declaration on German Atrocities, Nov. 1, 1943, 3 Benans 816, 834 Dep't St. Bull. (Nov. 
6, 1943), at 310-1l. 
407 See L.C. Green, Political Offences, War Crimes And Extradition, 11 INT'L & COMPo L. Q. 329, 
342,347-48 (1962). See generally Robert G. Neumann, Neutral States And The Extradition Of War 
Criminals, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1991). 
408 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity And The Principle Of Nonextradition Of 
Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REv. 927, 944-53 (1964). 
4091d. at 947. 
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to arrest those responsible for crimes against humanity, crimes against 
peace, and war crimes. These individuals were to be sent back to the 
site of their serious crimes.410 In 1970, the United Nations drew atten-
tion to the fact that many war criminals and persons who have com-
mitted crimes against humanity were continuing to take refuge and 
enjoy protection in the territories of certain States. 
The General Assembly called upon all States to arrest these indi-
viduals and extradite them to the countries in which they committed 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. States also were requested to 
co-operate in the collection and exchange of information which may 
contribute to the detection, arrest, extradition, trial, and punishment 
of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.411 Finally, 
in Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of December 3,1975, the United Nations 
General Assembly declared that persons suspected of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial, and if 
found guilty, to punishment. Individuals ordinarily shall be subject to 
trial in the territories in which such offenses were committed. The 
United Nations, however, recognized that States possess the right to 
prosecute their own nationals for war crimes or crimes against human-
ity. States were charged with the duty to assist in detecting, arresting, 
bringing to trial, and punishing persons convicted of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.412 
In 1951, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requested the United 
States to arrest and extradite Andrija Artukovic. Artukovic had served 
as Minister of Interior in the rump, the pro-Nazi Croatian government 
of Ante Pavelic, and was charged with ordering the extermination of 
as many as 200,000 persons.413 The District Court noted, in dicta, that 
Artukovic's alleged delicts were political offenses and that this was a 
41OU.N.G.A. Res. 3(1) (1946). 
411 U.N.G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV). Supp. (No. 28) at 294, U.N. Doc. 8233 (1971). 
4l2U.N.G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), Supp. (No. 30A) at 448, U.N. Doc. A/9326, A/L.7ll/Rev.1 
(1973). The United Nations Convention Relating To The Status Of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 (1954) provides in Article 1 (F) (a) that the Convention "shall not apply to any person 
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that ... he has committed a crime 
against peace, a war crime, or a crime aainst humanity, as defined in the international instruments 
drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes." Id. 
413 See Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F.Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd sub nom Ivancevic v. Artukovic 
211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954), rehgdenied, 348 U.S. 889 (1954); 
Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F.Supp. 245 (S.D.Cal. 1956), affd sub nom. Kardozle v. Artukovic 247 F.2d 
198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), decision on remand, 170, F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 
1959). Deportation proceedings were reinstituted and Artukovic was deported in 1986. SeeAr-
tukovic v. United States, 628 F.Supp. 1370 (C.D.Cal. 1986). For an overview of United States 
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sufficient basis to refuse his extradition.414 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals specifically rejected Garcia-Mora's contention that war crimes 
and crimes against humanity were common crimes and that the per-
petrators of such delicts should be extradited. The Court noted that 
various factions had been struggling for power in Croatia and that 
Artukovic's offenses were political. The Appellate Court dismissed the 
United Nations' resolutions of 1946 and 1947 as lacking "sufficient 
force of law" to require Artukovic's extradition.415 
The District Court reiterated its previous ruling in a 1956 hearing 
on a writ of habeas corpus filed by Artukovic: "the plain reading of the 
indictment . . . makes it immediately apparent that the offenses for 
which the surrender of the petitioner is sought, were offenses of a 
political character . . . and not extraditable under a treaty in terms 
such as the one before the court. "416 The case later returned to the 
District Court417 who again noted that Artukovic's acts had been com-
mitted in the context of political competition between the Croatian 
Government and the Chetniks and other partisan groups.418 
The Ninth Circuit, in Quinn v. Robinson, conceded that the analy-
sis in Artukovic was in error.419 The Tribunal observed that: 
[w] e erroneously assumed that "crimes against humanity" was 
synomymous with ''war crimes," and then concluded ... that 
not all war crimes ... fall outside the ... political offense ex-
ception .... The offenses with which Artukovic was charged 
were crimes against humanity; it matters not whether or not 
they were also war crimes; either way crimes of that magni-
tude are not protected by the exception.420 
Crimes against humanity, such as genocide, according to the Court, 
"violate international law and constitute an 'abuse of sovereignty' 
immigration law pertaining to the deportation of Nazi war criminals, See Matthew Lippman, The 
Denaturalization Of Nazi War Criminals In The United States: Is Justice Being Served, supra note 1 
at 178-89. 
414Artukovic v. Boyle, 107 F. Supp. at 34. 
415 Kardozle v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d at 205. 
416 Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. at 247. 
417 Kardozle v. Artukovic, 355 u.s. at 393. 
418 Kardozle v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. at 392-93. 
419 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court noted that "[it] erred." 
See id. Artukovic is distinguished in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 522 (7th Cir. 1981). 
420 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 799. 'We did not need then, and do not need now, to 
reach a conclusion about whether all war crimes fall outside the bounds of the exception." Id. 
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because ... they are carried out by or with the toleration of authori-
ties of a state. "421 
The Appellate Court went on to observe that the label "crimes 
against humanity" is no mere talisman-"the political offense excep-
tion ... should [not] have been extended to protect those carrying 
out a governmental policy calling for acts of destruction whose 'nature 
and scope ... exceeded human imagination,' ... [t]hese crimes are 
... generally excluded from the protection of many normally applica-
ble rules. "422 
Artukovic was prosecuted and extradited under a new indictment 
filed in 1984. The District Court, in adopting the opinion of the 
Magistrate presiding in the case, affirmed that Artukovic's offenses 
occurred during a political disturbance and uprising. The killings 
ordered by Artukovic, however, could not be considered political of-
fenses since he had failed to demonstrate a "rational nexus between 
the alleged crimes and the prevailing turmoil .... "423 These atrocities 
were committed for "personal gain, racial or religious hatred, and/or 
impermissible vengeance upon disarmed enemy soldiers. Ridding a 
country of ... its population for such reprehensible reasons ... is ... 
not covered by the political offense exception to extradition. "424 
The Ghanan Court of Appeals, in The State v. Schumann, in 1966, 
ordered the extradition of defendant Doctor Horst Schumann to the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Schumann was charged with the murder 
of more than 30,000 mental patients and Auschwitz inmates during the 
course of mass-sterilization experiments. The District Magistrate ruled 
that these were crimes against humanity which did not qualifiy as 
421Id. at 799-800. "While some of the same offenses that violate the laws and customs of war 
are also crimes against humanity, crimes of the latter sort most notably include murder, extermi-
nation, enslavement ... or persecutions on political, racial or religous grounds .... of entire 
racial, ethnic, national or religous groups." Id. at 800. 
The Court noted that the so-called incidence test, under which American courts adjudge 
acts undertaken in furtherance of an uprising or political conflict to be political offenses, should 
not be applied in the case of governmental officials. See id. Government officials who acted to 
suppress an uprising in the past were considered to fall within the ambit of the defense. See id. 
Since the exception is based on a desire to protect those rebelling against autocratic regimes, the 
Court concluded that officials should not benefit from the incidence test. See id. at 800 n.24. 
422Id. at 801 (quoting Excerpts from Speech by German President, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1985, 
at 10). 
423 628 F. Supp. at 1376. 
424 See id. In seaching for a nexus between the alleged crimes and the prevailing turmoil, 
"the focus of inquiry is on the circumstances, and on the status of those harmed, and not on 
whether the acts merely were committed during the disorder." Id. 
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political offenses.425 Chief Judge Akufo-Addo affirmed that these delicts 
did not constitute political offenses: 
It is not the case that the poor helpless lunatics at the Mun-
sungent Asylum or the Jews at Auschwitz had rebelled against 
the Nazi ideology and had thereby created some form of 
disturbance which needed quelling, nor indeed does he claim 
to have committed the offence charged with a view to avoid-
ing political persecution or prosecution.426 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal, in Kroeger, refused to prohibit a de-
fendant's extradition on the grounds that his prosecution for ordering 
the murders of seven thousand Jews, hundreds of communists and the 
inmates of a mental hospital, constituted political offenses. These acts 
were seen as an expression of the defendant's political philosophy. The 
defendant "acted against helpless women, children and sick persons 
who could not possibly have threatened German dominion over the 
occupied territories in Southern Poland and Ukraine. "427 
VI. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN DOMESTIC COURTS 
A. European Domestic Court Decisions 
Several European municipal court decisions interpreted and ap-
plied the concept of crimes against humanity in a manner which was 
consistent with international developments. The Special Court of Cas-
sation of Holland noted that crimes against humanity should be strictly 
construed and limited to acts which: 
[eJither by their magnitude and savagery, or by their large 
number or by the fact that a similar pattern was applied 
at different times and places, endangered the international 
community or shocked the conscience of mankind warranted 
intervention by States other than those on whose territory the 
crimes had been committed or whose subjects had become 
their victims.428 
425 State v. Schumann, 39 I.L.R 433, 444-45 (Accra, Ghana, C.A. 1969) (Crabbe,]., concuring). 
426Id. at 437; see also RV. Wilson ex parte Witness T, 86 I.L.R 169, 172-73 (1994). 
427 Kroeger v. Swiss Federal Prosecutor's Office, 72 I.L.R. 606, 612 (Switzerland, Fed. Trib. 
1966) (1987). 
428 In re Ahlbrecht (No.2), 16 I.L.R 396,398 (1955) (quoting United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (Holland, Special Court of Cassation, 1949». 
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The Dutch Supreme Court later clarified that a crime against 
humanity must "form part of a system based on terror or constitute 
a link in a consciously pursued policy directed against particular 
groups of people. "429 
The Court of Cassation of Holland held that the isolated shooting 
of a prisoner and the mistreatment of several others were not of such 
a character as to constitute crimes against humanity.430 The Court also 
ruled that enticing Dutch youths residing in Germany to join the 
Wehrmacht did not fall within the definition of crimes against human-
ity, particularly given that the young people had voluntarily emigrated 
to Germany. Crimes against humanity were to be strictly interpreted in 
accordance with the Nuremberg Charter and were to be limited to acts 
"committed against the will of the victims and by violence. "431 In addi-
tion, the Special Criminal Chamber of Holland ruled that a German 
doctor's refusal to provide treatment to a German soldier who had 
been shot while attempting to escape did not constitute a crime against 
humanity. The victim did not belong to the civilian population of the 
occupied territory and the acts directed against him were not part of 
a system of persecutions on account of political, racial or religious 
grounds.432 
The Austrian Supreme Court refused to recognize that the killings 
of the inmates in labor camps could be excused on the basis of superior 
orders. An order to execute inmates without trial was clearly recogniz-
able "by anybody" as illegal and would not have excused the defen-
dant's acts.433 The defendant also was not able to point to any facts 
which established that he had acted in response to duress or coer-
cion.434 
The Netherlands, District Court of Roermond, Extradinary Penal 
Chamber, approved the legislature's exclusion of statutory limitations 
on the prosecution of war crimes and crimes againt humanity. The 
Court noted that permitting these offenses to remain unpunished 
429public Prosecutor v. Menten. 75 I.L.R. 331, 362-63 (1987) (The Netherlands, Sup. 
Ct. 1981). 
430 Albrecht, supra note 428, at 398. 
431 In re Quispel, 16 I.L.R. 395, 395-96 (1955) (Holland, Special Court of Cassation, 1950). 
432 In re Pilz, 17 I.L.R. 391, 392 (1957) (Holland, District Ct. of the Hague, Special Criminal 
Chamber, 1949). 
433 Public Prosecutor v. Leopold L., 471.L.R. 464, 465 (1974) (Austria, Supreme Court, 1967). 
A direct order to engage in such conduct had not been directed the accused-the abuse of 
inmates was a general policy. See id. 
434Id. at 466. The duress defense under Austrian law required a proportionality between the 
harm confronting the defendant and the defendant's criminal act. See id. at 471. 
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offended the country's sense of justice and lessened the deterrent 
value of the criminal statutes involved. However, the Court ruled that 
the fact that the trial was taking place thirty-four years following the 
defendant's crime made the imposition of capital punishment un-
justifiable.435 On the other hand, the imposition of life imprisonment 
was justified in the interests of satisfying the victims' desire for psycho-
logical well-being and safety.436 
B. France 
France was unique in limiting the scope of crimes against human-
ity. Klaus Barbie headed the Gestapo in Lyons, France. The French 
were able to secure jurisdiction over Barbie when he was expelled from 
Bolivia in 1982. He was arrested in France and brought to trial for 
crimes against humanity-arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, murder, and 
torture. Barbie was alleged to have murdered 4,342 people and de-
ported 7,591 Jews and 14,311 members of the resistance in Lyons.437 
He was convicted in July 1987 on 340 counts and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.438 Barbie was prosecuted under a French Law enacted 
on December 26, 1964 which, inter alia provided that: 
Crimes against humanity, as defined by the United Nations 
Resolution of13 February 1946, which refers to the definition 
of crimes against humanity contained in the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, are by their 
nature not subject to statutory limitation of prosecution.439 
The Court of Cassation, in its judgment of October 6, 1983, ruled 
that the failure to initiate extradition proceedings prior to Barbie's 
expulsion and arrest in France did not prohibit his prosecution. Crimes 
against humanity under French municipal law were subject to an in-
ternational criminal order "to which the notions of frontiers and ex-
tradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign."44o The Court 
435 Public Prosecutor v. LJ,L., 741.L.R. 704, 707-08 (1987) (The Netherlands,Dist. Ct. Roer-
mond, Extraordinary Penal Chamber). 
436 Kotalla v. State Of The Netherlands, 741.L.R. 708, 712 (1987) (Neth. Ct. 1977). 
437Federation Nationale Des Deportes Et Internes Resistants Et Patriotes And Others v. 
Barbie, 781.L.R. 124 (1988) (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber 1983-85) [hereinafter Barbie 
Judgments]. 
438Id. at 148. 
439Id. at 126. 
440Id. at 128, 130. An arrest warrant was issued for Barbie on November 3, 1982 and was 
executed on February 5, 1983 by the airport police in French Guiana. See id. at 130. 
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noted that the Nuremberg Charter and United Nations Resolution 
3 (I), which are referred to in the Law of December 26, 1964, require 
that States take measures to ensure that the perpetrators of war crimes, 
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity are punished. They 
further require that those suspected of such crimes are returned to the 
country in which they committed their crimes.441 International instru-
ments also recognize the permissibility of the retroactive punishment 
of acts or omissions which, at the time of their commission, were 
"criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations. "442 
The Court of Cassation, in its judgment in the Barbie case of 
January 26, 1984, declared that crimes against humanity, as defined in 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, are not subject to 
statutory limitations on prosecution.443 Both the International Cove-
nant On Civil And Political Rights and the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms permit 
the retroactive punishment of delicts, such as crimes against humanity, 
which at the time of their commission, contravened the principles 
recognized by the community of civilized countries.444 
The Court of Cassation, in its third Barbie judgment of December 
20, 1985, ruled that war crimes, unlike crimes against humanity, are 
subject to statutory limitations. This is based on the desirability of 
abating and ameliorating the accrued animosities of armed conflict. 
On the other hand, crimes against humanity are unrelated to the 
conscientious conduct of war and are not subject to statutory limita-
tion, even in those instances in which they also constitute war crimes.445 
441Id. at 13I. 
442 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(2), G.A. Res. 
2200 (XXI), V.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 52, V.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights]; see also European Convention For The Protection Of 
Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, art. 7(2), Eur.T.S. No.5, 213 V.N.T.S. 
221 (1953) [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention]. 
443 Barbie Judgments, supra note 437, at 132. 
444 See supra text accompanying note 442. Barbie argued that the Nuremberg Tribunal was 
a tribunal of temporary jurisdiction and that there had been no need to provide for statutory 
limits on prosecution. See Barbie Judgments, supra note 437, at 134-35. The Tribunal determined 
that the abrogation of statutory limitations on punishment did not fall within Article 60 of the 
European Convention which provides that "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed 
as ... derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured 
under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a 
Party." See id. at 135 (citing European Human Rights Convention, supra note 442, at art. 60). 
445 Barbie Judgments, supra note 437, at 136--37, 139. Crimes against humanity, according to 
the Court are "inhumane acts and persecution committed in a systematic manner in the name 
1997) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 257 
The lower courts, which adjudicated the Barbie case, ruled that 
crimes against humanity are limited to the persecution of innocent 
Jews based upon racial and religious motives. The prosecution of 
individuals for the unlawful abuse and mistreatment of members of the 
French Resistance, even those who were Jewish, did not constitute 
crimes against humanity and was barred by the statute of limitations. 
These combatants were both motivated and persecuted based upon 
their patriotic challenge to the Germans rather than as a consequence 
of their political ideology or racial identity.446 The Court of Cassation, 
however, ruled that the German occupants severe and systematic abuse 
of members of the Resistance was an expression of National Socialist 
ideology: "Neither the driving force which motivated the victims, nor 
their possible membership of the Resistance, excludes the possibility 
that the accused acted with the element of intent necessary for the 
commission of crimes against humanity. "447 
The definition of crimes against humanity set forth in the Barbie 
Case was subsequently elaborated upon in Touvier. 448 Barbie limited 
crimes against humanity to "inhumane acts and persecution commit-
ted in a systematic manner in the name of a State practising a policy 
of ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of their 
membership of a racial or religious community, but also against the 
opponents of that policy, whatever the form of their opposition."449 The 
Court of Cassation also noted, in a June 1988 judgment affirming 
Barbie's conviction for crimes against humanity, that: 
[t]he fact that the accused ... took part, in perpetrating that 
crime, in the execution of a common plan to bring about the 
of a State practicing a policy of ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of their 
membership of a racial or religious community, but also against the opponents of that policy, 
whatever the form of their opposition." ld. at 137. Acts constituting crimes against humanity 
include the arrest and illegal imprisonment of numerous persons, including the brutal treatment 
and physical torture of detainees. See id. The judgment also listed four actions carried out on the 
instructions of the accused which resulted in the extermination of over 800 Jews and resistance 
members. See id. at 138. 
446 ld. at 139. 
447Id. at 140. The lower court failed to find that the murder of a Jewish member of the 
Resistance was based on his religion. See id. The Court of Cassation ruled that the crimes 
committed "systematically or collectively against persons who were members or could have been 
members of the Resistance were presented by those in whose name they were perpetated, as 
justified politically by the national socialist ideology." ld. 
448Touvier, 100 I.L.R. 341 (1988) (Paris, C.A. First Chamber of Accusation, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter Touvier II); see id. at 358 (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 1992) [hereinafter Tou-
vier III). 
449 Barbie Judgments, supra note 437, at 137. 
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deportation or extermination of the civilian population dur-
ing the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
gounds, constitutes not a separate offence or an aggravag-
ing circumstance but ... an essential element of the crime 
against humanity consisting in the fact that the acts ... were 
performed in a systematic manner in the name of a State 
practising ... a policy of ideological supremacy.450 
Touvier involved the prosecution of Paul Touvier, a high-ranking 
officer in the Militia (Milice) in Vichy France during the wartime 
German occupation. The Court dismissed ten charges due to an in-
sufficiency of evidence and limited its examination to the collective 
execution of seven Jews in Rillieux in June 1944. This was in reprisal 
for the assassination of Secretary of State for Information and Propa-
ganda, Phillipe Henriot.451 
The Court of Appeal of Paris noted that the substantive elements 
of crimes against humanity "are no different to that of crimes under 
the ordinary law, except for the specific circumstances of their com-
mission" as defined in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter.452 The 
required criminal intent, however, differs from ordinary delicts. Arl 
individual "cannot be held to have committed a crime against human-
ity unless it is also established that he had a specific motivation to take 
part in the execution of a common plan by committing in a systematic 
manner inhuman acts or persecutions in the name of a State practising 
a policy of ideological supremacy. "453 
The Court of Appeals determined that Vichy "[a]t no time" sought 
"to establish any kind of domination or to impose a conquering ideol-
ogy."454 The Militia "was merely one of the component forces of that 
State which could not, without falsifying the least contested facts of 
Id. 
450Id. 
451 Touvier II, supra note 448, at 343. 
452Id. at 351. 
453Id. at 352. 
(i) In order to be categorized as crimes against humanity, the alleged acts must 
firstly form part of the execution of a common plan performed in the name of a 
State practicing in a systematic manner a policy of ideological supremacy. 
(ii) Secondly, the alleged acts must have been committed against persons by 
reason of their belonging to a racial or religious group, or against the opponents 
of that policy of ideological supremacy. 
454Id. at 354. 
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history, be categorized as a State practising a policy of ideological 
supremacy .... "455 
The German Reich was the prototype of a State imposing ideo-
logical domination. Touvier and the Militia, however, were not Hitler's 
agents-Touvier had either acted independently or had carried out a 
reprisal on behalf of the Militia in order to discourage a more draco-
nian German response. Touvier, in either case, had not executed a 
decision, or acted on behalf of the Reich and the Rillieux killings. 
Consequently, this did not constitute a crime against humanity and, 
therefore, was outside the statutory limitation of prosecution.456 
The Court of Cassation, in November 1992, reversed and remanded 
the Touvier case to the Court of Appeals.457 The Court of Cassation 
conceded that, under the Nuremberg Charter, individuals were re-
quired to have acted in the interests of one of the European Axis 
countries. The Court of Cassation independently evaluated the evi-
dence and ruled that the Court of Appeal "could not ... declare that 
the murders ... did not constitute crimes against humanity while at 
the same time concluding that they had been perpetrated at the insti-
gation of an officer of the Gestapo . . . . "458 
The Barbie and Touvier judgments affirmed that crimes against 
humanity, even those constituting war crimes, were not subject to 
statutory limitation on prosecution.459 The decisions also suggested that 
continental courts would not question the process through which 
individuals charged with atrocities were brought within their jurisdic-
tion.460 The political persecution component of crimes against human-
ity was broadly interpreted to encompass persecution against members 
455Id. at 355. 
456Id. at 356. The killings were "not . . . part of a systematic plan of extermination coldly 
executed but rather was essentially a 'heated' criminal reaction, spectacular, ferocious and rela-
tively improvised." Id. 
457Touvier III, supra note 448, at 363-64. 
458Id. at 363. The Court of Cassation noted that the Court of Appeal had concluded that 
the Regional Head of the Militia in Lyons had conferred with the head of the local Gestapo and 
had negotiated a reduction in the number of victims. See id. The Court of Appeals also argued 
that the execution was "a heated reaction" which was "relatively improvised" and was a reaction 
to the death of Philippe Henriot. See id. The Court of Appeals concluded that Touvier was 
responsible for the execution of the hostages, but was influenced by the German's intent to exact 
retribution. See id. at 363. Touvier was subsequently convicted of one count of having been an 
accomplice in the commission of a crime against humanity. See id. at 364. See supra text accom-
panying notes 437-58. 
459 See supra text accompanying notes 437-58. 
460 See supra text accompanying notes 438-41. 
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of the resistance.461 The Court of Appeal narrowly interpreted crimes 
against humanity, requiring that the acts were undertaken on behalf 
of a State seeking to impose ideological hegemony. The Court of 
Cassation stated that the test was whether the defendant had acted on 
behalf of the European Axis Powers. Barbie thus could be held liable 
for the abuse and execution of partisans which the Court of Cassation 
ruled was an expression of the Reich's desire to eradicate political, 
racial, and religious opponents. French collaborators, on the other 
hand, who were not determined to have committed such acts at the 
behest of the German regime, would be exonerated. The Court of 
Cassation did not propose a legal test for establishing a nexus between 
a defendant and the Nazi regime.462 
The Tel Aviv District Court differed from the French Court of 
Cassation in interpreting the nexus requirement for crimes against 
humanity. The Israeli Tribunal ruled that crimes against humanity 
encompasses the persecution of individuals on racial, religious, and 
political grounds as well as other inhumane acts. The latter are re-
quired to be of a "serious character and likely to embitter the life of a 
human being, to degrade him and cause him great physical or moral 
pain and suffering. "463 Such acts must be '''performed against a civilian 
population on a broad scale and systematically, as distinct from isolated 
acts so that it arouses the conscience of mankind against it.' "464 The 
Distrtict Court also ruled that a prisoner in a camp may be liable for 
a crime against humanity towards a fellow inmate. In contrast to a war 
criminal, '''the perpetrator of a crime against humanity does not have 
to be a man who identified himself with the persecuting regime or its 
evil intention. "'465 
VII. THE DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND THE 
SECURITY OF MANKIND REVISITED 
Crimes against humanity have taken on increased contemporary 
relevance and have been invoked to condemn disappearances466 and 
461 See supra text accompanying note 447. 
462 See supra text accompanying notes 453-56. 
463 Attorney-General v. Enigster, 18 I.L.R. 540, 541 (Isr., TAD.C. 1952). 
464 Id. 
465Id. at 542. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals. held that 
an individual who harms another may be liable for a crime against humanity if the perpetrator 
possessed the intent to harm a group and his or her act was in furtherance of this intent. See Pal 
v. Attorney-General. 18 I.L.R. 542 (Isr., Ct. Crim. App. 1952). 
466 See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disap-
pearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994). 
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the utilization of nuclear weapons.467 There is strong support for the 
view that crimes against humanity are no longer required to be con-
nected to armed conflict. Mr. Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur on 
the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
in 1989, observed that the concept of crimes against humanity now is 
"separate from ... war crimes .... [N] ot only the 1954 draft code but 
even conventions which have entered into force (on genocide and 
apartheid:) no longer link that concept to a state of war. "468 The Spe-
cial Rapporteur accordingly noted that crimes against humanity "have 
their own specific characteristics which differentiate them from war 
crimes."469 Theodore Meron notes that "[t]he tangled meshing of crimes 
against humanity and human rights militates against requiring a link 
with war for the former. The better opinion today ... is that crimes 
against humanity exist independently of war. "470 This view is not uni-
versally endorsed. Diane Orerentlicher concludes that post-Nurem-
berg developments have failed to clarify crimes against humanity and 
to resolve whether a nexus is required between crimes against human-
ity and other international crimes.471 
The Special Rapporteur on the Draft Code of Offences Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind, in his fourth report in 1986, 
clarifies that crimes against humanity are intended to safeguard human 
dignity, existence, and culture. The Special Rapporteur notes that the 
content of crimes against humanity remains uncertain. Acts constitut-
ing crimes against humanity are variously characterized as barbarous, 
brutal, degrading, and humiliating. Others stress the infringement of 
fundamental rights or of the rights to life, health, and physical well-be-
467 See Resolution on Non-use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of Nuclear War, G.A. Res. 
33/71B (XXXIII), U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess. Supp. No. 45, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978). The 
resolution declares that the use of nuclear weapons "will be a violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations and a crime against humanity." Id. See generally Matthew Lippman, Nuclear 
Weapons and International Law: Towards A Declaration on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Nuclear Humancide, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 183 (1986); Matthew Lippman, First 
Strike Nuclear Weapons and the Justifiability of Civil Resistance Under International Law, 2 TEMP. 
INT'L & COMPo LJ. 155 (1988). 
468 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind Seventh Report, Mr. Doudou 
Thiam, Special Rapporteur, [1989] II YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 81, 86, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/419/ Add.l 
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Seventh Report]. 
469Id. at 87. The two concepts may overlap, but crimes against humanity is more expansive 
than war crimes. See id. War crimes only can be committed in time of war while crimes against 
humanity can be be committed in times of war or peace. See id. War crimes can be committed 
only between belligerents, but crimes against humanity may be commmitted between nationals 
or belligerents. See id. 
470 Theodore Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Develpoment of International Law, 88 
AM.]. INT'L L. 78, 85 (1994). 
471 Id. at 85-93. 
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ing. Some emphasize the mass nature of such delicts. While others 
argue that a single atrocity could constitute a crime against humanity. 
There also is disagreement over whether crimes against humanity are 
limited to State-sponsored acts.472 Motive, according to the Special 
Rapporteur, is the only element which is generally accepted-"the 
intention to harm a person or group of persons because of their race, 
nationality, religion or political opinions. "473 
The Special Rapporteur argued in 1989 that crimes against hu-
manity "has its own content and specific characteristics" which include 
a specific provision on crimes against humanity in the Draft Code of 
Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind.474 He reiterated that 
these delicts are distinguished by motive; they are prompted by "ideo-
logical, political, racial, religious or cultural intolerance and strike at 
a person's innermost being, i.e. his convictions, beliefs or dignity."475 A 
crime against humanity, according to the Special Rapporteur, requires 
either an act directed against the mass of people or an inhuman act 
directed against a single person which is part of a plan or system of 
persecution.476 
The Special Rapporteur's proposed draft on crimes against hu-
manity includes prohibitions on genocide and apartheid. The text also 
prohibits murder, deportation, extermination, persecution and the 
mass destruction of property and other inhumane acts carried out on 
social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds. The inclusion of 
the destruction of property is an amendment to the 1954 text. The 
Special Rapporteur also incorporates separate clauses sanctioning slav-
ery, the expulsion or forcible transfer of populations and the settle-
ment of peoples in territory, and serious and intentional harm to vital 
human assets, such as the human environment.477 He explains that acts 
472 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Fourth Report, Mr. Doudou 
Thiam, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 (1986) reprinted in II YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 
53,57-60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/398 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Fourth Reportl. Despite the fact 
that genocide and apartheid overlap with crimes against humanity, both are accorded recognition 
in separate articles. See id. at 58-61. 
473 [d. at 58. 
474 Special Rapporteur Seventh Report, supra note 468, at 87. 
475 [d. The Special Rapporteur argued that a crime against humanity may involve physical 
atrocities as well as the "infliction of flagrant public humiliations or forcing individuals to act 
against their conscience and ... ridiculing them or forcing them to perform degrading acts .... " 
See id. at 87. 
476 [d. at 88-89. "[Wlhere the mass element is absent, an individual act should constitute a 
link in a chain and be part of a system or plan. The notion of system, plan and repetitiveness is 
necessary in order to categorize an act committed against an individual victim as a crime against 
humanity." [d. at 89. 
477 [d. art. 14(1 )-(6), at 85-86. 
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against property may constitute crimes against humanity when part of 
a large-scale depredation or confiscation and are motivated by politi-
cal, racial or religious animus. He also includes cultural property and 
other vital human assets, such as the environment, within crimes against 
humanity.47H 
The International Law Commission only partially ratified the Spe-
cial Rapporteur's proposal. The Commission abandoned the designa-
tion Crimes against humanity and retitled the article "Systematic or 
mass violations of human rights."479 This emphasizes the common factor 
underlying the crimes contained in this article; the involvement of 
serious violations of fundamental human rights. Crimes against hu-
manity thus are substantively and symbolically severed from armed 
conflict and are conceptualized as a safeguard for fundamental human 
rights.480 
The text sanctions systematic or mass violations of human rights. 
The systematic element requires a recurrent practice or plan while the 
mass-scale component is directed at the number affected. Isolated 
acts-no matter how atrocious-are not encompassed within the text. 
The International Law Commission expanded the Special Rapporteur's 
draft by including torture. The Commission reasoned that a more 
expansive enumeration safeguarded against claims of retrocative pun-
ishment.481 Murder, torture, slavery and deportations are not required 
to be motivated by animus-a separate clause sanctions "persecution 
Id. 
478Id. at 86. 
479 [1991] II YB. Int'l L. Comm'n 103 [hereinafter 1991 Int'l L. Comm'n]. 
Article 21. Systematic or mass violations of human rights. 
An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following 
violations of human rights: 
murder 
torture 
establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced 
labour 
persecution on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds in a systematic 
manner or on a mass scale; or 
deportation or forcible transfer of population shall, on conviction thereof, be 
sentenced [to .... ] 
480 See Convention on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 442. 
481 See 1991 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 479, at 103. Extermination was viewed as encom-
passed within murder and was not included in the text. See id. Murder was covered by all domestic 
criminal codes. See id. The Commission believed that the odious and widespread character of 
torture merited its inclusion in the draft code. See id. "It was pointed out in the Commission that 
a practice of systematic disappearances of persons was also a phenomenon that deserved to be 
specifically mentioned in the draft Code." Id. at 104. 
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on social, political, racial, religious or cultural grounds. "482 "Persecu-
tion" encompasses acts committed on a systematic or mass scale and is 
intended to include acts such as prohibitions on religious worship or 
language, prolonged and systematic detention, and the destruction of 
monuments or buildings.483 There is no general prohibition on inhu-
man acts. Genocide and apartheid are included in separate articles of 
the text.484 
The draft text encompasses public officials as well as private indi-
viduals. The Commission did not "rule out the possibility that private 
individuals with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or 
groups might also commit the kind of systematic or mass violations of 
human rights covered by the article .... "485 
The historical development of the concept of crimes against hu-
manity culminated in a reformulated Draft Code of Offenses. The 
article sanctioning systematic and mass violations of human rights 
negates the nexus between crimes against humanity and armed combat 
and conceptualizes crimes against humanity as a safeguard for funda-
mental human dignity and rights. The text encompasses atrocious acts 
as well as conduct which is motivated by racial, religious social, cultural 
or ideological animus. Both are required to be part of a plan or 
pattern. Liability is extended to individuals with de facto public power 
as well as to organized private groups and public officials.486 The Spe-
cial Rapporteur observed that despite the contemporary and compre-
hensive nature of the draft, the text inevitably would be amended: "The 
nature of crimes against humanity changes with technological progress 
.... Because of that evolving nature, any attempt to list all the crimes 
against humanity would narrow the scope of the subject and ... allow 
offences which are sometimes difficlt to imagine before they are com-
mitted to go unpunished."487 
The Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal also affirmed that crimes 
against humanity are not required to be connected with crimes against 
humanity. 
482Id. at 103. 
483Id. at 104. Some argued that this provision was overly broad. See id. 
484 Id. arts. 19-20, at 101-02. "Apartheid,like genocide, has a certain degree of autonomy in 
the code, even though both are inhuman acts." Special Rapporteur Fourth Report, supra note 
472, at 61. The inclusion of environmental damage was based on the importance of the environ-
ment in preserving human existence. See id. 
485 1991 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 479, at 103-04. 
486 See supra text accompanying notes 466--85. 
487 Special Rapporteur Fourth Report, supra note 472, at 61. 
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VIII. THE YUGOSLAVIAN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL 
The United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 808, estab-
lished an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons respon-
sible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Yugo-
slavia. The Secretary-General was requested to submit a draft statute 
for the Tribuna1.488 His report was approved by the Security Council 
on May 2, 1993.489 
Article One empowers the proposed International Tribunal to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.490 
This includes crimes against humanity, which the Secretary-General's 
commentary notes were initially recognized in the Charter and Judg-
ment of the Nueremberg Tribunal and in Control Council Law No. 
10. He notes that crimes against humanity are directed against a civil-
ian population and "are prohibited regardless of whether they are 
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in charac-
ter. "491 The Secretary-General records that a number of such inhumane 
acts were committed in Yugoslavia, including "'ethnic cleansing'" and 
widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual ass sault. 492 
Article Five authorizes the Tribunal to prosecute those responsible 
for crimes against humanity "when committed in armed conflict, whether 
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population. "493 The enumeration of these crimes generally follows Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 and includes murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, torture and rape. Persecutions on 
political, racial and religious grounds and other inhumane acts are also 
punished. The latter anticipates that acts of similar gravity to those 
enumerated, such as prostitution and sexual assault, might fall within 
488 Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704/ Add. I reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
1159, 1164-66 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General Resolution 808 Report]. The legislative 
history is outlined in United Nations Secretary-General, Annexed Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2. See id. 
489 Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704/ Add. I reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 
1159, 1203 (1993). 
490 Secretary-General Resolution 808 Report, supra note 488, at art. I, 1170. 
491Id. para. 47, at 1173. 
492Id. para. 48, at 1173. "Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious 
nature, such as ... killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds." [d. 
493Id. art. 5, at 1173-74. 
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the statutory standard.494 Separate articles sanction war crimes and 
genocide.495 
Commentator James C. O'Brien observes that this language means 
that acts undertaken "during" armed conflict fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the International Tribunal, "regardless of their connection to 
the armed conflict. "496 This is an advance over the Nuremberg Charter 
in that crimes against humanity under the Yugoslav statute are not 
required to be in execution of, or connected to, a crime within the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. The result is that crimes against humanity are 
accorded an autonomous penal statuS.497 
There is no explicit requirement of State sponsorship of crimes 
against humanity. This extends crimes against humanity to the inde-
pendent militia which operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The stipula-
tion that crimes against humanity are to be directed against "any 
civilian population" presumably requires that acts constituting crimes 
against humanity are part of a systematic and widespread attack.498 The 
use of the terminology, "any" arguably extends crimes against humanity 
to atrocities committed by a State or armed band against its own 
nationals.499 Crimes against humanity may, but are not required to be 
motivated by political, racial or religious animus. The text significantly 
494Id. art. 5(a)-5(i). The Tribunal possesses concurrent jurisdiction with domestic courts. See 
id. art. 8, at 11 76. 
495Id. art. 3-4, 1172-73. A crime against humanity presumably must contravene international 
law. See id. The deportation or imprisonment of a person pursuant to a valid judicial or admin-
istrative decree following a full and fair hearing would not constitute a crime against humanity. 
See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 79 (1995) [hereinafter AN INSIDER'S GUIDEJ. 
496 James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM.]. INT'L L. 639, 650 (1993). 
497Id. Legislation in most Member States did not require a connection between crimes againt 
humanity and another crime or an armed conflict. See id. at 649-50, 650 n.45. In addition, 
O'Brien's suggested interpretation is consistent with the Secretary-General's commentary to the 
provision on crimes against humanity. See supra text accompanying note 491. O'Brien also urged 
the Tribunal to expand its jurisdiction to encompass acts which occurred prior to 1991. See id. 
The limitation of the Court's jurisdiction to acts committed in armed conflict seems to reflect 
the fact that the Tribunal was established to adjudicate crimes committed during the fugoslav 
conflict. See id. The latter, according to O'Brien, thus appears to be a jurisdictional rather than 
substantive limitation on crimes against humanity. See O'Brien, supra note 496, at 650. 
498 See supra text accompanying notes 493-94. O'Brien suggested that the Tribunal "should 
note that persons of political or military authority are responsible for repressing and punishing 
crimes; their failure to do so could be regarded as evidence of governmental approval or 
instigation ... it could regard as governmental acts those acts of persons charged with, or 
asserting, executive or occupation authority in a region." O'Brien, supra note 496, at 649. 
499 O'Brien, supra note 496, at 649. 
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follows Control Council Law No. 10 in including rape as a CrIme 
against humanity.50o 
The indictment issued by the International Criminal Tribunal on 
November 7, 1994 charged Dragan Nikolic with the commission of 
various crimes against humanity in the Susidca internment camp dur-
ing a period of armed conflict and as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population. These acts include mur-
der, serious assault, and torture. Nikolic was charged with participating 
in the persecution on account of political, racial and/or religious 
grounds of more than five hundred civilians.50! 
The February 19,1995 indictments charged various Serbs with the 
collection, confinement, murder, sexual assault, starvation and torture 
of Croats and Muslims in the Omarska mining complex. The 3,000 
internees had been forced to flee their homes as a result of intense 
shelling by the Serbian forces. 502 The defendants were charged with 
genocide,503 as well as beatings with "metal batons and cables, a knife 
... fists and kick[ing] the victims with ... military-style boots. "504 Oth-
ers forced prisoners to "drink water like animals from puddles on the 
ground, jumped on their backs, and beat them until they were unable 
to move. As the victims were removed in a wheelbarrow, one of the 
Serbs discharged the contents of a fire extinguisher into the mouth of 
one of the victims. "505 Inmates, in some instances, were subjected to 
sexual perversion and mutilation and then murdered.506 
In October 1995, the Apellate Chamber of the Yugoslavian War 
Crimes Tribunal rejected a motion by defendant Dus'ko Tadic' which, 
in part, challenged the Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction. The 
Tribunal noted that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
approved and cooperated with the International Tribunal's jurisdic-
tion and, at any rate, Tadic lacked standing to challenge this assertion 
of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.507 
500 See supra notes 493-96. Various proposals for crimes against humanity are noted in AN 
INSIDER'S GUIDE, supra note 495, at 77-78, 78 n.77 (1995). 
501 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Indictment Against Nikolic, (Nov. 7, 
1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 996, 998-1010 (1995). 
502International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Indictments Against Meakic 
& Others And Tadic & Other (Feb. 1995) reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 1011, 1014-15 (1995). 
503Id. at 1017. 
504 Id. at 1022. 
505 Id. at 1027. 
506 Id. at 1030-31. 
507International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dus'ko Tadic (Oct. 2, 
1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32,50-51 (1996). 
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The Tribunal also was fully justified in asserting jurisdiction since 
the defendants' offenses "shock the conscience of mankind. "508 Inter-
national tribunals must be recognized as possessing jurisdiction over 
such offenses. Otherwise, State sovereignty and national borders would 
frustrate the protection of human rights and the rule of law and 
"protect those who trample underfoot the most elementary rights of 
humanity. "509 
Are crimes against humanity limited to international conflicts? 
According to the Court, the nexus between crimes against humanity 
and either crimes against peace or war crimes was "peculiar to the 
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal ... there is no logical or legal 
basis for this requirement and it has been abandoned in subsequent 
State practice with respect to crimes against humanity. "510 The obsoles-
cence of the nexus requirement, which was abandoned in Control 
Council Law No. 10, is evidenced by the Genocide and Apartheid 
Conventions which prohibit "particular types of crimes against human-
ity regardless of any connection to armed conflict. "511 
The Tribunal concluded that it is now a "settled rule of customary 
international law" that crimes against humanity are not required to be 
connected, or even related, to an international armed conflict.512 The 
Security Council's requirement that crimes against humanity may be 
committed "in either internal or international armed conflict may have 
defined the crime in Article five more narrowly than necessary under 
customary international law. "513 The Tribunal thus adopted the "wider 
definition in the commentary, which effectively discards any nexus with 
war; this tempering may have important consequences on the future 
development of customary international law in this field. "514 
The Security Council adopted a different formula in vesting the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda with jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity. The Tribunal was authorized to prosecute "persons respon-
sible for ... crimes when committed as part of a widespread or system-
5081d. at 51. 
509 ld. at 52. 
510 ld. at 72. The Appellate Chamber ruled that the conflict in YUgoslavia possessed both 
internal and international aspects and that the Security Council had empowered the Interna-
tional Tribunal to adjudicate violations of humanitarian law in either context. See id. at 57. 
511 ld. at 72. 
5121d. 
5131d. ''There is no question, however, that the definition of crimes against humanity adopted 
by the Security Council in Article 5 comports with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege." ld. 
514Theodore Meron, Preparing to Wage Peace: Toward the Creation of an International Peace-
making Command and Staff College, 88 AM.]. INT'L L. 76,87 (1994). 
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atic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, 
racial or religious grounds. "515 The acts constituting crimes against 
humanity mirrored those set forth in the Yugoslavian statute.516 
Professor Theodore Meron notes that the Rwanda Statute "makes 
no allusion to armed conflicts, supporting the view that crimes against 
humanity (like genocide) can be committed in peacetime."517 He ar-
gues that this language, together with the Secretary-General's com-
mentary and the Yugoslavian Tribunal's ruling, all combine to establish 
that crimes against humanity may be committed in peacetime.sls 
Meron observes that the scope of the Rwandan statute is clouded 
by the requirement that crimes against humanity are required to be 
committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack ... on na-
tional, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. "519 In contrast, the 
Yugoslavia Statute only requires that crimes against humanity are "'di-
rected'" against "any civilian population. "520 Meron notes that although 
the "large-scale, systematic nature of attacks against a civilian popula-
tion appears in the jurisprudence of Nuremberg, there was no need 
to include it in the statutory definition .... One may ask whether ... 
the Security Council has not inadvertently made the burden of proving 
crimes against humanity more difficult to meet."521 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Martens Clause introduced the notion of laws of humanity 
which supplemented the conventional and customary code of war.522 
515S.C. Res. 955, art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994) reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994). The Tribunal was 
charged with the prosecution of those responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and of Rwandan citizens responsible for such 
violations committed in the territory of neighboring States. Id. art. 1. Article two punishes 
genocide. Id. art. 2. 
516Id. 
517Theodore Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Hu-
manitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 242 (1996). 
518Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 
554, 557 (1995). The Rwandan statute strengthens the precedent established by the Secretary-
General and the Tribunal's opinion and "enhances the possibility of arguing in the future that 
crimes against humanity (in addition to genocide) can be committed even in peacetime." See id. 
519Id. See supra text accompanying note 515. 
520 See supra text accompanying notes 493-94. 
521 Meron, supra note 518, at 557. Meron observes that genocide is a "species and particular 
progeny of the broader genus of crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes 
under customary law. Genocide is a crime under both customary law and a treaty. The core 
prohibitions of crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide constitute jus cogens norms." 
Id. at 558. 
522 See supra text accompanying notes 2-6. 
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The Committee charged with investigating the causes and consequences 
of World War I relied on this concept in recommending that the Axis 
military men and leaders be held responsible for atrocities and bar-
barities brought to the bar of justice. The American representatives 
dissented, objecting to the prosecution of government officials on such 
an ambiguous and novel charge. The Treaty of Versailles provided for 
war crimes prosecutions, but the Allies failed to convene an interna-
tional tribunaP23 
Crimes against humanity were formally recognized in the Nurem-
berg Charter. The International Military Tribunal did little to contrib-
ute to the doctrine's development, generally interpreting crimes against 
humanity as co-extensive with war crimes. The Tribunal did convict 
defendants of acts undertaken prior to 1939 which were connected to 
the waging of aggressive war. This indicated that international law 
would extend crimes against humanity to take cognizance of a State's 
conduct towards its own citizens.524 
Control Council Law No. 10 severed the connection between 
crimes against humanity and armed conflict, providing that such crimes 
could be committed in periods of peace as well as war. American 
occupation courts diverged in their interpretation. However, a sig-
nificant number of judges determined that the nexus requirement was 
a jurisdictional rather than a substantive limitation.525 
The trend towards severing the connection beween crimes against 
humanity and armed conflict was accelerated by the Genocide Con-
vention's specification that genocide could be committed in time of 
peace as well as war.526 This standard was extended to other acts an-
nointed as crimes against humanity in the Draft Code of Offenses 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind as well to Apartheid, which 
also was recognized as a crime against humanity in the Apartheid 
Convention.527 The United Nations accorded formal recognition to 
crimes against humanity, as defined in the Nuremberg Charter, and 
highlighted the importance of punishing these delicts when it prohib-
ited the imposition of a statute of limitations on prosections.528 
Various domestic tribunals recognized universal jurisdiction over 
crimes against humanity. The intellectual rationale for such jurisdic-
523 See supra text acompanying notes 7-2l. 
524 See supra text accompanying notes 88-15l. 
525 See supra text accompanying notes 164-245. 
526 See supra text accompanying notes 255-85. 
527 See supra text accompanying notes 286-31l. 
528 See supra text accompanying notes 312-37. 
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tion was articulated by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Eichmann 
case.529 Commentators and Municipal courts also established that crimes 
against humanity did not constitute political offenses and that offend-
ers should either be prosecuted or extradited to the requesting State.530 
The exercise of universal jurisdiction and the obligation to detect, 
detain, and extradite those responsible for such offenses was recog-
nized in a series of United Nations resolutions. 53! 
International tribunals concurred that crimes against humanity 
were limited to serious, severe, sustained, and systematic offenses against 
a civilian population. These general principles were affirmed in the 
judgments of European domestic courtS.532 The French Court of Cas-
sation ruled that crimes against humanity encompassed acts against 
partisans. The French courts, however, retreated from the expansion 
of crimes against humanity-holding that only those affiliated with, 
subordinated to, or acting on behalf of the Axis Powers could be 
prosecuted for crimes against humanity.533 
The contemporary perameters of crimes against humanity was 
sketched in the most recent text of the Draft Code of Offenses Against 
the Peace and Security of Mankind and in the statutes and commen-
taries of the Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes tribunals. These texts 
concur that crimes against humanity are independent of crimes against 
peace and war crimes.534 
Yet, crimes against humanity remains a matter of customary rather 
then conventional law. This, as illustrated by the formulas adopted in 
the Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes statutes, has resulted in a sig-
nificant degree of uncertainty. What is the content of crimes against 
humanity? Do crimes against humanity encompass inhumane acts as 
well as acts animated by racial, religious, political, social and cultural 
animus? Maya single manifestation of abuse constitute a crime against 
humanity? Are acts directed against property, cultural objects, and the 
environment encompassed within crimes against humanity? Does State 
sponsorship remain an element of the offense? May private individuals 
as well as public officials be prosecuted? Is there a nexus requirement 
between crimes against humanity and armed conflict? May such of-
fenses be committed against a domestic population? Did crimes against 
529 See supra text accompanying notes 348-405. 
530 See supra text accompanying notes 406--27. 
531 See supra text accompanying notes 379-85. 
532 See supra text accompanying notes 428-65. 
533 See supra text accompanying notes 437-65. 
534 See supra text accompanying notes 466--521. 
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humanity pre-date the Nuremberg Charter? Is there universal jurisdic-
tion over all crimes against humanity? Under what conditions may the 
superior orders and necessity defense be recognized? What is the scope 
of permissible punishment?535 
Professor Cherif Bassiouni has persuasively proposed that crimes 
against humanity should be incorporated into an international con-
vention.536 This would provide the same formal prohibition against 
crimes against humanity as has been extended to war crimes. The 
existing protections for fundamental human rights are based upon a 
flawed, if not futile, set of State-based international procedures.537 The 
incremental codification of individual crimes against humanity also has 
resulted in a caesura in coverage. Genocide is prohibited, but there is 
no criminal convention which condemns extrajudicial executions.538 
Existing treaties also are inadequate and inconsistent. The Genocide 
Convention, for instance, which does not protect gender and political 
groups, only sanctions acts undertaken with an intent to eliminate 
designated collectivities, and does not incorporate the customary prose-
cute or extradite provision.539 
The proposed convention should prohibit and punish specified 
inhumane and persistent State-sponsored delicts as well as the perse-
cution of racial, religious, national, cultural, political and gender groups. 
Acts already prohibited under separate instruments may be incorpo-
rated by reference. The convention might provide uniform procedures 
for the punishment of such offenses, including universal as well inter-
national jurisdiction. The statute of limitations on prosecutions and 
the superior orders and Act of State defenses also should be abrogated. 
535 See supra text accompanying notes 7-52l. 
536 See Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity"; The Need for a specialized Convention, 
31 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457 (1994). 
537 See Matthew Lippman, Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights Under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 10 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 450 (1980). 
538 See generally Matthew Lippman, Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 121 
(1988); Matthew Lippman, Government Sponsored Summary and Arbitrary Executions, 4 FLA. J. 
INT'L L. 401 (1989); Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 
B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 275 (1994). 
539 See generally Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo LJ. 1 (1994); Matthew 
Lippman, The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 3 B.D. INT'L LJ. 1 (1985). 
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Liability should be extended to public officials, as well as to civilians 
and to members of organized criminal, militia and terrorist groupS.540 
The global escalation in ethnic, racial, religious, and tribal vio-
lence and animus directly threatens national and global stability. The 
United Nations should take the bold and historic step of adopting a 
Convention Prohibiting Crimes Against Humanity in order to protect 
civilian populations in peril and deter future barbarities.54! 
540 See Bassiouni, supra note 536 at 547. 
541 See Meron, supra note 518 at 557. 

REVISITING A CONFERENCE 
COMMEMORATING THE NUREMBERG 
TRIALS: A COMMENTARY FROM A 
NUREMBERG PROSECUTOR 
AN INTRODUCTION BY ARTHUR L. BERNEY* 
Except for students of history, most individuals do not devote 
much time to studying events which transpired prior to their birth. 
Students of law may share an expanded vision of time, since so much 
of importance in law traces itself to the distant past. Students of Inter-
national Law must have a particularly long range vision because ordi-
narily that body of law changes in a glacial fashion-slowly and pon-
derously. However, there are special moments in history when even 
international law leaps forward. 
One such leap occurred at the end of World War II, when surviv-
ing leaders of Nazi Germany (and later Japan) were tried by tribunals 
that constituted themselves as international criminal courts. The Euro-
pean trials were initiated at Nuremberg, Germany and produced what 
are now known as the Nuremberg Principles. Before Nuremberg, there 
had never been an international trial criminally charging military, 
political and financial leaders of a country with violations of interna-
tional law.! 
In retrospect, it is not a great surprise that this break with tradition 
involved members of the Nazi regime. The Nazis committed such 
atrocities and despicable acts that the conscience of the world was 
shocked and outraged. Six million EuropeanJews were brutally slaugh-
tered by the Nazis. Other minorities, including "Gypsies," homosexuals 
and mentally ill persons were also systematically persecuted and killed.2 
Millions of non-combatant Russians and Slavs were killed. Human 
brutality accounted for some of this but the driving force behind this 
massive genocidal campaign was a theory of racial superiority. The 
* Professor Arthur L. Berney has been a faculty advisor and friend to both the Boston College 
Third World Law Jmtrnal and the Owen M. Kuperferschmid Holocaust/Human Rights Project 
since their inceptions. 
1 See Treaty of Peace With Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 227, 2 Bevans 
43,136-37. 
2 SeeD.H. Goldhagen, There is No Hierarchy Among Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 21. 
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chief prosecutor for the French at Nuremberg defined the Nazi evil in 
the following fashion: 
This monstrous doctrine is that of racialism: The German 
race, composed in theory of Aryans, would be a fundamental 
and natural concept. Germans as individuals do not exist and 
cannot justifY their existence, except insofar as they belong 
to the race or Volkstum, to the popular mass which represents 
and amalgamates all Germans. Race is the matrix of the 
German people; proceeding therefrom this people lives and 
develops as an organism. The German body, fulfilling within 
the collectivity a definite technical function; his activity and 
his usefulness are the exact gauge and justification of his 
liberty. This national body must be "moulded" to prepare it 
for a permanent struggle."3 
The urge for vengeance was strong and there were calls for imme-
diate political retribution.4 Instead, the major allied powers, the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, entered an international agreement for 
the prosecution and punishment of the "major war criminals" of 
the Axis powers.5 As a result of this agreement, ultimately agreed 
upon by nineteen other nation states, the International Military 
Tribunal was created. Not only was the establishment of such an 
institution a unique historical event, but the charter it adopted 
established novel and important principles of law. Both the estab-
lishment of the tribunal and the nature of the crimes charged6 were 
3TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
NUREMBERG 14 Nov. 1945-1 Oct. 1946 (Nuremberg, 1947), Vol. 5. at 373. 
4 SeeThLFoRD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, 21-22 (1992). Supposedly, 
Prime Minister Churchill of England initially had proposed that the leaders of Nazi Germany be 
executed, as a matter of political decision. See id. at 29-31. 
5 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, 
82 V.N.T.S. 279, 284. 
6 See TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 4-5. The most commonly heard criticism was that the tribunal 
created by victorious powers to try the vanquished, was a retroactive form of victors justice. The 
crimes listed in Article 6 of the Charter were Crimes Against the Peace, War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity. This is not the place to rehearse the arguments about the legitimacy of the 
tribunal, but suffice it to say that the criticism that still holds the most sting is that war as an 
instrument of national policy (crimes against the peace) has not been renounced, and thus victors 
in war need not be concerned with the application of the Nuremberg principles. This charge can 
only be put to rest through application of the principles to members of the victorious forces, and 
finally by establishing international tribunals capable of imposing meaningful sanctions against 
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controversial. There were certainly some acts of vengeance against 
the Germans after the war, but in general, responsibility and pun-
ishment were meted out in accordance with law and fair trials based 
upon evidence. That was the impetus, the meaning and the most 
enduring legacy of the Nuremberg trials. Justice Jackson expressed 
this idea in his eloquent opening statement: 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been 
so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that civiliza-
tion cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot 
survive their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed 
with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance 
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment 
of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power 
has ever paid to Reason.7 
In April of 1995, almost half a century to the date after those words 
were uttered, a conference was held at Boston College Law School 
commemorating the Nuremberg Trials. In a minor way the conference 
was a historic event in its own right in that like no other meeting on 
the subject, it brought together almost all the surviving members of 
the American prosecuting teams. The honoree at the conference was 
General Telford Taylor, who succeeded Justice Jackson as Chief Prose-
cutor for the United States after the first round of trials were com-
pleted.8 The "prosecutors' panel" consisted of six men: Benjamin Kaplan, 
Henry J. King, Jr., Thomas Lambert, Jr., Walter Rockler, Drexel Spre-
cher and Whitney Robson Harris. All had gone on to illustrious careers 
in the legal profession as attorneys, writers, professors of law, and 
judges. But in different ways, all counted their involvement in the Trials 
as a defining period of their lives.9 
The Nuremberg Conference was the seventh international confer-
ence sponsored by the Owen M. Kupferschmid Holocaust/Human 
any state that resorts to war and violence in pursuit of any goal other than defending against an 
armed attack. 
7Id. at 167. 
8 The first chief prosecutor, and in some respects the driving force behind the Nuremberg 
trials, was Justice RobertJackson of the United States Supreme Court. For a more comprehensive 
account of the trials see TAYLOR, supra note 4. 
9 For a more in-depth presentation of the prosecutors' experiences at Nuremberg, see Allan 
Ryan,judgments on Nuremberg: The Past Half Century and Beyond-A Panel Discussion of Nurem-
berg Prosecutors, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 193 (1996). A high quality video tape was made 
of this panel and copies may be ordered by writing the Holocaust and Human Rights Project, 
Boston College Law School, 885 Centre Street, Newton, MA 02159. 
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Rights Project (HHRP) of Boston College Law School, a remarkably 
innovative, student-initiated enterprise begun in 1984.10 Past confer-
ences had attracted scholars and practitioners from around the world 
to compare national practices and jurisprudential approaches to prose-
cuting international human rights violations. Research by HHRP stu-
dents-in support of deportation and prosecution of Nazi war crimi-
nals, in analyzing liability for genocidal policies, and most recently in 
aiding the definition of war crimes for ongoing prosecutory efforts 
arising from events in the former Yugoslavia-has provided a unique 
service to national and international human rights agencies. 
With its shared concern for human rights, the Third World Law 
Journal has published portions of the HHRP conferences and related 
research. By re-submitting papers from the Nuremberg 50th Anniver-
sary Conference, HHRP and the Boston College Third World Law Journal 
hope to present, through a series of occasional papers, as much of the 
conference as possible. The following commentary, written by one of 
the Nuremberg prosecutors, Professor Henry J. King, Jr., is meant to 
reinstate and revive this process. Coming as it does at a time when the 
first serious effort in fifty years to mount "Nuremberg" trials (concern-
ing violation committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda) IS 
being made, we can do no less. 
IOHHRP was established by Owen M. Kuperferschmid and fellow students of the class of 
1986. The organization's purpose is to study the lessons of the Holocaust experience, the 
Nuremberg precedents, and state sponsored crimes against humanity in general. The purpose of 
the study is to apply these historic lessons to contemporary violations of a like nature, in order 
to advance the causes of humanity and justice. The project was renamed in Owen Kuper-
ferschmid's honor following his untimely death in 1991 at age 33. The Boston College Third World 
Law Journal dedicated its Spring 1996 issue to the memory of this extraordinary man. See Ryan, 
supra note 10, at 193. 
